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Summary
This thesis proposes a design of experiment for testing and evaluation of
the equipment and the methods used in manual mine clearance. The thesis
is based on several metal detector trials and a trial of manual demining
methods.
The core of this dissertation comprises four metal detector trials per-
formed in Germany and Croatia in 2003 and 2005. The purpose of these
trials was to investigate the feasibility of the tests described in the CWA
(Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation /CEN/ Workshop Agreement) 14747:-
2003, the standard for testing metal detectors for humanitarian demining.
The goals of the trials were: to find an appropriate design of experiment
for testing metal detectors; to establish the use of ROC diagrams (Receiver
Operating Characteristics) and POD curves (Probability of Detection) in
the analysis of the experimental results; and to gain practical experience
in organising and conducting metal detector trials. A part of this thesis is
devoted to a trial of manual demining methods performed in Mozambique
in 2004. The main goal of that trial was to compare the speed of various
manual demining methods, including the most common excavation meth-
ods. The outcome of this work are the proposals and recommendations for
an update of the standard for testing metal detectors CWA 14747:2003.
Maximum detection height measurements were performed as a part of
the metal detector trial carried out in Croatia in 2005. The results reveal
a high variability of the maximum detection height. This high variability
needs to be taken into account in all experiments. A part of the variability
is caused by the differences between the operators and by the setup of the
metal detector. It is therefore recommended that two kinds of experiments
with the maximum detection height as a response variable are defined in the
next update of CWA 14747:2003. The first kind should include the setup,
the soil and the operator as factors in the design of experiment. The in-soil
measurements with the same detector should be performed with repeated
setups and with several operators. The second kind of experiments should
be experiments evaluating the influence of other predictor variables. In those
experiments, it is recommended to perform one-factor or multiple-factor in-
air measurements with the operators and the setup as a block.
The main part of the metal detector trials described in this thesis were
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the detection reliability tests. Detection reliability tests as described in CWA
14747:2003 come closest to representing the real field conditions in demining.
They include many environmental influences and, most importantly, many
of the human factor influences. However, each test design is a compromise
between fully representative conditions and cost effectiveness. In this thesis,
a fractional factorial design based on the Graeco-Latin square is proposed
as a solution to the experimental problem. The results are reported in
the form of ROC diagrams and POD curves. The crossover design enables
each operator to work with fewer detector models within a certain time.
The variations of the design enabled an unbiased comparison of detectors
in each soil and with each target model separately. It is recommended that
the solutions proposed in this thesis be incorporated in the standard CWA
14747:2003.
It has been shown that maximum detection height measurements provide
the information about the best possible performance of a metal detector in
a reliability test.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Doktorarbeit stellt eine Versuchsplanung fu¨r Pru¨fung und Bewertung
von Gera¨ten und Methoden vor, die in der manuellen Minenra¨umung einge-
setzt werden. Die Grundlage hierfu¨r wurde mit einer Reihe von verschiede-
nen Versuchsreihen zum Test von Metalldetektoren und einer Versuchsreihe
zur Untersuchung von ausgewa¨hlten manuellen Minenra¨umtechniken erar-
beitet.
Im Mittelpunkt dieser Dissertation stehen vier Versuchsreihen zum Test
von Metalldetektoren, die in Deutschland und Kroatien in den Jahren 2003
und 2005 durchgefu¨hrt wurden. Der Anlass dieser Versuchsreihen war, die
Durchfu¨hrbarkeit der Tests, die im CWA (Comite´ Europe´en de Normali-
sation /CEN/ Workshop Agreement) 14747:2003, dem europa¨ischen Stan-
dard zum Test von Metalldetektoren in der humanita¨ren Minenra¨umung,
beschrieben sind, zu untersuchen. Die Ziele waren, eine geeignete statis-
tische Versuchsplanung zum Test von Metalldetektoren aufzustellen, ROC-
Diagramme (Receiver Operating Characteristics) und POD-Kurven (Proba-
bility of Detection) fu¨r die Analyse der experimentellen Ergebnisse einzufu¨h-
ren und praktische Erfahrungen bei der Organisation und Durchfu¨hrung von
Metalldetektortests zu sammeln. Ein weiterer Teil der Arbeit wurde einer
Versuchsreihe auf dem Gebiet der manuellen Minera¨umung gewidmet, die
im Jahr 2004 in Mosambik durchgefu¨hrt wurde. Das Hauptziel dieser Ver-
suchsreihe war, die Geschwindigkeit verschiedener manueller Entminungs-
methoden zu vergleichen. Eingeschlossen waren die am ha¨ufigsten verwende-
ten manuellen Ausgrabungsmethoden, die keinen Metalldetektor verwenden.
Die Ergebnisse dieser Dissertation sind Vorschla¨ge und Empfehlungen zur
Aktualisierung des europa¨ischen Standards zum Test von Metalldetektoren
CWA 14747:2003.
Als Teil der Versuchsreihe in Kroatien in 2005 wurden Messungen des
maximalen Detektionsabstandes durchgefu¨hrt. Die Ergebnisse ließen eine
hohe Variabilita¨t des maximalen Detektionsabstandes erkennen. Diese hohe
Variabilita¨t muss bei allen Experimenten in Betracht gezogen werden. Ein
Teil dieser Variabilita¨t wird von den Unterschieden zwischen den bedienen-
den Personen und der Gera¨teeinstellung hervorgerufen. Deshalb werden fu¨r
die na¨chste Aktualisierung des CWA 14747:2003 zwei verschiedene Arten
von Experimenten mit dem maximalen Detektionsabstand als Zielvariable
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empfohlen. Die erste sollte die Gera¨teeinstellung, den Bodentyp und das
bedienende Personal als Faktoren in der Versuchsplanung enthalten. Die
Messungen im Boden sollten mit wiederholten Gera¨teeinstellungen und ver-
schiedenen Personen durchgefu¨hrt werden. Die zweite Art von Experi-
menten sollte die Bewertung des Einflusses von anderen Wirkungsvariablen
beinhalten. Bei diesen Versuchen wird empfohlen die Experimente mit einem
oder mehreren Faktoren in Luft durchzufu¨hren, wobei die bedienenden Per-
sonen und die Gera¨teeinstellung jeweils fu¨r sich einen Block bilden.
Die Zuverla¨ssigkeitstests zur Minendetektion, beschrieben im CWA
14747:2003, kommen realen Bedingungen bei der Entminung am na¨chsten.
Darin enthalten sind sowohl viele der Umweltbedingungen als auch viele
der u¨beraus wichtigen Einflu¨sse des Faktors Mensch. Jede Versuchsplan-
ung stellt jedoch einen Kompromiss zwischen vollsta¨ndig repra¨sentativen
Bedingungen und der Kosteneffektivita¨t dar. Zur Lo¨sung dieses experi-
mentellen Problems wird in dieser Doktorarbeit die fraktionell faktorielle
Versuchsplanung basierend auf dem griechisch-lateinischen Quadrat vor-
gestellt. Die Versuchsergebnisse werden in Form von ROC-Diagrammen
und POD-Kurven dargestellt. Die U¨berkreuz-Planung (”crossover design”)
ermo¨glicht, dass jede Person nur wenige Gera¨te in einem bestimmten Zeitab-
schnitt bedient. Die Variationen in der Versuchsplanung erlauben weiterhin
einen erwartungstreuen Vergleich der Leistungen der Detektoren in jedem
Boden und bei jedem Minentyp separat. Es wird empfohlen, die in dieser
Dissertation vorgeschlagenen Lo¨sungen in die na¨chste Version des Standards
CWA 14747:2003 einzuarbeiten.
Es wurde nachgewiesen, dass die systematischen Messungen des ma-
ximalen Detektionsabstandes die bestmo¨gliche Leistung eines Detektors in
einem Zuverla¨ssigkeitstest wiedergeben.
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Sazˇetak
U ovom se doktorskom radu iznosi prijedlog plana pokusa za testiranje i
evaluaciju opreme i tehnika koje se koriste u rucˇnom razminiranju. Temelji
se na nekoliko testova detektora metala i na jednom testu tehnika rucˇnog
razminiranja.
Jezgru ovoga rada cˇine cˇetiri testa detektora metala provedena 2003. i
2005. godine u Njemacˇkoj i Hrvatskoj. Svrha tih testova bila je ispitati
provedivost testova opisanih u CWA (Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation
/CEN/ Workshop Agreement) 14747:2003, standardu za testiranje detek-
tora metala za humanitarno razminiranje. Ciljevi testova bili su: odrediti
odgovarajuc´i plan pokusa za testiranje detektora metala, uvesti upotrebu
ROC-dijagrama i POD-krivulja u obradu rezultata testiranja i stec´i prakticˇ-
no iskustvo u organiziranju i provod-enju testova detektora metala. Dio
ove disertacije posvec´en je testovima tehnika rucˇnog razminiranja prove-
denim 2004. godine u Mozambiku. Glavni cilj tih testova bila je usporedba
brzine raznih tehnika rucˇnog razminiranja, od kojih neke ukljucˇuju potpuno
otkopavanje tla bez upotrebe detektora metala. Ishod ovoga rada su prijed-
lozi i preporuke za promjene standarda za testiranje detektora metala CWA
14747:2003.
Kao dio testova provedenih u Hrvatskoj 2005. godine, izvrsˇena su mjere-
nja najvec´e visine detekcije (”maximum detection height”). Rezultati uka-
zuju na visoku varijabilnost najvec´e visine detekcije. Stoga tu varijabilnost
treba uzeti u obzir u svim pokusima. Dio varijabilnosti uzrokovan je ra-
zlikama med-u operaterima i postupkom kalibriranja detektora. Stoga se
u ovom radu preporucˇuje da se pri sljedec´oj promjeni CWA 14747:2003
definiraju dvije vrste pokusa s najvec´om visinom detekcije kao izlaznom
varijablom. Prva bi vrsta trebala ukljucˇiti tlo, operatera i kalibriranje de-
tektora kao faktore u plan pokusa. Mjerenja u tlu s jednim detektorom
trebalo bi provesti uz ponavljanje kalibracije i s nekoliko operatera. Druga
vrsta pokusa trebala bi obuhvatiti testove utjecaja drugih varijabli. Za te
se pokuse preporucˇuje provesti mjerenja u zraku s jednim ili s viˇse faktora,
pri cˇemu bi operateri i kalibracija cˇinili blok.
Vec´inu testova opisanih u ovom radu cˇine testovi pouzdanosti detek-
cije. Testovi pouzdanosti detekcije kakvi su opisani u CWA 14747:2003 su
najblizˇe stvarnim uvjetima u razminiranju. Oni ukljucˇuju mnoge utjecaje
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okoline i, sˇto je najvazˇnije, mnoge utjecaje cˇovjeka. Med-utim, svaki je plan
pokusa kompromis izmed-u potpuno reprezentativnih uvjeta i efikasnog up-
ravljanja trosˇkovima. Kao rjesˇenje eksperimentalnog problema, u ovom se
radu predlazˇe frakcijski faktorijalni plan pokusa temeljen na grcˇko-latinskom
kvadratu. Rezultati testova prikazani su u obliku ROC-dijagrama i POD-
krivulja. ”Crossover” plan pokusa omoguc´uje da operateri rade s manje
modela detektora u istom vremenskom periodu. Varijacije plana pokusa
omoguc´ile su nepristranu usporedbu detektora u svakom tlu i sa svakim
tipom mete. Preporucˇuje se da rjesˇenja predlozˇena u ovome radu budu
ukljucˇena u standard CWA 14747:2003.
Pokazalo se da mjeranja najvec´e visine detekcije pruzˇaju informaciju o
najviˇsoj moguc´oj performansi detektora metala u testovima pouzdanosti
detekcije.
8
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank all who helped me during my work on this thesis.
Most of all, I would like to thank Christina Mu¨ller, my first supervisor, for
encouraging me, for trusting me and for pushing me always to the fore.
I am most grateful to Prof. Peter-Th. Wilrich for his invaluable help in
statistics. I would also like to thank my other supervisors, Prof. Wolfgang
Spyra, Prof. Damir Markucˇicˇ and Prof. Heinrich Heidt, for their help with
the preparation of the manuscript.
My deep gratitude goes to my colleagues, from whom I have learned a
lot about demining and metal detectors, and who supported me generously:
most of all, to Dieter Gu¨lle, Adam Lewis, and Andy Smith. I am also
grateful for the friendly support of other colleagues, who helped me in many
ways: Kurt Osterloh, Ivan Sˇteker, Prof. Uwe Ewert, Prof. Vjera Krstelj, and
many others. Special thanks go to Croatian and Mozambican deminers who
participated in our trials.
Finally, I would like to thank the German Federal Institute for Materials
Research and Testing, the German Federal Foreign Office, and the German
Ministry of Defence, for financially supporting our demining activities.
9
Contents
1 Introduction 18
2 Landmines and Humanitarian Demining 21
2.1 Landmines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2 Mine Action and Mine Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3 Instruments of International Law Addressing the Problem of
Landmines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4 Clearance and Detection Methods in Humanitarian Demining 27
2.5 New Technologies in Humanitarian Demining . . . . . . . . . 29
3 Metal Detectors in Humanitarian Demining 31
3.1 Physical Principles of Electromagnetic Induction . . . . . . . 31
3.2 Technical Properties of Metal Detectors . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.1 Coil Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.2 Audio Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.3 Frequency Domain and Time Domain . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2.4 Electromagnetic Interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2.5 Ground Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.6 Possible Technological Improvements . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3 Use of Metal Detectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4 Reliability Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4 Testing and Evaluation of Metal Detectors 41
4.1 Purpose of Testing Metal Detectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2 CEN Workshop Agreement CWA 14747:2003 . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2.1 Maximum Detection Height Measurements . . . . . . 43
4.2.2 Detection Reliability Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3 Metal Detector Trials Performed up to the Present . . . . . . 44
5 Design of Experiment 47
5.1 Basic Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.1.1 Replication, Randomisation and Blocking . . . . . . . 48
5.1.2 Guidelines for Designing Experiments . . . . . . . . . 49
5.2 Randomised Blocks, Latin Squares and Graeco-Latin Squares 50
10
5.2.1 Randomised Complete Block Design . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.2.2 Latin Square Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.2.3 Graeco-Latin Square Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6 Comparative Trial of Manual Mine Clearance Methods 58
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7 Maximum Detection Height Measurements 65
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
7.2 Design of Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
7.3 Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7.3.1 Comparison of Detectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7.3.2 Comparison between PMA-2 and PMA-S . . . . . . . 72
7.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.5.1 Variability of Maximum Detection Height Measurements 76
7.5.2 In-Air Measurement Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
7.5.3 Comparison between PMA-2 and PMA-S . . . . . . . 78
7.5.4 Choosing the Most Appropriate Detector . . . . . . . 78
7.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
8 Detection Reliability Tests 79
8.1 Overview of Detection Reliability Tests Performed in Ober-
jettenberg and Benkovac . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
8.2 Design of Experiment and Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
8.2.1 Design of Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
8.2.2 Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
8.3 Reliability Tests, Oberjettenberg, May 2003 . . . . . . . . . . 89
8.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
8.3.2 Design of Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
8.3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
8.3.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
8.4 Reliability Tests, Benkovac, July 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
8.4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
8.4.2 Design of Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
8.5 Reliability Tests, Oberjettenberg, November 2003 . . . . . . . 105
8.5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
8.5.2 Design of Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
8.5.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
11
8.5.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
8.6 Reliability Tests, Benkovac, May 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
8.6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
8.6.2 Design of Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
8.6.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
8.6.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
8.7 Connection between Maximum Detection Height Measure-
ments and Reliability Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
8.8 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
8.8.1 Representative Conditions in Tests . . . . . . . . . . . 129
8.8.2 Soils and Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
8.8.3 Target Depths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
8.8.4 Human Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
8.8.5 Improvements of Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . 135
8.8.6 Maximum Detection Height and Reliability Tests . . . 135
8.9 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
9 Proposals for Update of CWA 14747:2003 138
9.1 Maximum Detection Height Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . 138
9.1.1 Uncertainty of Maximum Detection Height Measure-
ments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
9.1.2 Layout of Test Area and Execution of Measurements . 142
9.2 Detection Reliability Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
9.2.1 Statistical Design of Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
9.2.2 Data Analysis and Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
9.2.3 Choice of Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
9.2.4 Target Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
9.2.5 Target Depths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
9.2.6 Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
9.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
10 Conclusions 148
12
List of Figures
6.1 Trial of manual demining methods, results, overview. . . . . . 62
7.1 PMA-S, a surrogate of the PMA-2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
7.2 Placement of targets before their burial for maximum detec-
tion height measurements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
7.3 Area fully prepared for the maximum detection height mea-
surements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
7.4 In-air maximum detection height measurements. . . . . . . . 71
7.5 Results of the maximum detection height measurements with
standard deviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
7.6 Results of the maximum detection height measurements with
95% confidence intervals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
8.1 Oberjettenberg May 2003, an ROC diagram for the complete
data set, a comparison of detectors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
8.2 Oberjettenberg May 2003, an ROC diagram for the complete
data set, a comparison of lanes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
8.3 Oberjettenberg May 2003, an ROC diagram for the complete
data set, a comparison of operators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
8.4 Oberjettenberg May 2003, an ROC diagram for the complete
data set, a comparison of high and low sensitivity measure-
ments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
8.5 Benkovac July 2003, an ROC diagram for the high sensitivity,
a comparison of detectors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
8.6 Benkovac July 2003, an ROC diagram for the high sensitivity,
a comparison of soils. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
8.7 Benkovac July 2003, an ROC diagram for the high sensitivity,
a comparison of operators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
8.8 Benkovac July 2003, an ROC diagram for the high sensitivity,
target PMA-2 in Obrovac soil, a comparison of detectors. . . 101
8.9 Benkovac July 2003, an ROC diagram for the high sensitivity,
target PMA-2 in Obrovac soil, a comparison of operators. . . 102
8.10 Benkovac July 2003, POD curves for the high sensitivity, tar-
get PMA-2 in Obrovac soil, a comparison of detectors. . . . . 103
13
8.11 Benkovac July 2003, an ROC diagram for the complete data
set, a comparison of high and low sensitivity measurements. . 104
8.12 Oberjettenberg November 2003, an ROC diagram for the
complete data set, a comparison of detectors. . . . . . . . . . 109
8.13 Oberjettenberg November 2003, an ROC diagram for the
complete data set, a comparison of lanes. . . . . . . . . . . . 109
8.14 Oberjettenberg November 2003, an ROC diagram for the
complete data set, a comparison of operators. . . . . . . . . . 110
8.15 Oberjettenberg November 2003, diagrams of POD versus depth
for lane 5 containing magnetite mixed with sand, targets
PMN and MS3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
8.16 Oberjettenberg November 2003, an ROC diagram for lane 5,
targets PMN and MS3, a comparison of detectors. . . . . . . 111
8.17 A comparison of the two Oberjettenberg tests, an ROC diagram.112
8.18 Benkovac May 2005, an ROC diagram for the complete data
set, a comparison of detectors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
8.19 Benkovac May 2005, an ROC diagram for the complete data
set, a comparison of lanes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
8.20 Benkovac May 2005, an ROC diagram for the complete data
set, a comparison of operators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
8.21 Benkovac May 2005, an ROC diagram for the PMA-2 in
Obrovac soil, a comparison of detectors. . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
8.22 Benkovac May 2005, POD curves for the PMA-2 in Obrovac
soil, a comparison of detectors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
8.23 Benkovac May 2005, ROC diagrams for the PMA-2 in Obrovac
soil with different halo radii. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
8.24 A comparison of the Benkovac July 2003 and the Benkovac
May 2005 test results, an ROC diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
8.25 A comparison of the Benkovac July 2003 and the Benkovac
May 2005 test results, POD curves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
8.26 The connection between POD curves and MDH measurements.124
8.27 The POD curves of the reliability test compared with the
POD curves calculated from the MDH measurements, PMA-
2 in Obrovac soil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
8.28 The POD curves of the reliability test compared with the
POD curves calculated from the MDH measurements, PMA-
2 and PMA-S in Sisak soil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
8.29 The POD curves obtained from the MDHmeasurements using
the generalised linear model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
8.30 A comparison of two methods for estimating MDH. . . . . . . 128
14
List of Tables
5.1 Randomised complete block design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.2 Analysis of variance (ANOVA) for a randomised complete
block design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.3 An example of a 5× 5 Latin square. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.4 An example of a 4× 4 Graeco-Latin square. . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.1 List of all methods tested in Mozambique trial. . . . . . . . . 59
6.2 Trial of manual demining methods, results. . . . . . . . . . . 61
7.1 Design of the maximum detection height measurements, Benko-
vac, May 2005. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7.2 Results of the multiple comparisons of the maximum detec-
tion heights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7.3 Results of the analysis of variance for the in-soil maximum
detection height measurements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
8.1 Overview of all metal detector trials described in this disser-
tation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
8.2 Detectors tested in the trials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
8.3 Soil types in the Oberjettenberg trials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
8.4 Soil types in the Benkovac trials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
8.5 Design of experiment for a simplified problem of testing four
metal detectors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
8.6 Design of the reliability test, Oberjettenberg, May 2003. . . . 91
8.7 Design of the reliability test, Benkovac, July 2003. . . . . . . 98
8.8 Training and testing scheme, Oberjettenberg, November 2003. 106
8.9 Design of the reliability test, Oberjettenberg, November 2003. 108
8.10 Training and testing scheme, Benkovac, May 2005. . . . . . . 114
8.11 Design of the reliability test, Benkovac, May 2005. . . . . . . 115
8.12 A comparison of two methods for estimating MDH. . . . . . . 128
1 List of targets, Oberjettenberg, May 2003. . . . . . . . . . . . 152
2 List of targets, Benkovac, July 2003. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
3 List of targets, Oberjettenberg, November 2003. . . . . . . . . 154
4 List of targets, Benkovac, May 2005. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
15
Abbreviations and Acronyms
ADP Accelerated Demining Programme (for Mozambique)
ANOVA analysis of variance
BAM Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing, or Bundesan-
stalt fu¨r Materialforschung und -pru¨fung
CCW Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CEN European Committee for Standardisation
CWA 14747:2003 CEN Workshop Agreement, Humanitarian Mine Ac-
tion — Test and Evaluation — Metal Detectors
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
ERW explosive remnants of war
FAR false alarm rate
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GPR ground penetrating radar
HCR-CTRO Croatian Mine Action Centre — Centre for Testing, Devel-
opment and Training
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines
IMAS International Mine Action Standards
IPPTC International Pilot Project for Technology Co-operation
ITEP International Test and Evaluation Program for Humanitarian Dem-
ining
ITOP International Test Operations Procedures
JRC Joint Research Centre of the European Commission
16
LIDAR light detection and ranging
LSD least signifficant difference
MAIC Mine Action Information Center of the James Madison University
MDD mine detection dogs
MDH maximum detection height
POD probability of detection
PPE personal protective equipment
R&D research and development
REST Remote Explosive Scent System
ROC receiver operating characteristic
SOPs Standard (or Standing) Operating Procedures
STEMD Standardised Testing and Evaluation of Metal Detectors
UNADP Accelerated Demining Programme
UNMAPA Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service
UXO unexploded ordnance
WTD 52 Military Engineering Department 52 of the German Federal Armed
Forces
17
Chapter 1
Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to establish a design of experiment for testing and
evaluation of the equipment and the methods used in manual mine clearance.
The thesis was written during the author’s work at BAM, Federal In-
stitute for Materials Research and Testing (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Materialfor-
schung und -pru¨fung), in the working group VIII.33 Reliability of Non-
destructive Diagnostic Systems, in Berlin, Germany. It is based on sev-
eral metal detector trials and a trial of manual demining methods. The
core of this dissertation comprises four metal detector trials performed in
Germany and Croatia in 2003 and 2005. The purpose of these trials was
to investigate the feasibility of the tests described in the CWA 14747:2003
(where CWA stands for Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation /CEN/ Work-
shop Agreement), the standard for testing metal detectors for humanitarian
demining. The goals of the trials were: to find an appropriate design of ex-
periment for testing metal detectors; to establish the use of ROC diagrams
and POD curves in reporting the experimental results; and to gain practical
experience in organising and conducting metal detector trials. A part of
this thesis is devoted to a comparative trial of manual demining methods
performed in Mozambique. The main goal of that trial was to compare the
speeds of various manual demining methods, including the most common
excavation methods. The practical outcome of all trials and of this disserta-
tion are recommendations for the update of the standard CWA 14747:2003.
These recommendations deal with the experimental design and data evalu-
ation of metal detector trials.
The trial of manual demining methods was conducted as a part of the
Study of Manual Mine Clearance by the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining. It was organised by A. Smith, an independent
consultant, and executed in Mozambique, Maputo province, in November
2004. The four metal detector trials were performed within ITEP projects
2.1.1.2 and 2.1.1.8 (where ITEP stands for International Test and Evaluation
Program for Humanitarian Demining) and organised by BAM, in a cooper-
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ation with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (JRC).
They took place in Oberjettenberg, Germany, in May 2003; in Benkovac,
Croatia, in July 2003; in Oberjettenberg, in November 2003; and in Benko-
vac, in May 2005. The hosts of these trials were the Accelerated Demining
Programme (ADP), Mozambique; the Military Engineering Department 52
of the German Federal Armed Forces (WTD 52), Germany; and the Croa-
tian Mine Action Centre — Centre for Testing, Development and Training
(HCR-CTRO), Croatia. The author of this thesis has participated in the
organisation, design, execution, monitoring and data evaluation of all ex-
periments described in this dissertation.
Context. Since the very beginnings of humanitarian demining, most
efforts of the research and development (R&D) community were directed
at improving landmine detection. Many scientists hoped to find a solution
among technologies not used before in the field. However, all technical de-
velopments in that direction have so far failed to meet field needs [4, 43, 35].
Almost all improvements were a result of small investments of commercial
companies, rather than large investments in R&D of new technologies [89].
One of the areas through which research efforts notably contributed to
humanitarian demining is testing and evaluation of equipment, especially
metal detectors [49]. Clearance organisations need reliable tests to choose
the most suitable device for their needs. It is therefore necessary to test
the equipment in conditions as close as possible to the actual field con-
ditions. The tests closest to representing field conditions in demining are
detection reliability tests described in the CWA 14747:2003. They include
many environmental influences and, most importantly, many of the human
factor influences. However, completely representative conditions cannot be
achieved: each trial is a compromise between a faithful reproduction of dem-
ining conditions and the efficient use of available resources.
Structure. This dissertation is structured in three parts: a theoreti-
cal part, an experimental part, and practical recommendations. Chapters
2, 3, 4 and 5 form the theoretical part of this dissertation. This part deals
with landmines, metal detectors, testing and evaluation of metal detectors
and design of experiments. Chapter 2 presents the problem of landmines
and how it is addressed. It describes mines and their impact, the inter-
national agreements regulating their use, the clearance methods currently
employed and the possible future use of some new technologies for detection
of landmines. The subject of Chapter 3 is the metal detector, the main de-
tection tool used in humanitarian demining. This chapter gives an overview
of the physical principles and the most important properties of metal de-
tectors, describes the conditions of their use in minefields and presents the
reliability model, a concept for understanding of all factors influencing the
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performance of metal detectors. Chapter 4 discusses the current “state of
the art” of testing metal detectors. It deals with the purpose of testing
metal detectors, the existing standards for testing and it gives an overview
of the trials performed up to the present. Chapter 5 is an introduction to
statistical design of experiments. It presents the main principles of exper-
imental design and gives examples of experimental design relevant to mine
detection tests.
The experimental part of this work is contained in Chapters 6, 7 and
8. These chapters discuss the design of experiment and the data analysis
for a comparative trial of manual demining methods, maximum detection
height measurements and detection reliability tests. The trial of manual
demining methods is the topic of Chapter 6. This chapter deals with the es-
timate of the experimental error and the problem of statistical bias. Chapter
7 discusses the measurements of the maximum detection height performed
during the trial in Croatia, May 2005. The uncertainty of the measurements
is estimated and discussed. Chapter 8 presents the experimental design and
the results of the detection reliability tests performed during the metal de-
tector trials in Croatia and Germany in 2003 and 2005. Detection reliability
tests include more human factor influences, compared with maximum de-
tection height measurements. This chapter clarifies the connection between
the reliability test results and the maximum detection height measurements.
Chapter 9 is a practical conclusion of this work. It presents proposals and
recommendations for an update of the standard for testing metal detectors
CWA 14747:2003. The proposals are based on the results of the maximum
detection height measurements and the detection reliability tests described
in the previous chapters.
Information sources. The most important literature sources are stat-
ed in the introductory part of each chapter. A reader willing to learn more
about humanitarian demining will find the following information sources
useful. The web site of ITEP [61] hosts a very comprehensive data base of
publications related to test and evaluation of humanitarian demining equip-
ment. Two e-mail forums of demining specialists, the IGEOD forum [53]
and the MgM forum [69], provide a lot of information about practical prob-
lems of demining and EOD. Conversations with deminers and observations
of their work in minefields give an invaluable insight into the demining prac-
tice; they were also very important for the creation of this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Landmines and
Humanitarian Demining
This chapter briefly presents the problem of landmines and how it has been
addressed to date. The first section describes mines and similar threats to
civilians. The impact of landmines and some measures of success of mine
clearance are discussed in the next section, with some examples. The third
section deals with the instruments of international law regulating the use
of landmines. The clearance methods currently employed in humanitarian
demining are described in the fourth section, and the last section discusses
some recent improvements and the possible future use of some new tech-
nologies.
There are numerous publications dealing with different aspects of mine
action. Some web sites provide excellent short overviews, for example the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) [60] and the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) [45]. A more
comprehensive introduction to mine action is the “Guide to Mine Action”
by GICHD [35], which has served as the main literature source for this
chapter. A reader interested in more specific details will find the following
sources helpful: the “Landmine Monitor” [57, 58, 59] published yearly, with
the most current information on the mine situation worldwide; the “Jane’s
Mines and Mine Clearance” [65], with elaborate descriptions and drawings
of hundreds of mines; the “Study of Manual Mine Clearance” [36], actually
encompassing the broader area of humanitarian demining; the web site of the
Mine Action Information Center of the James Madison University (MAIC)
[70], with some databases and useful links; and finally, the Journal of Mine
Action (available on the MAIC web site), which covers all topics of mine
action.
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2.1 Landmines
Long after their use in an armed conflict landmines continue to be a threat
to the civilian population. In even greater numbers, unexploded ordnance
— munitions that have been employed but which have failed to detonate as
designed — plague post-conflict societies around the world.
Landmines (or simply mines) are explosive traps that are victim-activat-
ed, whether the intended target is a person or a vehicle [65, 78]. Designed to
be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of the victim, mines are
placed under, on or near the ground. A mine comprises a varying quantity
of high explosive contained within a casing (metal, plastic or wood), and a
fusing mechanism to detonate the explosives. Mines are generally classified
into two categories: anti-tank (or anti-vehicle) and anti-personnel. Antiper-
sonnel mines are further divided into four categories based on their primary
method of operation: blast, simple fragmentation, bounding fragmentation
and directional fragmentation, based on their primary method of causing
injury.
Among these types blast mines are by far the most common. They are
activated with the victim’s weight. The energy released by the explosive
charge, typically 50-300 g of TNT, is the major cause of injuries, but sec-
ondary fragmentation injuries are also possible. The smaller blast mines are
deliberately designed not to kill the victim, but to cause severe injuries that
often lead to amputation. Minimum metal content blast mines can be very
difficult to detect with a metal detector. However, fragmentation mines are
responsible for more lethal demining accidents than blast mines [66, 88].
Simple fragmentation mines are installed on short wooden or metal posts
and activated by tripwires. They scatter hundreds of metal fragments with
the aim to kill or severely injure the victim.
Fragmentation bounding mines are also activated by tripwires, but their
fuzes are often also tilt and pressure sensitive. They are partly buried in
the ground and propelled in the air before exploding. The fragments cause
death and severe injuries.
Directional fragmentation mines, sometimes called ‘claymore’ mines, di-
rect hundreds of precut metal fragments in an arc on one side of the mine.
They may be mounted on a tree or placed standing on their own folding
legs. They are activated electronically by a soldier or initiated by tripwires.
Both terms, ‘mine’ and ‘anti-personnel mine’, are defined in international
law in the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) (more about this topic in Section
2.3). Anti-tank or anti-vehicle mines are often referred to as ‘mines other
than anti-personnel mines’.
The term unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions (bombs, shells,
mortars, grenades and the like) that have been used but which have failed
to detonate as intended, usually on impact with the ground or other hard
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surface. Bomblets from cluster bombs are particularly dangerous [67]. Their
failure rates vary between 1 and 40 per cent, depending on a range of factors,
such as the age of the weapon, its storage conditions, the method of use and
environmental conditions. Mine clearance operations include the removal of
UXO and other ordnance, whether fuzed, fired or in storage.
To cover this a new term has entered the lexicon of international law:
explosive remnants of war (ERW). Article 2 of Protocol V of the CCW
defines ERW as “unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance”.
The term does not include mines, booby-traps or other devices. However,
some authors use it to include all these explosive devices.
2.2 Mine Action and Mine Situation
The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) of the United Nations [55]
define mine action as “activities which aim to reduce the social, economic
and environmental impact of mines and UXO”.
The term ‘mine action’ covers five groups of activities:
 mine risk education (also known as mine awareness);
 humanitarian demining, i.e. mine and UXO survey, mapping, marking
and clearance;
 victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration;
 stockpile destruction;
 advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines.
A number of other activities support these five components of mine ac-
tion, including: assessment and planning, the mobilisation and prioritisa-
tion of resources, information management, human skills development and
management training, quality management and the application of effective,
appropriate and safe equipment [35].
One of the most frequently asked questions regarding uncleared land-
mines is the question about their number. However, the size of the area
known or believed to be affected by mines and its importance to the local
populations are much better indicators of the impact and the clearance costs
of landmines [96, 24]. Even better indicator is the required clearance time,
since it has the largest influence on the clearance costs. The time needed to
clear mine-affected land varies enormously depending on local conditions.
The number of mines may have little effect on the speed of the demining
process, because the search for mines usually takes much more time than
their destruction.
The requirement of the IMAS is to clear all mines and UXO items to a
specified depth. However, the same standard recognises that the term ‘safe’
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or ‘mine-safe’ (in the meaning: complete absence of risk) is not as “ap-
propriate and accurate” as the term ‘tolerable risk’. It should be accepted
that complete safety cannot be assured in mine clearance. The everyday
needs of local populations often force them to accept higher risk. Accord-
ing to the statistics of the Cambodian Mine Action Centre, about 60% of
all the landmines cleared in Cambodia before 1999 were cleared by local
people with no training, no funding and no equipment [25]. Many similar
examples prove that people are ready to manage risk. This is why the local
demining authorities sometimes actually tolerate a small reduction in the
clearance standard if that speeds up the return of the valuable land to the
community. The best measure of success is the greatest benefit possible to
the largest number of people given the limited resources in both time and
money. The socio-economic impact caused by mines and UXO is assessed
through landmine impact surveys, with the goal of assisting the planning
and prioritisation of mine action programmes and projects.
It is very difficult to estimate the total required funds to free the world
from the impact of mines. A good indicator of the costs would be the size of
the mined area, but it is not known with any certainty. The Croatian exam-
ple can illustrate the extent of the problem [22, 21]. Two years after the end
of the armed conflict, in 1997, 23% of the Croatian territory was considered
mine suspected. By the year 2004 mine suspected areas were reduced to
2.1% of the country’s area, which is 1,174 square kilometres. About 135
square kilometres of that area are known to be mined. Only a small part
of this area reduction was achieved through clearance, while most of it was
achieved through general survey. In that same period approximately $160
million has been expended on mine action, most of it on clearance. In 2005
the average cost of clearance of a square kilometre was about $1.68 million
[59]. The costs of area reduction through general survey were much lower.
The Croatian government and public companies finance about 80% of mine
clearance in Croatia [97]. Most of the other countries affected by mines can-
not finance their demining activities without significant foreign help, which
is why their progress in clearance is much slower.
The “Landmine Monitor Report 2005” [58] states that more than 135
square kilometres were cleared worldwide in 2004. An additional 250 square
kilometers were surveyed and returned to the community. According to
the same source, over 190,000 mines were destroyed during the same year.
According to the same source [57], 174,167 antipersonnel mines, 9,330 an-
tivehicle mines, and 2.6 million items of UXO were found and destroyed in
the year 2003. At the end of 1990’s different estimates of the number of
uncleared mines worldwide varied between several million and 150 million
[96].
Similarly, it is difficult to assess the total number of victims with any
certainty. It is only certain that landmines continue to claim human victims.
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines [60] reported: “In 2002
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and through June 2003, there were new landmine casualties reported in
65 countries; the majority (41) of these countries were at peace, not war.
Only 15 per cent of reported casualties in 2002 were identified as military
personnel.” The same organisation estimates the total number of victims
each year to be 15,000-20,000 [57, 58].
The indirect influence of the suspected presence of anti-personnel mines
has devastating effects for the social and economic development of a country.
Mined infrastructure such as transportation systems, electrical installations
etc. can paralyse a country with a post-conflict infrastructure. For rural
communities the loss of fertile agricultural land and safe access to water can
be among the most serious consequences of the use of landmines.
The number of UXO items is even more difficult to estimate than the
number of landmines, but it can be said with certainty that the total number
of UXO items worldwide far exceeds the total number of landmines. In the
last decade the international concern was dedicated to the impact of land-
mines, especially anti-personnel mines, so appearing to neglect the threat
posed by UXO, but in fact demining agencies have always given the threat
from ordnance the attention it deserves.
The notable decrease in the use of anti-personnel landmines throughout
the world is a promising development. Since 1997, the year of the Ottawa
Convention, there has been no legal trade in antipersonnel mines [58]. Al-
ready before that year the use of landmines dropped dramatically following
the end of the cold war. Those changes are not just a consequence of in-
creasingly higher public awareness, but also a result of a change in military
practices; some commanders are reluctant to use mines that they would
later have to clear themselves. Self-deactivating mines are being developed
as a “strategic substitute” of antipersonnel landmines, but their “safety” is
seriously questioned by many people involved in landmine clearance largely
because of a lack of confidence that they will reliably detonate or deactivate
as designed.
2.3 Instruments of International Law Addressing
the Problem of Landmines
Two instruments of international law apply specifically to landmines: the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) [20] from 1980 and
the Ottawa Convention (also known as Mine Ban Treaty) [79] from 1997.
The CCW restricts non-detectable shrapnel, blinding lasers, depleted ura-
nium, incendiary bombs and landmines. The Ottawa Convention prohibits
the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of all anti-personnel mines.
Both only apply to countries that sign up to the constraints.
The 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) reg-
ulates the use, and in certain circumstances also the transfer, of specific
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conventional weapons. In addressing landmines, booby-traps and “other
devices”, CCW Protocol II, adopted in 1980, reflected customary law by
limiting the use of mines to military objectives. The 1996 Amended Proto-
col II strengthened the rules governing anti-personnel mines, though it did
not include their total prohibition. The signatories are obliged not to use
non-metallic antipersonnel mines, as well as those designed to be activated
by metal detectors.
The Ottawa Convention was adopted on 18 September 1997 and entered
into force on 1 March 1999. The purpose of the Convention is stated in the
first line of its preamble: the States Parties are “determined to put an end to
the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim
hundreds of people every week (. . . ), obstruct economic development and
reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced
persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement”.
By the end of 2005, about 150 states have signed the Convention, which
is about three-quarters of the world’s states. The Convention obliges the
signatories not to use, develop, produce, stockpile or transfer anti-personnel
mines, and it requires that they destroy existing stocks of anti-personnel
mines, clear mined areas, and assist victims.
The definition of anti-personnel mine crucially influences the reach of
the Ottawa Convention. An anti-personnel mine is defined as a subset of a
mine. The Convention defines a mine as “a munition designed to be placed
under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded
by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle”. The anti-
personnel mine is defined as a “mine designed to be exploded by the presence,
proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one
or more persons”. Thus the Ottawa Convention does not prohibit antitank
mines, nor mines which are activated by an operator from a safe distance,
although all these devices can be a threat to civilians.
Each state is obliged to clear all emplaced anti-personnel mines not later
than 10 years after it becomes Party to the Convention, but an extension
period of up to 10 years is possible. It is apparent that many countries
will ask for an extension because of their limited ability to finance clearance
operations.
A new protocol to the CCW, Protocol V, adopted in November 2003 and
entered into force in November 2006, addresses the humanitarian impact of
explosive remnants of war (ERW). That document defines ERW as “un-
exploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance”, and calls for “all
feasible precautions” to protect civilians from their risks and effects.
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2.4 Clearance and Detection Methods in Human-
itarian Demining
Humanitarian demining is the core component of mine action. It covers
all activities which lead to the removal of mines and UXO hazard. These
include technical survey, mapping, clearance, marking, post-clearance doc-
umentation, community mine action liaison and the handover of cleared
land. Among these activities, clearance operations usually carry most of
the expenses. Humanitarian demining should be clearly distinguished from
military demining — when the land is cleared for civilian use, the public
requires complete safety.
In many clearance operations a combination of several methods is used.
According to the field conditions, the following three elements can be ap-
plied: manual demining [36], mine detection dogs [33] and mechanical equip-
ment [34]. The most frequently used method is manual clearance, although
machines and dogs are playing an ever-increasing role in humanitarian demi-
ning. The chosen method needs to be cost effective, but it also needs to min-
imise the risk for deminers. The choice of the most appropriate combination
of methods depends on many factors: mines/UXO, terrain, infrastructure,
logistics, national legislation, and others. For example, in countries with
higher labour costs the use of machines is more cost-effective [96], which is
why even 85% of the Croatian mine clearance in 2004 was performed with
the help of demining machines. Up to date there were no reported accidents
behind a machine in Croatia.
Manual demining [36] comprises the use of metal detectors and/or exca-
vation tools. Metal detectors are used for detection of mines, since all mines
known to be used in military conflicts contain some metal, while excavation
tools are used to uncover the finding. If the metal contamination of the
ground is too high, deminers cannot use metal detectors and they are forced
to prod and to excavate the soil over the entire suspect area. A deminer
typically works in a one metre wide lane until he locates a suspicious object.
He uncovers it or excavates it, and then, if the object is a mine or UXO, it
is blown up in situ or disarmed and moved for destruction at the end of the
day.
The prodder is a usually needle-shaped about 30 cm long tool used as
a physical check of the presence of a mine or UXO. It is simple, cheap and
often effective. Its shortcomings are that it brings the hands and the face of
the operator close to the mine and it is hazardous if the orientation of the
mine is different than horizontal. Furthermore, it hardly penetrates rocky
soil and, since it is applied under about 30◦ angle to the ground surface,
the depth of its penetration can not be greater than 10-15 cm. It is usually
used together with a small spade, trowel or some other tool to remove the
loosened spoil. In most demining organisations the prodder is the main
27
tool used to verify the presence of a mine after it is detected with a metal
detector.
Metal detectors work on principles of induced eddy currents. The pres-
ence of metal, or any other conducting material, is indicated to the operator
with the mean of an audio signal. The metal content of mines has been
decreasing in line with the development of more sensitive metal detectors.
In many mines it is confined to a firing pin and a tiny detonator case. Only
a few mine types with no metal content have found their way into use and
they were used in such small numbers that they have not caused recorded
accidents [86, 87]. Their use has been mostly in Lebanon and some African
countries 1 [49]. More and more sensitive metal detectors are being built to
cope with the problem of small metal content of mines. As a consequence,
the metal fragments present in the soil and the natural magnetisation and
conductivity of the soil represent the main limitations for the use of metal
detectors. Most modern metal detectors have some ability to compensate
for the effects of the magnetism of the ground. The next chapter describes
metal detectors and their use in more detail.
Under favourable circumstances, mine detection dogs (MDD) [33] can
discriminate between varieties of substances, and they can be more sensitive
than human made devices. Some gas chromatographs may be able to detect
concentrations down to 10−12, while dogs (and rats) can detect 10−15 or less.
Even though they cannot replace manual detection, dogs can be a powerful
tool when used in combination with manual and mechanical clearance meth-
ods. They are particularly useful on areas inaccessible to machines and on
areas with metal contamination. The main weaknesses of MDD’s are that
they fail in hot climates, their reliability cannot be easily checked and that
they cannot normally be used if the concentration of mines is too high.
Many mechanical devices have been produced to assist mine clearance by
detonating or destroying mines, or typically by cutting vegetation. There is
increasing empirical evidence that demining machines designed to detonate
or destroy mines can be efficiently used as part of a system in which other
processes are also applied in order to meet the clearance requirements of
the IMAS [34, 92]. Demining machines are usually followed by manual
demining and/or dog teams. The main advantage of machines is that they
can speed up the demining process significantly and their main shortcoming
is their high price. Their environmental effects have not yet been sufficiently
studied.
The tools and methods used for UXO detection are mostly inadequate for
mine searching, since they are designed to detect larger amounts of metal at
larger depths. The signal of a small metal content mine would be overwritten
1Surprisingly, there is no available literature dealing with the problem of non-metallic
mines applied in the field. However, two interesting discussions have developed on the
IGEOD forum [53] and the MgM forum [69] (subject: non-metal mines, from 30 January
2006). The entire e-mail correspondence is available from both forums on request.
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by other signals.
2.5 New Technologies in Humanitarian Demining
Most efforts of the research and development (R&D) community have been
directed towards improving landmine detection. Many scientists hoped to
find a solution among technologies that had not been used before in the
field. However, all technical developments in that direction have so far
failed to meet field needs [4, 43, 35, 38]. The only innovations that have
found their way into widespread use in the field are technical improvements
of the existing equipment: metal detectors, manual demining toolkit, per-
sonal protective equipment and especially methods of mechanical assistance
[89]. Almost all improvements have been the result of small investments by
commercial companies, rather than large investments in the R&D of new
technologies. In recent years demining has become both cheaper and safer,
but that is more the result of improvements in management and working
practices than significant technological or technical advances [44, 96, 36].
The main reason for the failure of new technologies is probably the lack of
international coordination of the R&D activities and the lack of interaction
between researchers, field operators, and donors [1]. This was recognised
already in 1997, at the workshop that accompanied the signing of the Ottawa
Convention. Nevertheless, the cooperation between the actors of the mine
action community is still not satisfactory. As a result, considerable effort
has been invested, often with competition between national projects, in
developing equipment that is inadequate for field use [4].
Contrary to the opinions of some disappointed practitioners, this is not
a reason to completely abandon financing R&D. The Ottawa Convention
commits the States Signatories to clear landmines until 2009, but with the
current technology and management practices even a tenfold increase of
funds for clearance operations would not solve the landmine problem by
2009 [4]. About $400 million is yearly spent on clearance worldwide, while
only about $30 million is spent on R&D for humanitarian demining [58].
The R&D funds are not transferable to clearance operations, but even if
they were, the benefit of such a transfer would be minor compared to the
potential benefits of research. New technologies are obviously needed, as
well as new management practices. Technologists need to invest their time
to understand the end-users’ needs. They need to visit mine fields and learn
more about the existing methods and the working conditions. They also
need to understand that detection is only one of the areas that can improve
demining efficiency; others include area reduction, strategic planning using
information technology tools, programme management, etc. Even more im-
portant, this needs to be understood by donors and by policy makers at the
national and international level.
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The detection technology closest to application in landmine detection
is the ground penetrating radar (GPR) [18]. It consists of a transmitter,
which sends an electromagnetic pulse or a continuous wave in the microwave
region, from several hundred MHz to several GHz, and a receiver, which
receives the reflected signals. It detects the difference of the permittivity or
dielectric constant, which is why plastic or other non-metallic objects can
be detected by GPR. In a dual sensor in conjunction with metal detectors
they can reduce the false alarm rate, but may also increase the probability
of missing a mine. Despite the significant improvements already achieved,
such combined detectors have not yet found widespread use in humanitarian
mine clearance.
The field of vapour detection also achieved some success. Rats are al-
ready in use in some organisations and the results are very encouraging.
Samples of air are collected and brought to them to identify traces of explo-
sive, and the “free-running mode” is also being investigated. The Remote
Explosive Scent System (REST) should also be mentioned. For this, the air
above the road surface is filtered with filters carried on a vehicle. The sam-
pling filters are replaced at recorded intervals and later analysed by mine
detection dogs. In case of a positive identification free-running dogs return
to the corresponding part of the road to locate the mine.
Another method that is considered promising is infrared detection, but
the resolution of current infrared cameras is insufficient to identify small
mines. Its use against antivehicle mines and UXO remains a possibility.
Some other detection methods that have been occasionally recognised as
potentially promising are some acoustic or seismic methods, light detection
and ranging (LIDAR), insects, chemical sensors (especially gas chromatog-
raphy), etc. Sensor fusion was also considered (especially dual sensors of
metal detectors with GPR), some vehicle mounted detectors, etc, but none
of these methods have found widespread use in the field.
There were some important advances in technology other than mine
detection. Most important are the improvements of personal protective
equipment, information technology, and prosthetic feet [1]. One of the most
important areas to which research has contributed significantly are the stan-
dards for testing and evaluation of demining equipment. The whole of Chap-
ter 4 is devoted to that topic.
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Chapter 3
Metal Detectors in
Humanitarian Demining
This chapter describes the main detection tool used in humanitarian dem-
ining, that is, the metal detector. The main principles of electromagnetic
induction are presented in the first section, and the application of these
principles in the construction of metal detectors is elaborated in the next
section. The third section describes the use of metal detectors in minefields
and some problems that deminers encounter in their daily work. The last
section presents a concept called ‘reliability model’, which is a possible ap-
proach to understanding all factors that influence the performance of metal
detectors.
An excellent study of metal detectors by C. Bruschini [16] offers a de-
tailed overview of the working principles and some technical properties of
metal detectors. The “Metal Detector Handbook” by D. Guelle et al. [49]
and the web site of A. Smith [91] provide a more practical view for field use,
including detailed descriptions of demining procedures and many practical
problems of mine clearance.
3.1 Physical Principles of Electromagnetic Induc-
tion
Various detection devices based on electromagnetic induction are used in
many areas of non-destructive testing. Metal detectors used in demining are
only one example of those devices. Their operating principles are described
in this section and the same principles are valid for other electromagnetic
induction devices.
Allmetal detectors used in demining consist of a search head, a telescopic
pole or an extension rod with a handle, and an electronic unit. The search
head of the metal detector contains a coil carrying a time-varying electric
current. This current generates a time-varying magnetic field (according
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to Ampere’s law), called a primary magnetic field, which propagates in all
directions [68]. In neighbouring objects it induces electromotive force (Fara-
day’s law), which causes currents in conductive materials like metals. These
currents create another magnetic field, which is called a secondary magnetic
field. Another coil placed in the search head receives both magnetic fields:
the primary field and the much weaker secondary field. The coil generating
the primary field is termed ‘primary coil’ or ‘transmitter coil’ and the one
receiving both fields is named ‘secondary coil’ or ‘receiver coil’. The sec-
ondary field is converted into an audio signal to be easily interpreted by the
deminer.
For a better understanding of these processes, it is worthwhile to discuss
them more in detail. Let us investigate the case when a small conductive
object is placed on the symmetry axis of a circular metal detector coil. We
are interested in the magnetic field created by the coil, the so called primary
field, at the position of the object. Since our object is small, the local
variations of the primary field can be neglected and we approximate that
the object is placed in a uniform field. From Ampere’s Law it is easy to find
a solution on the symmetry axes where our small object is placed. If the coil
has a radius R and carries a current I, the primary field on the symmetry
axes at a distance d from the coil behaves as
Bz (d) =
µI
2
R2
(R2 + d2)3/2
(3.1)
where µ is the magnetic permeability of the medium.
According to Faraday’s law this field creates an electromotive force in
the object,
EMF = −∂Φ
∂t
(3.2)
with the magnetic flux
Φ =
∫
S
~B d~S (3.3)
where S is the surface of the object and B the primary field. This elec-
tromotive force creates eddy currents, which are thus proportional to the
primary field. Let us suppose that our object is a small horizontally laid
circular loop of a radius REC , carrying the induced eddy current IEC . This
current creates another field called a secondary field, ~B2, which induces an
electromotive force in the coil. To find that electromotive force, we need to
integrate the secondary field over the area of the search head, which is why
we need the distribution of the secondary magnetic field in space. An exact
analytical solution to the problem of the field induced by a circular coil does
not exist, however, in most cases the size of the object is much smaller than
its distance to the search head, REC << d. Using Ampere’s law, it can be
shown [63] that for this case the secondary field in point ~r is approximated
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with
~B2(~r) =
3~n(~n · ~m)− ~m
|~r|3 (3.4)
where ~r is the position vector with an origin in the middle of our small
object, ~n is a unit vector pointing in the same direction (~n = ~r|~r|) and ~m is
the magnetic dipole moment of the object. It is defined as
|~m| = µ0
4pi
· I · S = µ0
4pi
· I ·R2ECpi (3.5)
having a direction towards the middle of the search head.
The induced voltage in the coil, or the electromotive force, is obtained
by integrating the secondary field over the area of the search head:
EMF2 = − ∂
∂t
∫
searchhead
~B2 · d~S (3.6)
The result of the integration is
EMF2 = −µ0pi2
∂IEC
∂t
R2R2EC
(R2 + d2)3/2
(3.7)
Since the eddy currents are proportional to the time derivative of the primary
field, we can write
EMF2 ∝ ∂
2Bz
∂t2
1
(R2 + d2)3/2
(3.8)
Using Equation (3.1) we get
EMF2 ∝ ∂
2I
∂t2
1
(R2 + d2)3
(3.9)
Thus we see that the induced voltage in the search coil reduces very
rapidly with the distance between the search head and the object. This is
why we say that metal detectors are proximity sensors. We can see from
the same equation that metal detectors with larger search heads (larger R)
are less sensitive on close targets, but they are more sensitive on targets
on larger distances from the search head. This is why they are used for
detection of UXO, which are often larger and can be found deeper than
antipersonnel mines.
The response of many minimum metal mines, for example, the PMA-2,
can be well approximated by the magnetic dipole model (Equations (3.4)
and (3.5)). Larger objects and composite objects will produce a different
secondary field [16]. An example of an elongated composite object known
from experience is the GYATA-64, which can even produce alarms at two
locations [90] (see Chapter 6).
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Eddy currents are not the only mechanism forming a secondary field.
Paramagnetic soils also create a secondary field that causes serious detection
problems if the goal is to detect conductive objects. This phenomenon is
responsible for the difficulties that metal detectors have with paramagnetic
soils and it is tackled in Section 3.2.5 in more detail.
The secondary field depends on many factors: the conductivity and per-
meability of the object and of the background, the size and the shape of the
object, its geometry (distance, orientation) and the temporal and spatial
distribution of the primary field [23]. It can be shown that the influence of
the target’s dielectric properties are negligible in the frequency range used by
mine searching metal detectors, which is between 1 and 100 kHz [16]. Low
conductivity materials like stainless steel, which is contained in some land-
mines, are harder to detect. Ferromagnetic objects create a larger secondary
field due to their higher relative permeability, or alternatively it could be
said due to their higher magnetic susceptibility, since they are connected in
the expression µr = 1+χ, where µr is the relative permeability and χ is the
magnetic susceptibility.
It is often believed that an object containing more metal will be easier
to detect with a metal detector, but this is not necessarily true. The eddy
currents circulate close to the surface of the object, which is why it is said
that metal detectors are surface area detectors. An electromagnetic field
decays in a conducting medium as e−r/δ, where r is the distance from the
surface and δ is a characteristic depth of penetration. This depth is called
skin depth and the whole effect is called skin effect . The skin depth in the
frequency range of metal detectors is typically of the order of 1 mm (e.g.
for aluminum at 20 kHz, δ = 0.60 mm). Since metal detectors are mostly
surface area detectors, the amount of metal does not necessarily influence the
size of the signal. The skin effect is well described in all physics textbooks
[68, 63]. A simple explanation of this phenomenon is offered by C. Bruschini
[16].
This section gave some insight into the main principles of metal detec-
tors. Actual detectors use more than one frequency or they use an electro-
magnetic pulse. Many detectors have only one coil, having the role of both
the primary and the secondary coil. All the varieties of metal detectors are
briefly described in the next section.
3.2 Technical Properties of Metal Detectors
Metal detectors used in humanitarian demining typically weigh less than
2 kg [15]. The price of the latest models is usually between US$2000 and
4000. The most common search head shapes are round, oval and rectangular.
Most can detect a small metal content mine like the PMA-2 at about 10 cm
distance in air and a typical antivehicle mine with a metal casing at more
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than 50 cm. Magnetic soils reduce their detection capabilities. Most metal
detectors use standard cell batteries that last several days. They are easy
to use and the latest models are more ergonomic than their predecessors.
Their output is an audio signal resulting from an extensive data processing
and it helps the operator to locate a conductive object. For more specific
technical details of available metal detector models the reader should consult
the “Metal Detectors and PPE Catalogue 2005” [31] and the older “Metal
Detectors Catalogue 2003” [32].
All the varieties of metal detectors are briefly presented in Subsections
3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. There are some limitation to the achievable sensitivity
of metal detectors and these limitations are presented in Subsections 3.2.4
and 3.2.5, and in Section 3.3. A fundamental limitation is the noise of the
electronic elements, which will not be discussed in this work. It can easily
overwrite the signal coming from the eddy currents, since the secondary field
produced by eddy currents is much smaller than the primary field of the
transmitter coil. Other limitations include the electromagnetic interference
with external sources of electromagnetic fields, the magnetic response of the
soil and the eddy currents in the soil.
3.2.1 Coil Configurations
Several different coil configurations are used in the design of metal detectors
for humanitarian demining. Only those that were encountered in the trials
described in Chapters 7 and 8 are considered here.
Most metal detectors for landmine detection are coplanar, which means
that the primary and the secondary coil are in the same plane. Their diam-
eter is typically 20-30 cm. One of the oldest designs has two circular and
concentric coils, like those of the Schiebel AN-19/2. An oval coil is also in
use, for example, the Vallon VMH3CS and Ebinger EBEX RO 420 detectors.
Some detectors use only one coil having the function of both the primary
and the secondary coil. So called “double-D” metal detectors use a receiver
coil consisting of two halves resembling two D letters. This is the favoured
solution of some manufacturers such as CEIA and Foerster. The technical
specifications of the detectors mentioned in this paragraph and many other
detectors can be found in the “Metal Detectors and PPE Catalogue 2005”
[31]. For other possible coil designs see [16].
3.2.2 Audio Signals
The audio signals of metal detectors can be very different. The “double-D”
detectors record the difference of the signals in the left and the right side
of the search head. The positive and the negative difference produce two
different tones, so that it appears to the deminer that each half of the search
head produces a different tone. The audio signal has a sharp transition when
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the search head is moved left-right just above the object. All manufacturers
who decide to use other designs have a choice between the static mode and
the dynamic mode. Static mode detectors produce a sound whenever the
secondary field exceeds a detection threshold. Dynamic mode detectors give
an alarm when they detect a change of the secondary field, that is, when
the search head approaches a conductive object and when it strays from it,
but no alarm when the detector is not moved relative to the target.
3.2.3 Frequency Domain and Time Domain
Metal detectors can be classified according to the time dependence of the pri-
mary field. There are frequency domain (or continuous wave, or sine wave)
and time domain (or pulse induction) metal detectors [94, 16, 15]. Tests
performed so far showed no systematic differences in performance between
frequency domain and time domain metal detectors.
Frequency domain metal detectors have a sinusoidal primary field and
they often use several frequencies in the range between 1 and 100 kHz. The
amplitude and the phase of the received signal contain some information
about the detected object. As an equivalent alternative we could imagine
a complex change of impedance as a consequence of the proximity of the
target. Frequency domain detectors can use a single coil or separate transmit
and receive circuits.
Time domain metal detectors create pulses of electromagnetic field with
a typical repetition rate of the order of 1 kHz and measure the exponential
decay of the secondary magnetic field. This decay is slower than the decay
of the primary field as a consequence of the eddy currents induced in the
object. Either the secondary field itself or its time integrals in certain time
windows are used as a source of information about the target. Since the
receive phase follows after the transmit phase, the same coil can be applied
for transmitting and receiving.
3.2.4 Electromagnetic Interference
A signal from an external source can induce a voltage in the detector coil
or directly influence the electronics of the metal detector, so that it causes
an audio signal without any presence of metal [49]. Possible sources of
interference are high-voltage power lines and substations, radio transmitters,
electric motors and other metal detectors. Some detectors filter radio signals
and the frequency of electric power transmission, 50 Hz or 60 Hz. The
interference with other metal detectors occurs if their mutual distance is
smaller than a certain critical distance which varies between 1 and 20 m,
depending on the detector model. The working frequency of some detector
models can be adjusted so that the critical distance is very small. The
interference between detectors is rarely a problem in practice, since the
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safety distance between deminers is 25 m. It is an important issue after
an accident, if a rescue team needs to use metal detectors to approach the
victim having a switched on metal detector, and during testing, since there
is no need to keep a safety distance.
3.2.5 Ground Compensation
The magnetic properties of soil are one of the most important factors influ-
encing detection capabilities of metal detectors [19, 16, 27, 49, 64, 13, 17].
Magnetic susceptibility and to a lesser degree electric conductivity of the soil
create a secondary magnetic field which makes the detection of conductive
objects more difficult. The frequency dependence of the magnetic suscep-
tibility is the most important influencing factor [9, 76]. While the metal
components of mines can be very small, the soil occupies the whole space
below the search head, so even though the ground electro-magnetic proper-
ties are much weaker than those of the metal piece, they can still produce a
significant secondary field making detection more difficult. Soils that reduce
the performance of metal detectors are termed uncooperative or noisy , while
the other soils are called cooperative or neutral .
A careful examination of Equation (3.1) in Section 3.1 reveals that the
soil hardly influences the primary and the secondary magnetic field coming
from the detected object. All non-ferromagnetic media, which means most
of the soils found in nature, have a relative magnetic permeability close to
1, i.e. their permeability µ is almost equal to the permeability of air. The
source of problems for metal detectors is not the alteration of the primary or
the secondary field, but the frequency dependence of the soil susceptibility.
Most modern detectors have so called ground compensating abilities,
which allows them to reduce their sensitivity to the soil, with much smaller
reductions of sensitivity to metal objects. This procedure is based on the
electromagnetic differences between metal and the soil. However, no detector
known to the author has achieved a ground compensation that would not
reduce its sensitivity to metal. Heterogeneous soils are particularly difficult
to compensate out. The ground compensation is performed in the field in
a way that the detectors are adjusted to the soil in which deminers search
for mines. This procedure is simple and it lasts no longer than two minutes
with the latest detector models. The exact procedure varies between models
of detector. Some models require the search head to be moved, while some
require the search head to be brought into a specific position.
Frequency domain detectors use the information contained in the am-
plitude and phase of the received signal. During the ground compensation
procedure they record the background signal, that is, the signal coming from
the soil. During mine searching this signal is subtracted from the signal com-
ing from the search head.
Time domain detectors make use of the difference in the decay time of
37
the soil and the metal [17]. A pulse detector samples only specific time
windows of the received signal, or the signal itself in just a few points, so
that it can be made less sensitive to soil.
3.2.6 Possible Technological Improvements
The R&D community seeking improvements in existing metal detector tech-
nology faces two major challenges. The first is to increase the sensitivity
of metal detectors to smaller and deeper targets. The other challenge is to
reduce the false alarm rate. There are two main sources of false alarms:
metal clutter and the soil. Over recent years we have witnessed a constant
improvement in the ground compensation abilities of metal detectors. Since
the ground compensation reduces the noise from the soil, metal detectors can
be setup to a higher sensitivity, thus improving their detection capabilities.
Metal detectors are not mine detectors, they are designed to detect metal.
Deminers frequently have to investigate several hundred signals caused by
metal clutter before they find a mine, which can add significantly to the
time taken to clear an area. The only way to deal with this problem using
today’s metal detectors is to reduce the sensitivity to the level at which the
expected threat will be still detected with certainty and most of the clutter
will not produce an alarm. This calibration procedure is sometimes called
“setting up the detector to the known threat” and it certainly carries some
risks.
Many R&D efforts are directed to reducing the false alarm rate by target
identification and parameter estimation, like the target depth, size or type
of metal [16]. Some imaging applications and some sensors other than coils
are being studied. These technologies are not yet ready for field use.
3.3 Use of Metal Detectors
Daily routines of the work with metal detectors are well described by D. Guel-
le [49], R. Gasser [44] and A. Smith [91]. Demining drills vary locally, so
that a more interested reader should study the Standard Operating Proce-
dures (or Standing Operating Procedures, SOPs) and training materials of
the specific demining group. However, actual practice may not be recorded
in writing because it can take a lot of time to update the documentation to
reflect current best practice. For example, many SOPs prescribe that dem-
iners lie prone when excavating mines, but this is very rarely being followed
[88, 87, 86]. The parts of the drills of interest for this work are described in
the following paragraphs.
Deminers work in 1 m wide lanes and they typically mark them with
sticks and tapes as they progress. In many areas, most of the time they
spend removing vegetation before the actual search begins. When the threat
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includes tripwires, deminers may use their detectors to detect tripwires be-
fore they start to cut the undergrowth. A visual check gives them the first
information about the area to be cleared. It is common for deminers to have
a wooden stick placed horizontally across the lane at the limit of the cleared
area. This stick marks the so called baseline and deminers never cross it.
During the search deminers move their metal detectors sideways, and such
a movement is called a sweep. The distance between consecutive sweeps is
termed sweep advance. It is most common that the sweep advance is a half
of the search head width.
The audio signal produced by detectors in proximity to a metal piece is
called a reading , a (detection) alarm or a (detector) signal . Every reading
has to be investigated , which means that the deminer has to look for the
cause of the signal, first visually, than with a prodder. The search head must
be used to approach the signal from different angles to pinpoint the signal
source. If there are two signals, the deminer pinpoints the signal closest to
him and places a marker where the detector starts to signal. The excavation
starts usually 20 cm before the marker. The deminer prods and excavates
(for example, with a trowel), gradually getting closer to the detected object.
A deminer frequently investigates hundreds of detector signals before he
finds a mine.
There are numerous factors influencing the detection capabilities of metal
detectors. Here are some of them: the size and the shape of the target, its
orientation and placement in relation to the search head, the electromagnetic
properties of the target and the soil, electromagnetic interference, detector
design (in particular how the detection threshold is determined and how
the ground compensation is performed), detector stability, repeatability of
the setup procedure, sweeping speed, and finally, the operator’s skill and
interpretation of the signals.
Problems of mine clearance are not just those of detection. In most cases
it is easy to locate a fragmentation mine, since it is often partly above the
ground and so visible to a deminer. It contains a large amount of metal, so
that it is easily detectable with a metal detector if it is not visible. How-
ever, it can still pose a great danger to deminers [30]. The stakes carrying
fragmentation mines may have fallen over, and tripwires may have corroded
[96]. There is no metal detector that can reliably detect tripwires, even if
they are still in one piece [49]. Winds may sway a bush enough to pull a
tripwire and activate a mine.
Blast mines probably cause the largest number of accidents [88]. Mini-
mum metal blast mines are difficult to detect with metal detectors due to
their low metal content. They are buried close to the surface, but they can
be covered with undergrowth or floodwater sediment. It is possible that
they may be pushed deeper by the flails of a demining machine. Antitank
mines with a non-metal case can also be difficult to detect, since they are
usually placed to larger depths.
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Mines of all types may have been in place for many years, their metal
parts may be corroded, their cases filled with soil, and they can behave
unpredictably. Often mines were laid by untrained personnel or civilians,
without a predictable pattern, which makes their detection more difficult.
3.4 Reliability Model
The overall reliability of a mine detection system (R) can be understood
as a function of three factors: an intrinsic capability (IC) describing the
physics and the basic technical capabilities of the device and representing
an upper limit of R, factors of application such as specific environmental
conditions in the field (AP ) generally diminishing R and finally the human
factor (HF ), which lowers R. All three factors are described in a concept
called reliability formula or a reliability model [73, 77]:
R = f (IC,AP,HF ) (3.10)
The reliability of the system is indicated as a function of all influencing fac-
tors, whose mutual correlation can be very complex. The reliability formula
should be understood as a compact description of the factors influencing
detection, rather than a strict quantitative statement. It emphasizes the
influence of the human operator on the process of detection, an influence
which is often ignored or underestimated. In humanitarian demining the
influence of the last two factors has already been recognised as very impor-
tant, since the conditions in the field and the behaviour of the operators
have proven to have a significant impact on the overall performance.
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Chapter 4
Testing and Evaluation of
Metal Detectors
This chapter discusses the current “state of the art” of testing metal de-
tectors for humanitarian demining. The first section deals with the reasons
for testing metal detectors. The topic of the next section are the existing
standards for testing metal detectors for humanitarian demining, i.e. the
CWA 14747:2003 (where CWA stands for Comite´ Europe´en de Normali-
sation /CEN/ Workshop Agreement) and the International Mine Action
Standard IMAS. The third section gives an overview of trials performed
worldwide in the last several years.
The web site of the International Test and Evaluation Program for Hu-
manitarian Demining (ITEP) [61] offers many documents related to test and
evaluation of demining equipment. All trial reports referenced in Section 4.3
are available on that web site, as well as the standards described in Section
4.2.
4.1 Purpose of Testing Metal Detectors
The focus of our interest in testing metal detectors is the determination of
their detection capabilities. Some other important factors determining the
quality of a detector are: battery life, ergonomics, robustness, etc. The
most important factors that influence the detection capabilities of metal
detectors are the target that they need to detect, the depth of the target,
and the electromagnetic properties of the soil.
The purpose of testing and evaluation is to provide an assessment of
the effectiveness of mine action equipment. The International Mine Action
Standard “Test and Evaluation of Mine Action Equipment” IMAS 03.40
[54, 37] defines several categories of trials: concept and technology demon-
stration trials, development trials, acceptance trials, and consumer report.
Most metal detector trials performed up to now do not fit entirely into any of
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the listed categories. The purpose of most metal detector trials was to find
the best device for a given range of conditions. Such trials should constitute
a separate category and they could be called comparative trials. They are
similar to acceptance trials and to a lesser degree to consumer reports, but
there are important differences. The purpose of acceptance trials, as defined
in the IMAS, is “to provide the Sponsor with sufficient information so that
a decision can be taken on the acceptability of an equipment for its intended
use.” As we see, they do not determine the best among the acceptable de-
vices. Consumer reports, according to the IMAS, “may involve a review
of previous trials, tests in laboratory conditions, and some new field trials
to enable a useful summary of current systems.” It is not recommended
to base acquirement decisions solely on consumer reports, since the equip-
ment should be tested against the conditions of its intended use. However,
consumer reports can provide an overview of the market and provide an
informed guide when selecting the devices for a comparative trial.
4.2 CEN Workshop Agreement CWA 14747:2003
Although metal detectors have been used to clear landmines since the Second
World War, an international standard for their testing was proposed only in
2003. That standard is the CEN Workshop Agreement CWA 14747:2003 ,
where CEN stands for the European Committee for Standardisation [26,
11, 12]. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has referenced
the CEN Workshop Agreement in its International Mine Action Standard ,
IMAS . The IMAS 03.40 [54, 37] provides some general guidelines to testing
and evaluation of demining equipment and it refers to the CWA 14747:2003,
which is much more specific.
The results of test and evaluation are more useful if the testing conforms
to standard protocols and if the results are reported in a uniform manner. It
is stated in the CWA 14747:2003 [26] (Section 5.2.3 of that document) that
standardised procedures and tests in controlled conditions may enable com-
parisons of the results of tests performed at different times. However, even
if the conditions are nominally the same, there are so many factors, perhaps
some of them not yet known, that influence the performance of demining
equipment, that it is practically impossible to recreate them all accurately.
(This problem is discussed in detail in Subsections 8.8.1 to 8.8.4.) For exam-
ple, let us imagine that we want to compare two metal detectors. We might
decide to use the result of an earlier test on one of these detectors and to
perform a new test on the other detector. Many things change in time, most
obviously the weather conditions and the operators. Since an essential re-
quirement of a good statistical design is that like be compared with like, the
two detectors should be compared under comparable conditions, and that
also means roughly at the same time. Standardisation enables others to
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infer how useful a device would be for their own needs, and this is certainly
helpful, but this is not the main benefit of standardisation, since it does not
exclude the need to test the equipment under comparable conditions. It is
a simple fact that two nominally identical trials have never been performed.
The reasons are constant improvements of the experimental design, execu-
tion of trials and the choice of locally specific conditions. The main benefit
of standardisation is facilitated sharing of the best practices in organising
trials, testing, data analysing and reporting.
It is important that the devices are tested in conditions relevant for
their use: on local soil, with local deminers, on local threats. An example
from practice can illustrate this problem. It has been proposed to use sim-
ple geometric targets as standard targets for metal detector tests (Section
5.6 of the CWA 14747:2003 [26]). Although such “unrealistic” targets can
provide some information about the performance of metal detectors, it has
been shown [10] that they can help to predict only roughly how the metal
detectors will react to mines.
The CWA 14747:2003 specifies procedures for: in-air tests, tests of the
immunity to environmental and operational conditions, in-soil tests, and
operational performance tests. In-air tests, in-soil tests and tests of the im-
munity to environmental and operational conditions are all based on the
maximum detection height measurements (see Section 4.2.1) and they con-
tain sensitivity profile measurements and measurements of the repeatability
of the setup. The tests of the immunity to environmental and operational
conditions contain tests of the influence of the search head orientation, mois-
ture, temperature etc. on the maximum detection height. The tests that
receive the most attention by detector end users are the blind in-field tests
called “detection reliability tests”, which are the main subject of this the-
sis. They are described in Section 4.2.2. The operational performance tests
include the tests of: pinpointing accuracy, resolution of adjacent targets,
detection near large linear metal objects, electromagnetic interference, er-
gonomics, robustness, and some others.
4.2.1 Maximum Detection Height Measurements
The maximum detection height (MDH) is a measure of the detection capa-
bility of a metal detector. The CEN Workshop Agreement [26] gives the fol-
lowing definition of the maximum detection height: “The maximum height
above a test target at which a metal detector at given settings produces a
true alarm indication due to that target.”
4.2.2 Detection Reliability Tests
In blind tests, the operators using the detectors do not know the target
positions. Detection reliability tests are the blind tests defined in Section
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8.5 of the CWA 14747:2003 [26]. Among all the tests in the CWA 14747:2003,
these tests include the influence of most factors that affect the performance
of metal detectors, including a large part of the human factor influence.
They are also the only tests that can evaluate the ability of metal detectors
to deal with false alarms. In the CWA 14747:2003 detection reliability is
defined as “the degree to which the metal detector is capable of achieving
its purpose, which is to have maximum capability for giving true alarm
indications without producing false alarm indications.”
In a reliability test, targets are placed in metal free lanes at positions
not known to detector operators. While searching, the operators mark the
places of indications and, later, supervisors measure and record the positions
of the markers. A target is considered to have been detected when a marker
is dropped within a prescribed radius around the true target location. The
area defined with this radius is called a detection halo, or in this document
just a halo. The halo radius, according to CWA 14747:2003, is defined as
“the half of the maximum horizontal extent of the metal components in the
target plus 100 mm”. An indication falling inside the halo is called a true
positive indication. A missed mine, or an absence of a marker in the halo, is
called a false negative indication. A marker outside of the halo is classified
as a false positive indication, or a false alarm.
CWA 14747:2003 makes recommendations about the lane width, soil
types, target types, numbers, depths, orientation, separation and halo size
and gives some practical instructions about the lane preparation.
4.3 Metal Detector Trials Performed up to the
Present
Many metal detector trials have been performed in recent years. Most of
these trials had the aim of choosing the most suitable detector for a certain
clearance program. Numerous trials were organised by the military forces
all over the world for the purposes of military demining, but the reports of
those trials are rarely publicly available. The results of some non-military
trials have been distributed informally, since the publicly available reports
often contain little information [48].
In the mid-1990s some trials were executed in Cambodia (results not
published). The series of tests was performed under the UN umbrella start-
ing from 1997, when the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
performed trials in Sarajevo and Mostar, towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(without publishing any results). The following UN trials were the Mine Ac-
tion Programme for Afghanistan (UNMAPA) trial in Peshawar, Jalalabad
and Kabul in 1999/2000 [2], the Accelerated Demining Programme (UN-
ADP) trials in three southern provinces of Mozambique (Inhambane, Gaza
and Maputo) in 1999 and 2000 [46, 47] and another Afghan UNMAPA trial
44
in 2002 [3]. Among these trials, only some results of the ADP and the second
Afghan trials were made public. The reports of these two trials were not very
detailed and the knowledge was transferred mostly informally. Each trial
was conducted differently, since there was no agreed standard methodology.
A great step towards a standardised testing procedure was the Inter-
national Pilot Project for Technology Co-operation (IPPTC) launched in
1998. Five research organisations and two national mine action authorities
carried out tests on 29 devices under controlled conditions in laboratories
and in blind field trials in two countries. Their intention was to evaluate the
performance of the devices in a wide range of conditions. The results of the
study were published in a consumer report in 2000 [28]. The time needed
to perform and to publish the study was its main weakness. By the time
the results were made available, several new detector models had appeared
on the market. However, the experiences gained during that work had a
crucial influence on the shaping of the standard for testing metal detectors
for humanitarian demining, the CWA 14747:2003 (described in Section 4.2).
Many of the tests that later entered the CWA 14747:2003 were performed
during the IPPTC.
Although most of the metal detector trials performed by the military
were not made public, there are three exceptions known to the author of
this work. These are the Nicaraguan trial by the US Department of De-
fense Humanitarian Demining R&D Program in 2001 [82], the Colombian
trial organised by “Defence R&D Canada” in 2002 [95], and a trial in the
Netherlands organised by the Engineers Centre of Expertise of the Royal
Netherlands Army in 2004 [83]. The last of these trials partially used the
CWA 14747:2003 as a guideline, which had already been published in 2003.
All three reports are fully transparent, describing both the testing procedure
and the results in detail.
The first trial that was carried out according to the guidelines of the
CWA 14747:2003 was the trial organised by the Federal Institute for Mate-
rials Research and Testing (or BAM, standing for Bundesanstalt fu¨r Mate-
rialforschung und -pru¨fung) in partnership with the Joint Research Centre
of the European Commission (JRC). The trial was executed in 2003 and the
results were published in 2004 [76, 10], together with the results of other
two trials performed in the same year by BAM. Their goal was to validate
the part of the testing procedure proposed in the CWA 14747:2003 dealing
with detection capabilities of metal detectors. They comprised maximum
detection distance measurements and detection reliability tests, which have
the aim of evaluating the detection capabilities of metal detectors. Another
trial organised by BAM was performed in 2005. Two articles presenting the
results of this trial were published in 2006 [41, 40] and the final report [72]
is expected in 2007. A detailed description of these four trials organised by
BAM is given in Chapters 7 and 8, which are the core of this PhD work.
Other trials carried out after the standard CWA 14747:2003 was already
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published were the Lao and Mozambican trials as a part of the STEMD
project (Standardised Testing and Evaluation of Metal Detectors) [48, 50,
51, 52] organised by JRC and published in 2005, and the Croatian STEMD
trial executed in October 2006 and organised by BAM. The final report of
that trial is expected in 2007. The importance of the STEMD trials is that
they included many commercially available metal detectors not included in
the IPPTC, and that the names of the manufacturers were made public.
A comparative trial of manual demining methods [90] performed as part
of the GICHD Study of Manual Mine Clearance [36] contained only a small
metal detector trial. It was executed in Mozambique in 2004 and its report
published in 2005, with the participation of the author (see Chapter 6).
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Chapter 5
Design of Experiment
The topic of this chapter is the statistical design of experiments. The basic
principles are discussed in the first section and some examples of experimen-
tal design relevant to mine detector tests are offered in the second section.
It is expected from the reader to be familiar with the main statistical con-
cepts such as experimental error, random sample, with some distributions
(normal, t, chi-square and F), with the notion of confidence intervals and
with the basics of hypothesis testing. Excellent textbooks about the design
and analysis of experiments were written by G. E. P. Box, W. G. Hunter
and J. S. Hunter [14], and by D. C. Montgomery [71]. The first of these
books includes a broader introduction to basic statistical concepts, with
many examples, while the other is more compact and it offers more about
the analysis of experimental data. They are both written for engineers and
require no previous statistical knowledge.
5.1 Basic Principles
The statistical design of experiments1 is the process of planning the experi-
ment so that appropriate data will be collected, enabling sound and objective
conclusions. A scientific approach to planning an experiment results in the
highest possible efficiency of that experiment. High efficiency means that
the results are unambiguous and as little affected by experimental error as
possible.
When the data are subject to experimental errors, statistical evaluation
is necessary. This is why all experimental problems have two aspects: design
of experiment and statistical analysis of the data. If the design of experiment
1Besides “statistical design of experiment(s)”, the terms “design of experiment(s)” and
“experimental design” are used as synonyms. Most statisticians prefer to use the first two
expressions. One of the reasons to use “experimental design” is to avoid double genitive,
like “methods of design of experiment”. In 1999 an ISO standard has been written to bring
order in the terminology of this field [62]. All definitions in this work are in compliance
with that standard.
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is well chosen, sometimes a very elementary analysis, maybe even a visual
examination of the data, will provide an answer. On the other hand, even the
most sophisticated analysis cannot save the experiment if the data contain
no information, as a result of the poor design of the experiment.
Experimental design methods are widely used in industry, for improving
a manufacturing process or as a part of engineering design activities. The use
of experimental design can result in products that have better performance
and reliability, lower production costs and shorter development time.
When a measurement is repeated under, as nearly as possible, the same
conditions, the observed results are never identical. The experimental er-
ror or simply error is the variation caused by uncontrolled and generally
unavoidable factors. Usually only a small part of it is caused by the mea-
surement procedure, most of it is caused by incomplete control of the exper-
imental environment. An adequate design of experiment reduces the effect
of the experimental error, which can otherwise obscure important effects.
In a designed experiment we make a difference between the predictor
variables of a process and the response variables. A predictor variable is
a variable that can contribute to the explanation of the outcome of an ex-
periment. A response variable is a variable representing the outcome of an
experiment. The predictor variables included in the experiment by control-
ling their values are called factors and the specific values that these factors
can take in an experiment are called levels. If one of the factors is of special
interest, it is called a principal factor . The experimental goal is to investi-
gate the influence of factors on the response variables. Another important
notion is the treatment . Treatment is a specific combination of factor levels
that appears in the experiment.
5.1.1 Replication, Randomisation and Blocking
Three basic principles of experimental design are replication, randomisation
and blocking. These principles are briefly described in the next paragraphs
and their application is explained in Section 5.2.
Replication is the performance of an experiment more than once for a
given set of predictor variables. It allows the experimenter to estimate the
error, which is important for determining whether the observed differences
between the data are significant. More replicates allow more precise esti-
mates of the model parameters.
Randomisation is a fundamental part of the experimental design. It
means that both the allocation of the experimental material and the order
of execution of measurements are determined randomly. As a result of ran-
domisation, errors are usually independently distributed random variables,
which is important for the statistical analysis. Another consequence of ran-
domisation can be “averaging out” the effects of extraneous factors that may
be present.
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A block is a portion of the experimental material that is expected to
be more homogeneous than the entire set of material. Blocking enables
comparisons within each block. This way the variability between blocks does
not affect the experimental error, so that the precision of the experiment is
higher.
5.1.2 Guidelines for Designing Experiments
All participants of an experiment need to clearly understand the goal of their
study, the process of data collection and at least something about how those
data will be analysed. The following list was proposed by D. Montgomery
[71] as a guideline to an experimenter:
1. Recognition of and statement of the problem. All participants of the
experiment must have a clear understanding of the problem. However
obvious this point might seem, the practical experience teaches us
that it is often difficult to reach common understanding and a clear
statement of the experimental goals.
2. Choice of factors and levels. The experimenter needs to determine the
factors to be varied, the ranges of variations, and the specific levels to
be used in the experiment. It has to be established how these factors
are to be controlled and how they will be measured. At this point,
but also at points 1 and 3, the non-statistical professional knowledge
of the experimenter will be crucial.
3. Selection of the response variable and the response parameter. The
response variable needs to be adequately chosen, so that it really pro-
vides useful information. It is usual to choose a mean or a standard
deviation of the response variable, or both, as a response parameter.
4. Choice of experimental design. This step involves defining the number
of replicates, the suitable order of runs, the decision about blocking or
other randomisation restrictions and the choice of treatments. Simple
solutions should be preferred, since they are almost always best. Some
experimental designs are presented in Section 5.2.
5. Performing the experiment. Errors in the execution can easily destroy
experimental validity. This is why careful monitoring and detailed
planning are very important to success. Logistical and similar prob-
lems are often underestimated.
6. Data analysis. If the experiment has been designed and performed
correctly, the data analysis is usually simple. Many software packages
that assist in data evaluation are present on the market.
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7. Conclusions and recommendations. The experimenter must give prac-
tical conclusions and recommend actions. Very often these recommen-
dations will include additional tests.
Points 2, 3 and 4 form a more coherent whole; the experimenter’s knowledge
in design of experiment influences his choice of factor levels and response
parameters, which again influence the design of the experiment.
It is usually not recommended to design a trial of a larger scope at the
beginning of the study. The first experiments help the experimenter to
learn more about his problem. With this new knowledge he starts a new
iteration, another experiment. This is why it is said that experimentation
is an iterative process.
A common misconception is that statistical methods can prove an influ-
ence of a certain factor. They cannot do that, but, when applied properly,
they can give guidelines to objective and reliable conclusions. In particular,
they help us to assign a confidence level to our statements or to estimate the
likely error in our conclusions, thus helping the decision-making process.
5.2 Randomised Blocks, Latin Squares and Graeco-
Latin Squares
5.2.1 Randomised Complete Block Design
In some experiments the influence of only one factor on a certain response
needs to be evaluated. If some variability of the output comes from a known
nuisance source, blocking can be an effective way to control it. As an ex-
ample, suppose we want to compare the maximum detection heights of four
metal detectors on the same target in air. We have decided to perform five
measurements with each device to estimate the experimental error. Our
principle factor is “metal detector” having four levels, and the response
variable is the maximum detection height. We know from experience that
the measurements performed within a short period of time will have a lower
variance. Actually, we are aware that some factors like temperature, electro-
magnetic surroundings, etc. influence the result, but we are not interested
in measuring those influences separately. Instead, we introduce a single
nuisance factor called “time”, with levels “day 1”, “day 2” etc. All mea-
surements in a day will be executed within an hour, a period short enough
to assume that the conditions stay constant. Our goal is to remove the
variability between days from the experimental error.
An experimenter not familiar with the principles of experimental design
might perform repeated measurements with each detector, each day using
another detector. This approach would lead to biased2 conclusions: the
2While the term ‘bias’ sounds pejorative, it is not necessarily used in that way in
statistics.
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Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5
Treatment 1 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15
Treatment 2 y21 y22 y23 y24 y25
Treatment 3 y31 y32 y33 y34 y35
Treatment 4 y41 y42 y43 y44 y45
Table 5.1: Randomised complete block design.
differences between the detectors would not be distinguishable from the
differences between days. The two factors, “metal detector” and “time”,
would be confounded .
The appropriate design is presented in Table 5.1 and it is called ran-
domised complete block design. The word ‘complete’ indicates that each
block contains all principle factor levels. In our example, blocks are days and
principal factor levels are metal detectors: each day only one measurement
with each metal detector will be performed. ‘Randomised’ indicates that
the measurements within a block are executed in a random order. A result
of a single measurement yij is called an observation. The variance between
the blocks is most welcome, but the blocks should be chosen to represent
realistic conditions. In tests of demining equipment, typical blocking factors
are operators and time.
After the data are collected, they need to be analysed. Suppose we have
a principal factor levels and b blocks. The most frequently used statistical
model for the randomised complete block design is
yij = µ+ τi + βj + ij with
{
i = 1, 2, . . . , a
j = 1, 2, . . . , b
(5.1)
where µ is the overall mean, τi is the effect of the i-th level, βj is the effect
in the j-th block, and ij is the random error, normally and independently
distributed with the mean 0 and a variance σ2. The level and block effects
are defined so that
a∑
i=1
τi = 0 (5.2)
and
b∑
j=1
βj = 0 (5.3)
The analysis described in the following paragraphs is called analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA). We want to test the equality of the level means. Our
hypothesis is
H0 : µ1 = µ2 = · · · = µa
H1 : at least one µi 6= µj
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where the statementH0 is the null hypothesis, H1 the alternative hypothesis,
and µi = µ + τi is the i-th level mean. It is helpful to introduce some
abbreviations. Let yi. be the sum of all observations of level i, similarly
y.j is the sum of all observations of block j, and y.. is the total sum of
observations. Let us call the total number of observations N = ab. We can
write
yi. =
b∑
j=1
yij for i = 1, 2, . . . , a (5.4)
y.j =
a∑
i=1
yij for j = 1, 2, . . . , b (5.5)
and
y.. =
a∑
i=1
b∑
j=1
yij (5.6)
The corresponding averages are marked as follows:
y¯i. =
yi.
b
y¯.j =
y.j
a
y¯.. =
y..
N
(5.7)
The expression
∑a
i=1
∑b
j=1(yij − y¯..)2 is called the total corrected sum
of squares and it can be expanded to three terms:
a∑
i=1
b∑
j=1
(yij−y¯..)2 = b
a∑
i=1
(y¯i.−y¯..)2+a
b∑
j=1
(y¯.j−y¯..)2+
a∑
i=1
b∑
j=1
(yij−y¯.j−y¯i.+y¯..)2
(5.8)
We can write them abbreviated,
SST = SSLevels + SSBlocks + SSE (5.9)
The sum of squares due to levels, SSLevels, is the measure of the differences
between the level means. The sum of squares due to blocks, SSBlocks, is the
measure of the differences between the blocks. SSE is the measure of the
differences between the observations within a level from the level average
and it is caused by random error, which is why it is called sum of squares
due to error.
To calculate the sums of squares, it is easier to use totals than averages.
With some simple calculations we get
SST =
a∑
i=1
b∑
j=1
y2ij −
y2..
N
(5.10)
SSLevels =
a∑
i=1
y2i.
b
− y
2
..
N
(5.11)
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SSBlocks =
b∑
j=1
y2.j
a
− y
2
..
N
(5.12)
The SSE is found by subtraction, using Equation (5.9).
It can be shown that the quantity
MSE =
SSE
(a− 1)(b− 1) (5.13)
has an expected value σ2, which describes the experimental error.
E(MSE) = σ2 (5.14)
We call this quantity, MSE , the mean square of the error. The mean square
of the levels is defined as
MSLevels =
SSLevels
a− 1 (5.15)
and its expected value is
E(MSLevels) = σ2 +
b
∑a
i=1 τ
2
i
a− 1 (5.16)
If the level means differ, the expectation of the MSLevels is larger than the
expectation of the MSE , that is, E(MSLevels) > E(MSE). The test of our
hypothesis can be performed by comparing these two values of mean squares.
It can be shown that they are independent and each of them follows a chi-
square distribution, so that their ratio follows an F distribution if the null
hypothesis is valid. Therefore our test statistic is
F0 =
SSLevels
a−1
SSE
(a−1)(b−1)
=
MSLevels
MSE
(5.17)
If the null hypothesis is true, F0 is distributed as F with a − 1 and N − a
degrees of freedom. If the null hypothesis if false, the expected value of F0
is greater than 1. We reject the null hypothesis if
F0 > Fα,a−1,(a−1)(b−1) (5.18)
where α is the significance level. We can test the hypothesis against a given
significance level, for example α = 0.05, but it is more informative to state
the significance level at which the hypothesis is rejected, saying, for example,
“H0 is rejected with the p-value α = 0.0034”.
The whole procedure is summarised in Table 5.2 and the method is called
analysis of variance, or by many authors ANOVA.
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The test statistic
F0 =
MSBlocks
MSE
(5.19)
is also important, because it gives us feedback about the usefulness of block-
ing. In the case when no significant difference between blocks is detected,
it would be better to design an experiment without blocks. The reason is
that blocking reduces the number of degrees of freedom for the SSE , thus
increasing the error.
The model of the Equation (5.1) is linear and hence completely additive.
This means that, for instance, the first block increases the observations in
all levels for the same amount, namely β1. In many cases such a model is
useful, but there are situations when it is inadequate, for example, if one
of the blocks strongly affects only one level, but not the others. In such
a case we say there is an interaction between the blocks and the levels.
An interaction generally inflates the experimental error and thus affects the
comparison of level means. If both factors and their interactions are of
interest, factorial designs have to be used.
After the experimenter finds out that there are significant differences
between the levels, he or she is usually interested in multiple comparisons to
discover which level means differ. There are several available methods, but
the most powerful ones are the Duncan’s multiple range test and the least
significant difference (LSD) test [71]. The LSD test is described in the next
lines.
Let us suppose we want to test H0 : µi = µj . The pair of means µi and
µj would be declared significantly different if
|y¯i. − y¯j.| > tα
2
,N−a
√
2MSE
b
(5.20)
The right hand side is called the least significant difference. It also defines
the confidence interval for this specific difference:
(y¯i. − y¯j.)± tα
2
,N−a
√
2MSE
b
(5.21)
5.2.2 Latin Square Design
Suppose that an experimenter wants to evaluate the influence of a certain
factor on a certain response variable and that he wants to include the influ-
ence of two nuisance factors in his evaluation. The appropriate design is the
Latin square design presented in Table 5.3. The principal factor levels are
denoted with Latin letters A, B, . . . , while the columns and rows represent
the two nuisance factors. Each column and each row can be understood as
a block. Principal factor levels are orthogonal to both rows and columns,
which means that each letter appears once in each row and in each column.
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A D B E C
D A C B E
C B E D A
B E A C D
E C D A B
Table 5.3: An example of a 5× 5 Latin square.
The statistical model for the Latin square design is
yijk = µ+ αi + τj + βk + ijk with

i = 1, 2, . . . , p
j = 1, 2, . . . , p
k = 1, 2, . . . , p
(5.22)
where yijk is the observation in the i-th row, k-th column, for the j-th level,
µ is the overall mean, αi and βk are the i-th row effect and the k-th column
effect, τj is the j-th level effect, and ijk is the random error. Any two indexes
of an observation yijk determine the third one, since each level appears only
once in each column and row. Therefore, the total number of observations is
N = p2. If all factor level combinations would be present, the total number
of observations would be p3. Like the model for the randomised complete
block design (Equation (5.1) on page 51), this model is completely additive,
which means that there is no interaction between the rows, columns and
levels. Similarly as with the randomised complete block design described in
the previous section, we perform the analysis of variance. The procedure is
described in [14] and [71].
5.2.3 Graeco-Latin Square Design
In the section about the randomised complete block design we considered
only one nuisance factor, while the Latin square design dealt with two nui-
sance factors. We continue to increase the number of nuisance factors and
we ask ourselves what is the best design if there are three nuisance factors
influencing our result. The solution is in superimposing two Latin squares.
The procedure is illustrated in Table 5.4. The second Latin square is writ-
ten in Greek letters and superimposed on the first one. If the two squares
have the property that each Latin letter appears once and only once with
each Greek letter, we say that the two squares are orthogonal and the design
obtained is called a Graeco-Latin square. This design allows investigations
of four factors, each with p levels, in only p2 runs.
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Latin square 1 Latin square 2 Graeco-Latin square
A B C D A B C D Aα Bβ Cγ Dδ
B A D C D C B A Bδ Aγ Dβ Cα
C D A B B A D C Cβ Dα Aδ Bγ
D C B A C D A B Dγ Cδ Bα Aβ
Table 5.4: An example of a 4× 4 Graeco-Latin square.
The statistical model for the Graeco-Latin square design is
yijkl = µ+ αi + τj + ωk + βl + ijkl with

i = 1, 2, . . . , p
j = 1, 2, . . . , p
k = 1, 2, . . . , p
l = 1, 2, . . . , p
(5.23)
where yijkl is the observation in the i-th row and l-th column for Latin
letter j and Greek letter k, µ is the overall mean, αi is the effect of the
i-th row, τj is the effect of Latin letter j, ωk is the effect of Greek letter k,
βl is the effect of column l, and ijkl is the random error. Two subscripts
identify an observation, e.g. a row and a column identify the Latin letter
and the Greek letter. The total number of observations is only p2. If all
factor level combinations would be present, the total number of observations
would be p4. The analysis of variance of the Graeco-Latin square design is
an extension of the Latin square analysis of variance and it is described in
[14] and [71].
This concept of combining orthogonal Latin squares can be extended.
A p × p hypersquare is a design with three or more superimposed p × p
orthogonal Latin squares. The highest possible number of superimposed
Latin squares is p − 1, because a design with p − 1 Latin squares would
utilise all p2 − 1 degrees of freedom, so that an independent estimate of the
error variance σ2 would be necessary.
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Chapter 6
Comparative Trial of Manual
Mine Clearance Methods
A trial of manual mine clearance methods [90] took place in Moamba in
Maputo Province, Mozambique, at the training centre of ADP (Accelerated
Demining Programme), in November 2004, as a part of the Study of Man-
ual Mine Clearance [36] managed by the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining. This chapter deals with some aspects of the trial
mostly concerning the estimate of the experimental error and the problem
of bias.
The goals of the trial and the testing procedure are described in the
introductory section. The next section presents the results, followed by a
discussion. The chapter ends with conclusions, including some recommen-
dations for future tests.
6.1 Introduction
The primary goal of the trial of manual demining methods performed in
Mozambique in 2004 was to compare the speeds of seven manual demining
methods. Three of them include a metal detector, while the other four
were excavation methods during which the top layer of the soil was removed
from the entire lane (see [90] for a complete description of the demining
methods and the tools). Some metal fragments were deliberately placed on
the lanes to simulate a difficult scenario for metal detectors. A part of the
test area labelled “method 4” was kept almost free from metal to provide
a benchmark. The demining procedures of methods 1 and 4 were identical,
the only difference being the metal contamination of the lanes. Table 6.1 is
an overview of the tested methods.
Another goal of the trial was to compare the results of a detection re-
liability test with the results of a test with full excavation of the targets.
This test was performed on the lanes with a minimum metal contamination
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Method Description Team
1 metal detector with standard tools A
2 metal detector + magnet attached to a trowel B
3 metal detector + magnet attached to a brush-rake B
4 metal detector with standard tools (no metal fragments) B
5 excavation with rakes C
6 excavation with a spade A
7 excavation with a trowel D
8 excavation with a mattock B
Table 6.1: List of all methods tested in Mozambique trial.
labelled “method 4”. The positions of the deminers’ indications were com-
pared with the target positions and the halo radii. All indications falling
inside the halo radii were counted as true positives, while the other were
counted as false alarms.
Four 5-m lanes were prepared for each method. Six metal fragments
per square metre were placed on random positions to depths between 0 and
1 cm. Some targets simulating mines were placed in the lanes to enable
the evaluation of the thoroughness of the excavation methods. The simu-
lated targets were GYATA-64 and Type 72. The clearance was performed
by professional deminers from several demining organisations working in
Mozambique. Four teams participated in the tests, each consisting of two
deminers and a section leader controlling their work. Each deminer cleared
10 m, if his speed was sufficient to complete these 10 m in three days, oth-
erwise the test was interrupted. For that reason, the test of methods 5 and
7 was not completed. Team A executed the clearance with methods 1 and
6, team B with methods 2, 3, 4 and 8, team C with method 5 and team D
with method 7, as indicated in Table 6.1. The deminers wore their personal
protective equipment, because it has a large influence on their comfort and
consequently on their speed. It might also have had some positive influ-
ence on their concentration, since it is a part of their daily routine. The
section leaders were present during the whole trial and they controlled the
work of the deminers. The involvement of section leaders and the protective
equipment was important because the goal was to test the whole demining
system, not just the tools.
6.2 Results
For a reliable comparison between the methods, some confidence limits need
to be attributed to the average speed of each method. Each lane was di-
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vided to four or five areas of similar size (1-1.5 m) and these areas are called
segments. The time required for each segment was measured without inter-
rupting the work of the deminers. The time required to clear a segment of
a certain area divided with the size of that area is a reciprocal of speed.1
The measurement unit of the reciprocal of speed is min/m2. We use the
standard deviation of the segments’ reciprocal speeds to estimate the ex-
perimental error of the reciprocal speed for each method. We assume that
the reciprocal values of the segment speed are roughly normally distributed
to construct 95% confidence limits. The results of the experiment, i.e. the
reciprocal speeds for each segment and the averages for each method are pre-
sented in Table 6.2. Figure 6.1 is a graphical representation of the overall
results. (The figure was created in Microsoft Excel 2002.)
As expected, the results of the reliability test and the test with a full
investigation of the signal were very similar. The only significant difference
was with the GYATA-64. The signal of the original mine, as well as that
of the surrogate used in this test, has two local maxima, so that it appears
to the deminer that there are two point-like metallic objects under the soil
surface. Two out of eight deeply buried GYATAs were narrowly missed in
the reliability test because both signal maxima fell just outside the detection
halo. The same deminers who closely missed these two targets in a reliability
test found the targets in the full investigation test.
6.3 Discussion
When comparing the speeds or the reciprocals of speeds of the tested meth-
ods, we should keep in mind that the results are highly biased. The strongest
source of bias is the confounding between the methods and the deminers (see
Table 6.1). The individual differences between the deminers, although not
measured, were obvious during the trial, and they certainly influenced the
outcome. The methods were not tested simultaneously, so that there is con-
founding between the methods and time. The influencing variable “time”
actually encompasses the influences of many variables not explicitly consid-
ered, like weather, experience of the personnel etc.
Nevertheless, the differences between the estimated speeds of some meth-
ods were so high, that there is no doubt about the actual difference between
1The reciprocals of speed are easier to analyse than the speeds. The speed of each
method cannot be estimated with the average of the segment speeds, since the segments are
approximately equally large. If we have N segments and if xi and ti are the segment area
and the clearance time for the segment i, then the average segment speed is 1
N
PN
i=1
xi
ti
,
while the estimated speed is
PN
i=1 xiPN
i=1 ti
. These expressions are equal only if the times ti are
equal. However, the average reciprocal of speed, 1
N
PN
i=1
ti
xi
, is approximately equal to
the estimated reciprocal of speed,
PN
i=1 tiPN
i=1 xi
. Only approximately, because the segments are
only approximately equal.
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method
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
lane 1 segment 1 60 11.7 11.6 20.7 107 69 104 22
segment 2 28.7 9 10.5 12.7 105 43 242 23
segment 3 57.7 49 13.1 6.09 145 47 230 23
segment 4 79.1 21 2.73 13.6 44.6 53 29
segment 5 79.5 46 31
lane 2 segment 1 138 16.5 11.8 19.7 110 53 26
segment 2 31.2 10 8.18 29.2 145 29 23
segment 3 20.8 7.33 18.5 15.6 36 35
segment 4 36.8 11.3 18.6 9.03 28 24
segment 5 23 13
lane 3 segment 1 135 57.9 12.2 32.4 138 70 159 56
segment 2 37.3 13.1 21.3 15.1 67 85 142 54
segment 3 25 28.9 16.9 3.1 80.4 49 74.4 41
segment 4 17.5 32.9 15 6.07 96.4 37 101 22
segment 5 36 109 30
lane 4 segment 1 42.7 40 22.5 16.5 49 32
segment 2 54.5 49.2 15 11.5 56 25
segment 3 17.2 12.7 38.2 7.8 38 27
segment 4 35.8 7.27 17.3 10.3 40 32
segment 5 22 34
average 51.1 23.6 15.8 14.3 102 45.5 145 30.1
standard deviation 37.4 17.1 7.78 8.14 32.5 16.1 61.8 10.4
estimated error 19.9 9.1 4.1 4.3 22 7.6 52 4.9
quality assurance 4 2 4 4 4.5 0.4 0 0
average + quality assurance 55.1 25.6 19.8 18.3 106 45.9 145 30.1
measurement unit: min/m2
Table 6.2: Trial of manual demining methods, results. Each lane was divided
to four or five segments and the reciprocal of speed is given for each of these
segments, measured in min/m2. The row “estimated error” refers to 95%
confidence limits based on the assumption of normal distribution. The time
spent on quality assurance performed by the section leader is added to form
the total result.
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Figure 6.1: Trial of manual demining methods, results, overview. The data
include the time spent on quality assurance. The error bars indicate 95%
confidence limits based on the assumption of normal distribution.
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some methods. A comparison of the methods tested by the same deminer
team is less subject to bias. Thus we can see, for example, that the use of
magnets (methods 2 and 3) significantly improved the performance of dem-
iners, making it comparable with their performance in lanes without any
metal fragments (method 4).
It is possible to perform a Duncan’s multiple range test or an LSD test
(see Section 5.2.1) to compare the methods, however, the comparison would
be unreliable and could be misleading due to high bias present in the trial
results. The bias is high because not all methods were tested with the
same deminer team; in other words, because the teams and the methods
were confounded (see Table 6.1). The presence of bias also justifies the
approximations used in the data analysis and mentioned in the previous
section.
The results of the reliability test indicate no significant difference be-
tween the overall results of the reliability test and the full investigation test.
A similar conclusion follows from another test with a full investigation, per-
formed in Oberjettenberg in November 2003 and described in Section 8.5.
There is, however, a difference in the results for the GYATA-64. The prob-
lem of indications falling very close to the detection halo can be easily solved
by choosing a slightly larger halo radius.
The presence of section leaders had a marked influence on the deminers.
This conclusion is based on a comparison with the experiences from the
Oberjettenberg trials and the Benkovac 2003 trial described in Chapter 8,
when no section leaders were included in the test.
6.4 Conclusions
The results of this trial are highly biased mostly due to confounding be-
tween the tested methods and operators. Nevertheless, the large differences
between the results indicate that some methods are significantly faster than
others.
Future tests should be organised and planned so that all methods are
tested in the same conditions. They should be tested by the same personnel,
on the similar ground and under the same weather conditions. It is not
possible to assure that all conditions are the same for all tested methods,
but it is possible to minimise the impact of the uncontrolled factors by
randomising the design. For example, selecting adjacent lanes for testing
one of the methods could lead to bias, since the soil properties might be
different on that area than on the rest of the testing area. The assignment
of lanes to the methods should be random. All these requirements are a
serious challenge for the organiser of the trial, but they have to be fulfilled
in order to reach unbiased conclusions.
For testing detection abilities of metal detectors, a full investigation of
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each signal with an immediate excavation of the targets is not necessary.
It is very time consuming and eventually it provides the same result as a
reliability test, provided that the work of the deminers in a reliability test
follows a procedure similar to their standard operating procedures applied
in their daily work.
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Chapter 7
Maximum Detection Height
Measurements
This chapter deals with the measurements of the maximum detection height1
performed during the metal detector trial in Croatia, May 2005. These mea-
surements include the first attempt to estimate the variability of maximum
detection height measurements. A short introduction presents the notion of
the maximum detection height. The topics of the next two sections are the
experimental design of the maximum detection height measurements and
the corresponding data analysis. The results are presented, interpreted and
discussed in the next two sections, followed by a conclusion.
7.1 Introduction
Measurements of the maximum detection height are used to estimate the
detection capabilities of metal detectors. The maximum detection height
(MDH) is the distance between the search head of the metal detector and the
top of the target at which the detector starts to give clear audio signals [26].
The position of the target is clearly marked and known to the operator. In
all earlier investigations it has been conjectured that repeated measurements
give very similar results. The experiment described in this work had been
designed to check this conjecture of the stability of metal detectors and to
investigate the possible sources of variability.
The main difference between the maximum detection height measure-
ments and the blind trials is that the operators know the positions of the
targets during the maximum detection height measurements. Therefore the
influence of the operator, i.e. the “human factor” in the reliability model
(see Section 3.4), is much smaller than in the blind trials. However, it is
1Maximum detection height is sometimes called maximum detection depth or maximum
detection distance. Regarding terminology, this work follows the recommendations of the
CWA 14747:2003 [26].
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not entirely excluded: the operator sets up the metal detector to the re-
quired sensitivity, performs the ground compensation procedure, operates
the device and decides whether the audio signal is clear enough to call it
detection. In this respect metal detector models can be very different. The
setup procedure of some models minimises the influence of the operator and
the audio signal of some models is very clear, while some detectors require
more actions and decisions from the operator.
7.2 Design of Experiment
During the trials in Benkovac in May 2005 (see Section 8.6 and [72] two
series of maximum detection height (MDH) measurements were performed:
the first one during the two weeks of the reliability test and the second one
within a two-day period after that test. The goals of the maximum detection
height measurements were:
1. To assess the variability of the maximum detection height measure-
ments.
2. To compare the detecting capabilities of four metal detectors in two
soil types separately.
3. To compare the surrogate of the PMA-2 with the real mine, using the
in-air measurements.
4. If the surrogate faithfully represents the real mine, to use it for com-
paring the influence of the two soils used in the experiment.
The first measurement series was based on the design of the reliability
test, which is described in Section 8.6.2, Table 8.11. During that series each
deminer performed the MDH measurement just before each start of the reli-
ability test, with the detector scheduled for that start, in the corresponding
soil. This way each deminer tested each detector in each soil exactly once.
The original intention was to use only one target type, PMA-2, in both
soils. Unfortunately, only a limited number of these targets was available,
so that surrogates of PMA-2 were buried in one of the soils. There were two
target-soil combinations in this first series of measurements: PMA-2 in soil
1 and PMA-S in soil 2. PMA-S is the surrogate of the PMA-2 (see Figure
7.1), soil 1 is the uncooperative Obrovac soil present in lanes 1 and 2 of the
test site and soil 2 the cooperative Sisak soil of lanes 3 and 4, where the
numbering of the lanes follows the numbering used in the reliability trials
described in Section 8.6.2. For example, operator D performed the MDH
measurement in soil 1 with detector delta just before start 3 of the relia-
bility trial, according to Table 8.11. The order of execution within a start
was not random, but dictated by organisational requirements. In most cases
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Figure 7.1: PMA-S, a surrogate of the PMA-2. The surrogate on the right
side of the image is taken apart to make the metal content visible.
two deminers started earlier than the other two due to interference between
detectors.
The second measurement series was performed according to the design
presented in Table 7.1. All levels of all factors are combined in a full factorial
design. This means that all combinations operator-detector are present in
this design. MDH measurements were performed on the two combinations
target-soil from the first series (see the last two columns of Table 7.1) and
on three targets in air. The third target for the in-air measurements was the
antipersonnel mine PMA-1A. A careful examination of the designs of both
measurement series reveals that the same measurements were performed in
both series, just in a different order. In addition, the second series included
some in-air measurements. The numbering of treatments indicates the or-
der of execution of the measurements, i.e. the measurements were performed
starting with the 1st treatment and ending with the 16th. (The only ex-
ception was treatment 6. There was a mistake in the setup of the metal
detector, so that this measurement was repeated after treatment 16 and
only the result of the repeated measurement was counted as valid.) Within
each treatment, the in-air measurements were performed before the in-soil
measurements, numbers 1-3 indicating the order of execution. For example,
treatment 10 was executed after treatment 9 and the measurements were per-
formed in this order: PMA-2 in air, PMA-S in air, PMA-1A in air, PMA-2
in soil 1, and finally PMA-S in soil 2. This way the in-air measurements
on the PMA-2 and the PMA-S were always performed one after the other,
in a random order. As can be seen from the table, the order of treatments
was arranged to avoid bias, i.e. a systematic influence of unknown factors
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related to time (for example, gradual increase of the deminers’ concentra-
tion or fatigue). If there was such an influence, it was “distributed” to all
detector models and all operators equally. The measurements with treat-
ments 1-8, except treatment 6, were performed 27 May 2005 11:45-12:45,
while the other measurements, treatments 6 and 9-16, were performed 30
May 08:30-09:30.
The targets were placed on a top of a wooden board and buried together
with the board, which eased the control of their depths during the burial
and even afterwards (see Figure 7.2). There was no indication that the
presence of the board influenced the performance of the metal detectors.
The targets were buried to depths 3, 4, 5, . . . , 11 cm in soil 1 and 6, 7,
8, . . . , 15 cm in soil 2. Their mutual distance was 50-60 cm. After the
burial their positions were clearly marked. The area prepared for the MDH
measurements is illustrated on Figure 7.3.
For the measurements of each treatment the deminer performed the de-
tector setup and the soil compensation. The in-soil measurements were per-
formed after a ground compensation, while the in-air measurements were
performed without ground compensation. The in-soil measurements con-
sisted of the following procedure: the deminer checked the detectability of
each target by moving the search head as close as possible to the ground
without touching it. His indications (‘detected’ or ‘not detected’) were
recorded for each depth. The in-air measurements were performed as in-
dicated on Figure 7.4. The targets were repeatedly moved horizontally side-
ways with the help of a board, thus simulating the sweeping of the metal
detector search head. The deminers made the decision whether the target
is detected or not. The results were recorded to the closest centimetre at
which there was a signal.
7.3 Data Analysis
7.3.1 Comparison of Detectors
The main goal of maximum detection height measurements is to detect
differences between the detectors. Let us consider the measurements for
each target-soil combination separately. An important assumption necessary
for the analysis of variance (see subsection 5.2.1) is that the experimental
error is normally and independently distributed. There are good reasons
to suspect that the error of MDH measurements depends on the detector
model, which is why the analysis of variance cannot be used. (The results,
Figure 7.5 in Section 7.4, confirm the validity of this approach.) If the result
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Figure 7.2: Placement of targets before their burial for maximum detection
height measurements. The boards help to control the depth of the targets.
Figure 7.3: Area fully prepared for the maximum detection height measure-
ments. The target positions and their depths are clearly indicated with red
markers.
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Figure 7.4: In-air maximum detection height measurements. The target is
being moved, while the search head is kept still.
of a single MDH measurement is denoted with yijk, it can be written
yijk = µ+ τi + βj + ρk + ijk with

i = 1, 2, . . . a
j = 1, 2, . . . b
k = 1, 2, . . . c
(7.1)
where µ is the overall mean, τi is the effect of the i-th detector, with a = 4, βj
is the effect in the j-th operator, b = 4, ρk is the effect of the k-th repetition,
c = 2 for in-soil measurements and 1 for in-air measurements, and ijk is
the random error, normally distributed with the mean 0 and a variance
σ2i depending on the detector model i. We assume that all yijk for the
i-th detector are distributed normally, the parameters of this distribution
depending on the detector. The variance of the results for a particular
detector i is
ΣjΣky2ijk − yi..
2
bc
bc− 1
We want to compare a pair of detectors i and l on each of the soil-target
combinations separately. We want to test the hypothesis H0: µi = µl, where
µi and µl are the means of the MDH for detectors i and l. The pair of means
would be declared significantly different if
|y¯i.. − y¯l..| > tα
2
,ν
√
S2i
ni
+
S2j
nl
(7.2)
with
ν =
(
S2i
ni
+ S
2
l
nl
)2
(S2i /ni)
2
ni−1 +
(S2l /nl)
2
nl−1
= (bc− 1)
(
S2i + S
2
l
)2
S4i + S
4
l
71
where y¯i.. and y¯l.. are the MDH averages, tα
2
,ν is the quantile of the Student’s
t-distribution, ni = nl = bc is the sample size, b = 4 is the number of
operators, c = 2 the number of repetitions, and S2i and S
2
l are the sample
variances of the measurements with detectors i and l respectively. The
right hand side of Equation (7.2) also defines the confidence interval for this
specific difference:
(y¯i.. − y¯l..)± tα
2
,ν
√
S2i
ni
+
S2l
nl
(7.3)
We construct confidence intervals on the mean of each detector, to ex-
press the uncertainty of our estimates of the mean:
y¯i.. ± tα
2
,bc−1
Si√
bc
(7.4)
The estimated MDH for the i-th detector is y¯i.. increased by 0.5 cm, since
the targets were buried in 1-cm steps:
yˆi = y¯i.. + 0.5 cm (7.5)
7.3.2 Comparison between PMA-2 and PMA-S
Let us investigate the problem of comparing the PMA-2 with the PMA-S.
The maximum detection height measurements of these two targets in air can
be observed as paired measurements. Each combination operator-detector
can be understood as a block (see Section 5.1.1) and the two targets can be
understood as two levels of the principal factor “target”. Each combination
operator-detector-target represents a treatment. We want to test the null
hypothesis that the difference between the maximum detection heights of the
two targets is zero. If we name the measured maximum detection heights
of the two targets y1i and y2i, where i denotes the i-th block, than the
measured difference in that block equals
di = y1i − y2i (7.6)
This variable follows a t-distribution with n − 1 degrees of freedom, where
n = ab is the number of blocks (in our case, n = 16). Therefore our test
statistic is
t0 =
d¯
Sd/
√
n
(7.7)
where d¯ = Σni=1di/n is the average difference, and Sd is the sample standard
deviation of the difference di. We reject the null hypothesis with significance
level α if ∣∣d¯∣∣ > tα
2
,n−1Sd/
√
n (7.8)
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7.4 Results
This section presents the results of the two series of maximum detection
height measurements described in the previous section.
It occurred during the in-soil measurements that a certain target was
detected at depths, for example, 6, 7, 8 and 10 cm and not detected at
9, 11, 12 etc. Such cases were treated the same as if the target had been
detected on all depths up to 10 cm, including on 9 cm.
Separate results for each target and each detector with the corresponding
standard deviations are presented on Figure 7.5, containing both measure-
ment series. Each column presented in the diagram is an average of four
in-air measurements or eight in-soil measurements. The same results, but
with confidence intervals instead of standard deviations, are presented on
Figure 7.6 (see Equation (7.4)). The standard deviations give us some infor-
mation about the variability of the MDHmeasurements, while the confidence
intervals indicate the uncertainty of our estimates of the mean MDH. (All
data analyses in this chapter were performed with Microsoft Excel 2002.)
We can compare each pair of detectors using Equation (7.2). The results
are presented in Table 7.2. The numbers 1 and 0 indicate whether the
difference is statistically significant with the significance level α = 0.05. For
example, for the in-air measurements with the PMA-1A there is a significant
difference between detectors X and Y and also between Y and Z, while all
other differences are not significant.
PMA-2 PMA-S PMA-1A PMA-2 PMA-S
soil 1 soil 2 in air in air in air
X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z
U 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Y 0 0 1 1 1
Table 7.2: Results of the multiple comparisons of the maximum detection
heights. Number 1 indicates a significant difference at significance level
α = 0.05.
To learn more about the possible sources of variability, we perform the
analysis of variance for each detector-soil combination separately. There
are two factors: operator, with four levels, and repetition, with two levels.
The results, Table 7.3, indicate that the difference between the operators is
greater than the difference between the two repetitions.
The targets PMA-2 and PMA-S are compared using the in-air measure-
ments as described in Section 7.3.2, Equation (7.8). The results indicate
that the maximum detection height of the PMA-2 is (9.4±6.6) mm larger
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Figure 7.5: Results of the maximum detection height measurements with
standard deviations.
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Figure 7.6: Results of the maximum detection height measurements with
95% confidence intervals.
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PMA-2 in soil 1:
detector U detector X detector Y detector Z
MS(operators) 1.792 1 1.125 2.125
MS(repetitions) 1.125 0.5 0.125 1.125
MS(residual) 0.125 0.167 0.125 2.458
MS(operators)
MS(repetitions) 1.593 2 9 1.889
PMA-S in soil 2:
detector U detector X detector Y detector Z
MS(operators) 2.458 3 0.5 0.833
MS(repetitions) 1.125 0.5 0.5 0.5
MS(residual) 3.125 2.833 1.833 0.833
MS(operators)
MS(repetitions) 2.185 6 1 1.667
Table 7.3: Results of the analysis of variance for the in-soil maximum detec-
tion height measurements. The mean squares of the operators, repetitions
and residuals.
than that of its surrogate, where the numbers mark the 95% confidence lim-
its. The null hypothesis that the two targets are identical is rejected with
the p-value α = 0.008.
7.5 Discussion
7.5.1 Variability of Maximum Detection Height Measure-
ments
The results (Figure 7.5) clearly show that comparing two single measure-
ments of MDH can not give a reliable answer about the difference between
two detector models. MDH measurements have a high variance that can-
not be ignored. The causes of such a high variability are discussed in this
subsection.
The ground compensation procedure includes some actions of the oper-
ator. Let us examine if the soil compensation is the main source of variabil-
ity. The in-air measurements were performed without ground compensation.
The in-air standard deviations for two of the detectors, U and X, are much
larger than the in-soil standard deviations, while the standard variations for
the other two detectors are similar in air and in soil. Therefore, it can be
concluded that the soil compensation procedure is not the main source of
variability.
The analysis of variance (see Table 7.3) showed no important differences
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between the averages of the first and the second series of measurements (the
first and the second repetition). The main source of the variability in this
experiment was therefore not the repetition.
The variability was caused by the differences between the operators, by
the setup, and by the remaining sources of the experimental error, which
are the changing subjectivity of the operators, the short-term instability of
the hardware of the devices, and the uncertainty of the measurements of
the distance between the search head and the target. From the results of
this experiment we cannot conclude which of these influences was dominant.
For example, it is not possible to separate the error coming from the sub-
jectiveness of the operator from the instability of the devices, because the
devices were always setup and operated by human beings. Some tests with
automated scanning and automated ground compensation could give more
insight into the main cause of the experimental error.
The only earlier publication with some tests of the setup repeatability
is the final report of the IPPTC [28] (see Section 4.3). The measurements
performed during those trials indicated that the metal detector setup is
an important source of variability. However, all influencing variables have
been examined separately, so that the influence of the setup variability to
all other results could not be evaluated. Some of the reported differences
between the detector models might have easily been caused by the variability
of the setup. The influence of the differences between the operators was not
studied during the IPPTC.
7.5.2 In-Air Measurement Procedure
During the in-air measurements the targets were moved by hand and the
position and the orientation of the search head was not strictly controlled
(see Section 7.2, Figure 7.4). This introduced a source of error not present
in the in-soil measurements. However, this error might be a few millimetres
(this is a subjective estimate of the double standard deviation) and it is for
most targets and most detectors much smaller than the estimated standard
deviation.
The main advantage of the in-air measurement procedure applied in
these trials is the speed. Some measurement devices were built with the aim
to improve the control of the distance between the target and the search
head (as described in the CWA 14747:2003 [26]). However, the use of more
precise equipment would be much more time consuming. It would also add
little value, since it would decrease only a small part of the experimental
error: the operators and the setup introduce a much higher error than the
distance measurements. There might be cases when such a high precision is
necessary, but in most trials a simple measurement procedure as described
in this work will be sufficient.
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7.5.3 Comparison between PMA-2 and PMA-S
It has been shown that the PMA-2 and its surrogate PMA-S give slightly
different signals in air. It is important to note that the measured difference
of (9.4±6.6) mm is valid only in air and for the four detectors used in the
experiment. Even though the PMA-S is slightly more difficult to detect,
in some cases it can still be used in metal detector trials as a surrogate of
the PMA-2. However, the difference between the two targets is too large to
enable us to make a valid comparison between the results in two soils.
7.5.4 Choosing the Most Appropriate Detector
If the choice between detectors has to be made only based on the MDH
measurements, and if there is a statistically significant difference at level
α = 0.05 between two detectors, the obvious choice would be the detector
with the higher average MDH. If the difference is not statistically significant,
the choice is not that easy. Both the average and the variance have to be
taken into account. Let us look at a fictional example. If detector 1 has
slightly higher average MDH than detector 2, but also much higher variance,
then it would miss shallowly buried targets more frequently that detector 2.
Since most of the mines are buried shallowly, we cannot say that detector
1 would be a better choice. This problem is discussed in more detail in
Section 8.7, where the in-soil MDH measurements are connected with the
probability of detection.
7.6 Conclusions
The maximum detection height measurements performed during the metal
detector trial in Benkovac, Croatia, May 2005, have shown that the sen-
sitivity of metal detectors has a high variability that has to be taken into
account. The variability was caused by the differences between the opera-
tors, by the subjectivity of the operators, by the setup, by the instability of
the hardware of the devices, and by the uncertainty of the measurements of
the distance between the search head and the target.
Repeated measurements with several operators are necessary to estimate
the experimental error and to attribute some confidence to our statements
about the performance of metal detectors. Planning an experiment accord-
ing to the principles of experimental design enables an unbiased estimate of
different influences and minimises the experimental error.
The simple in-air measurement procedure proposed in this work is suffi-
ciently precise for most purposes. The use of more complicated equipment
(for example, as proposed in CWA 14747:2003 [26]) would be more time-
consuming, and it would be justified only if higher precision in the distance
measurement is necessary.
78
Chapter 8
Detection Reliability Tests
This chapter describes the detection reliability tests, which were a part of
metal detector trials in Oberjettenberg, Germany, and Benkovac, Croatia
in 2003 and 2005. The design of experiment, the data evaluation and the
test results are presented. Each trial included the experience and lessons
learned from the earlier trials. Consequently, all sections of this chapter are
connected, each section often referring to earlier sections. To understand the
connection between the sections and to follow the discussions, the reader will
need to be familiar with Section 8.1 (overview of the tests) and Section 8.2
(design of experiment and data analysis).
Sections from 8.3 to 8.6 contain the information specific for each trial,
including the test results. Section 8.7 explains the connection between the
maximum detection height measurements and the probabilities of detection
from the reliability tests. A discussion in Section 8.8 connects all test results,
including the maximum detection height measurements. It also contains
some recommendations regarding future testing. A short conclusion closes
this chapter.
8.1 Overview of Detection Reliability Tests Per-
formed in Oberjettenberg and Benkovac
A series of metal detector trials was conducted in accordance with the CWA
14747:2003, the standard for testing metal detectors for humanitarian dem-
ining [26] (see Section 4.2). The purpose of these trials was to investigate
the feasibility of the tests described in the CWA 14747:2003. The trials were
performed within the frame of ITEP projects 2.1.1.2 and 2.1.1.8. The aims
of the projects were to find an appropriate design of experiment for testing
metal detectors, meaning the appropriate choice of factors, levels and treat-
ments; to establish the use of ROC diagrams and POD curves (explained
in Subsection 8.2.2) in reporting the experimental results; and to gain prac-
tical experience in organising and conducting metal detector trials. The
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trials comprised detection reliability tests and maximum detection height
measurements in different soil types and with different targets, including
real mines. Some results of these trials have been published in two reports
[76, 72] and presented at several conferences [42, 39, 41, 40, 75, 74, 5, 6].
Many laboratory measurements, mostly maximum detection height mea-
surements, were performed at the Joint Research Centre of the European
Commission and a separate technical note describing those measurements is
available [10]. Table 8.1 provides an overview of all trials.
The goal of the first trial, Oberjettenberg May 2003, was to find the most
appropriate metal detector for the choice of factor levels — soils, targets
and target depths — selected for that trial. This choice of factor levels was
representative for a rather difficult scenario. In later trials the goal was to
find the most adequate device for each combination soil-target-depth. To
achieve this goal, the number of investigated factor levels had to be reduced
and the design of the experiment had to be modified.
Two trials were conducted at the test sites of the German Federal Armed
Forces at the Military Engineering Department 52 (WTD 52) in Oberjetten-
berg, near Bad Reichenhall, Germany. Another two trials were conducted at
the test sites of the Croatian Mine Action Centre – Centre for Testing, De-
velopment and Training (HCR-CTRO) in Benkovacko Selo near Benkovac,
Croatia.
The metal detector models tested in the trials were European-manufac-
tured models currently in use in clearance operations worldwide. They are
products of the following companies, listed alphabetically: CEIA, Ebinger,
Foerster and Vallon. It has been agreed with the manufacturers to keep
the detector models anonymous, so that the models are labeled with Latin
letters U, W, X, Y and Z throughout all publications, including this thesis.
In many discussions of the experimental design throughout this thesis, the
names alpha, beta gamma and delta are used, to emphasise that the de-
sign is based on the Graeco-Latin square and to avoid confusion with the
operators. Detector models U, X, Y and Z were tested in all trials, while
detector W was tested only in the Oberjettenberg November 2003 trial. This
was a prototype of a new model and only one specimen was provided for
testing. The detector models operated on different principles: some were
time domain, some frequency domain ones; some used a single coil, some a
“double-D” coil; some were static mode detectors, and some dynamic mode
ones. The design of detector U allows the user to chose between the static
mode and the dynamic mode. All of the models had some ground compen-
sating abilities. Two specimens of each model were used in all trials in 2003
and only one specimen in the trial in 2005. The trial in Oberjettenberg in
November 2003 was an exception; three detector models were present with
two specimens and another two models with one specimen each. The tested
specimens were chosen by the manufacturers. An overview is presented in
Table 8.2.
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Detector Search Head Coil Mode Electromagnetic Wave
U (beta) single static or dynamic time domain
W (alpha-1) single dynamic time domain
X (alpha-2) single dynamic time domain
Y (delta) double-D static frequency domain
Z (gamma) double-D static frequency domain
Table 8.2: Detectors tested in the trials.
The tests were performed on several different soil types. The lanes were
prepared according to CWA 14747:2003 [26]. The first tests in Oberjetten-
berg, May 2003, were performed on four lanes, each containing different soil
(Table 8.3). One of them was covered with a 2-cm layer of blast furnace
slag to simulate uncooperative soil. The three soil types used in Benkovac
trials, in July 2003, represent some mined regions in Croatia (Table 8.4).
Two of these were highly uncooperative. In the next trial in Oberjetten-
berg, November 2003, the same lanes were used as in the first trial, with the
addition of other three lanes, one of which was highly uncooperative. The
last Benkovac trial, May 2005, included tests on only two of the soil types
used in the previous Benkovac trial. All lanes were cleared of metal with
the aid of detectors. The soils are described in detail in [76].
The targets used in the trials were real mines modified to be safe, ITOP
inserts (defined in [80] and described in [26]) and a chromium steel ball. The
mines used in the Oberjettenberg trials can be found in minefields worldwide,
while those used in the Benkovac trials are representative of South-Eastern
Europe.
In both Oberjettenberg trials, the operators were soldiers of the German
army with no experience in demining. In the Benkovac trials, the operators
were professional deminers. In the first two trials the operators had under-
gone a two-day training for four detector models. In the second two trials
the training was twice as long, that is, one day per detector model.
In the first two trials, two sensitivity levels of metal detectors were used.
The aim was to study the influence of the sensitivity on the probability of
detection and on the false alarm rate. Professional deminers sometimes use
lower sensitivities to avoid detecting metal clutter. This lower sensitivity is
usually calibrated so that the mine representing the local threat is buried to
a specific depth and the sensitivity of the metal detector is set up so that
this mine can still be detected. The calibration target for the trials was a
chromium steel ball.
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Soil Types  
in Oberjettenberg Trials 
χ (958 Hz)  
[10-5] 
χ (465 Hz) – χ (4650 Hz)  
[10-5] 
Lane 1 
artificially uncooperative soil 244 ± 64 6,1 
Lane 2 
cement gravel 0 ± 1 – 0,2 
Lane 3 
clay 2 ± 1 – 0,5 
Lane 4 
concrete gravel 6 ± 1 – 0,5 
Lane 5 
magnetite mixed with sand 3000 ± 500 6 ± 7 
Lane 7 
cement gravel – 1,0 ± 0,2 – 0,1 ± 0,2 
Lane 8 
concrete gravel 7 ± 1 – 0,1 ± 0,1 
 
 Table 8.3: Soil types in the Oberjettenberg trials. In the first trial, May 2003,
only lanes 1, 2, 3 and 4 were used. Magnetic susceptibility measurements
were performed with a Bartington MS2 magnetometer, MS2D sensor at 958
Hz and MS2B sensor at 465 and 4650 Hz. The sensor of the circular loop
probe operating at 958 Hz (MS2D) is calibrated to read 0.5 χ on rough soils
and will give about 0.75 χ on smooth surfaces [7]. The MS2B sensor works
with 10 cm3 samples.
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Soil Types  
in Benkovac Trials 
χ (958 Hz)  
[10-5] 
χ (465 Hz) – χ (4650 Hz)  
[10-5] 
Lanes 1, 5 (2003) 
Lanes 1, 2 (2005)  
bauxite 
154 ± 13 25,5 
Lanes 2, 6 (2003) 
Lanes 3, 4 (2005) 
clay 
13 ± 2 0,6 
Lanes 3, 4, 7, 8 (2003)  
bauxite with limestone 190 ± 36 35,4 
 
Table 8.4: Soil types in the Benkovac trials. In 2005 the labeling of the lanes
was different than in 2003. Lanes 1 and 5 from 2003 trials were named lanes
1 and 2 in 2005. Lanes 2 and 6 were renamed to lanes 3 and 4. Lanes 3, 4, 7
and 8 from 2003 trial were not used in the 2005 trial. Magnetic susceptibility
measurements were performed with a Bartington MS2 magnetometer, MS2D
sensor at 958 Hz and MS2B sensor at 465 and 4650 Hz. The sensor of the
circular loop probe operating at 958 Hz (MS2D) is calibrated to read 0.5 χ
on rough soils and will give about 0.75 χ on smooth surfaces [7]. The MS2B
sensor works with 10 cm3 samples.
8.2 Design of Experiment and Data Analysis
8.2.1 Design of Experiment
This section describes some common properties of the experimental designs
of the four detection reliability tests. Detection reliability tests in general
are described in Section 4.2.2.
The outcome of the experiment is described with two response variables:
variable ‘detected’ with two levels, 1 (“detected”) and 0 (“not detected”),
defined for each pass over a target, and variable ‘signals’ with levels 0, 1, 2,
3, . . . , which is the number of false alarms in a run. A run is a single pass
of an operator with a detector through a lane.
The factors appearing in the tests were: ‘detector model’, ‘detector spec-
imen’, ‘detector sensitivity’, ‘lane’, ‘operator’, ‘target’, and ‘target depth’.
Only one of the tests (Benkovac, July 2003) included all of these factors,
while the others included only a selection of them. Each of the four tests
had a different design of experiment, each of them introducing some im-
provements. They are described in detail in Subsections 8.3.2, 8.4.2, 8.5.2
and 8.6.2. All designs are based on the idea described in the following lines.
A factorial design including all factor level combinations would certainly
solve our experimental problem. However, such a test would require a lot of
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Start 1 Start 2 Start 3 Start 4
Lane 1 A alpha C beta B delta D gamma
Lane 2 C gamma A delta D beta B alpha
Lane 3 B beta D alpha A gamma C delta
Lane 4 D delta B gamma C alpha A beta
Table 8.5: Design of experiment for a simplified problem of testing four
metal detectors. A, B, C and D are operators and alpha, beta, gamma and
delta are detectors.
time and therefore an unacceptably high budget. This is why a fractional
factorial design had been proposed: each detector is tested with each level
of each factor, but not with all the possible combinations of factor levels.
The choice of treatments (i.e. factor level combinations) is determined with
a Graeco-Latin square, thus making an orthogonal design. A solution to
a simplified problem with only four factors is presented in Table 8.5. This
design was the basis for the design of all trials. An additional factor called
‘start’ had been introduced to solve the problem of the order of execution.
Four runs of a single start were planned to be executed simultaneously,
thus saving time. The levels of the variable ‘start’ indicate their order of
execution. (Actually, in some tests the runs of the same start were not
performed simultaneously because of electromagnetic interference between
detectors, but they were performed consecutively or two at a time.)
8.2.2 Data Analysis
Section 8.5.7 of the standard CWA 14747:2003 [26], dealing with reliability
tests, gives a recommendation to report about the numbers of true positive,
false positive and false negative indications (see their definitions in Section
4.2.2 of this dissertation). The standard does not specify how this informa-
tion should be presented, neither a method of attributing a confidence level
to the results.
The estimated probability of detection for a particular factor level com-
bination is the ratio of the number of detected targets and the total number
of opportunities to detect a target. The estimated false alarm rate is de-
fined as the number of false alarms counted on an area divided by the size
of that area, or the average number of false alarms per square metre. The
area is calculated as the area of the test lane minus the area of all detection
halos. If we assume a binomial distribution for the number of true positive
indications, we can find the 95% confidence limits for the probability of de-
tection. Similarly, if we assume Poisson distribution for the false alarms, we
can construct the confidence limits for the false alarm rate [98, 14, 84, 85].
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For the probability of detection and the false alarm rate, we will use the
usual abreviations POD and FAR respectively, and their estimated values
will be marked with a circumflex: P̂OD, F̂AR.
The upper and the lower confidence limits of the POD and those of the
FAR can be computed with many commercially available computer pro-
grammes or calculated with the help of some statistical tables ([98, 14]).
Before the widespread use of computers some approximative procedures had
been developed. However, their use today seems to be hardly justified, since
even the most common spreadsheet programmes can deal with the functions
necessary for computing the confidence limits of a binomial and a Poisson
distributed variable. We will nevertheless mention two extreme approxi-
mations, since their use requires very little calculations, thus making them
suitable for a quick assessment of the size of the confidence interval.
Let us call the number of opportunities to detect a target n, and the
number of detections y. We introduce two more abbreviations: p = POD
and q = 1− p. The number of detections is binomially distributed with the
parameter p. The two sided 1− α confidence limits1 [98, 84] are
PODlower =
y
y+(n−y+1)F1−α/2, f1, f2
with f1 = 2(n− y + 1), f2 = 2y
PODupper =
(y+1)F1−α/2, f1, f2
n−y+(y+1)F1−α/2, f1, f2
with f1 = 2(y + 1), f2 = 2(n− y)
(8.1)
The quantities F1−α/2, f1, f2 are F-quantiles (also called percentage points) of
the F distribution. In the special case when y = 0 the two sided confidence
limits are
PODlower = 0
PODupper = 1− n
√
α/2
(8.2)
When y = n,
PODlower = n
√
α/2
PODupper = 1
(8.3)
It has been proposed [14] that a normal approximation of a binomial
distribution can be used if n > 5 and∣∣∣√pq −√ qp ∣∣∣√
n
=
|p− q|√
npq
< 0.3 (8.4)
This condition means that n is sufficiently large and both p and q are suf-
ficiently far from 1 and 0. For the confidence level 1 − α = 95% and with
some additional approximations (described by K. M. Simonson [84]) we get
the following relation:
PODupper/lower = p± 2
√
pq
n− 1 (8.5)
1It can be shown from the relation Fα,a,b = 1/F1−α,b,a that the confidence limits given
in [84] are identical to those from [98].
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If p is close to 0.5, further approximation is possible:
PODupper/lower = p±
1√
n
(8.6)
The number of false alarms in a single scan over a lane follows a Poisson
distribution. A variable which is a sum of Poisson distributed variables
also follows a Poisson distribution. Consequently, the total number of false
alarms x in N repeated scans over an area of size A also follows a Poisson
distribution. The estimated false alarm rate is F̂AR = xN ·A . The two sided
confidence limits are [98, 85]
FARlower = 12N ·Aχ
2
α/2, f with f = 2x
FARupper = 12N ·Aχ
2
1−α/2, f with f = 2(x+ 1)
(8.7)
where χ2α/2, f and χ
2
1−α/2, f are called quantiles or probability points of the
χ2-distribution. In the special case when x = 0, the confidence limits are
FARlower = 0
FARupper = ln(2/α)
(8.8)
When x exceeds 15, the Poisson distribution can be approximated by a
normal distribution [85]. Setting the variance of that normal distribution
to be equal to the variance of the Poisson distribution, we get approximate
95% confidence limits for the FAR:
FARupper/lower = F̂AR± 2
√
F̂AR
N ·A (8.9)
Because of their simplicity, equations (8.6) and (8.9) can be helpful in
the preparation phase of the experiment. Normally equations (8.1) and (8.7)
should be used, since F-quantiles and χ2-quantiles can be easily calculated
with most modern spreadsheet programmes.
The confidence limits to a binomially distributed and to a Poisson dis-
tributed variable have been known much before their application in tests of
demining equipment. Their first correct use in demining related papers was
in 1998 in two articles by K. M. Simonson [84, 85].
In this work, the P̂OD and the F̂AR are combined in a diagram called an
ROC diagram, where ROC stands for receiver operating characteristic. In
earlier applications, ROC diagrams are diagrams of POD versus probability
of false alarm. Receiver operating characteristic is an analytical procedure
based in statistical decision theory and was developed in the context of
electronic signal detection [93]. It has been applied to many fields, includ-
ing human perception and decision making, diagnostic systems in clinical
medicine, non-destructive testing etc. Already in 1998 K. M. Simonson
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[84, 85] proposed to use the FAR instead of the probability of false alarm
in tests of demining equipment, and she argued that a point on an ROC
diagram describes a so called ROC curve if the threshold is varied.
Another kind of diagram taken over from the field of non-destructive
testing and applied in demining is the POD curve [29, 8]. It describes the
dependency of the POD on a parameter of the target. In non-destructive
testing, that parameter is the flaw size , while in demining it is the target
depth. Some other target parameters have been considered, like the mass
or the volume of the metal part, but they are not convenient for this kind
of diagrams. The constitutive parts of each mine type have different shapes
and sizes, and they are made of different materials. The POD depends on
all these factors, which is why, for example, a diagram of POD versus mass
would not be very informative.
The detection of a target is modelled as a Bernoulli experiment where
the binary random variable Y takes its value y = 1 (“detected”) with the
probability p and its value y = 0 (“not detected”) with the probability
1− p. The parameter p is specific for each treatment and it depends on the
influence variables characterising that treatment. We cannot relate p linearly
with the influence variables, since p is limited to 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Therefore, the
parameter p of the Bernoulli distribution is transformed into the parameter
η:
η = ln
(
p
1− p
)
(8.10)
This transformation is called logistic (or logit) transformation and the in-
verse function
p =
1
1 + e−η
(8.11)
is called the logistic function. It is a monotonically increasing S-shaped curve
starting with p(−∞) = 0 and ending with p(∞) = 1. The parameter η,
which is between −∞ and +∞, is linearly related to the influence variables:
η = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + · · ·+ βqxq =
q∑
j=0
βjxj (8.12)
where one of the xj ’s stands for the depth of the target and the other xj ’s
are indicator variables indicating the presence of a particular level of a qual-
itative factor. This model is called a generalised linear model [56]. The
unknown parameters βj of the generalised linear model are estimated by
maximum likelihood estimation. The result is a curve of POD versus target
depth for each combination of other factor levels. It is possible to create
confidence bounds to POD curves. The procedure is described in [72].
A simpler analysis of POD dependence on depth has been proposed in
[42] and [76] and used later in the STEMD trials [50]. This analysis does
not use the generalised linear model described in Subsection 8.2.2. The
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detections for each depth are simply counted and expressed as P̂OD with
the appropriate confidence limits calculated from Equations (8.1). Such
a method has the obvious advantage that it needs fewer calculations and
that it does not depend on any assumptions about the relationship between
the POD and the depth; the only assumption is that the detections on a
certain depth are binomially distributed. Its disadvantage is that it produces
larger than necessary confidence intervals and that it cannot give information
about the depths not present in the test. An example, Figure 8.15, can be
found in Subsection 8.5.3.
The POD curves in this thesis, as well as some of the ROC diagrams,
were created with a programme written in R 2.0.1 [81] by Prof. P.-T. Wilrich.
All other diagrams were created in Microsoft Excel 2002.
8.3 Reliability Tests, Oberjettenberg, May 2003
8.3.1 Introduction
The goal of the detection reliability tests performed in Oberjettenberg in
May 2003 was to compare four metal detector models in conditions repre-
sented in the tests. These conditions are considered representative for a
certain scenario and the total results reflect the abilities of the detectors to
deal with this scenario. The four detector models were detectors U, X, Y
and Z from Table 8.2. There were two specimens of each model, marked with
numbers 1 and 2. The tests were performed with two sensitivity settings,
called low and high. The high sensitivity was the maximum sensitivity of a
metal detector. The low sensitivity was calibrated so that a detector could
just detect a 16 mm steel ball (100Cr6 steel) buried to a specified depth.
This depth was 15 cm in the cooperative soils in lanes 2, 3 and 4, and 12
cm in the uncooperative soil in lane 1.
There were four lanes in the experiment, each containing an other soil
type. Lane 1 was covered with a 2-cm layer of blast furnace slag to simulate
uncooperative soil. The other lanes were magnetically neutral (see Table
8.3). All lanes were about 20 m long and 1 m wide. Each lane contained
different targets buried to different depths. Their number varied between 24
and 28. The target positions and depths were determined before the plan-
ning of these trials and it was decided not to change them, since the targets
were already in the ground. They are listed in Table 1 in the Appendix.
Eight deminers tested the devices, four in the first week and four in the
second one. They were soldiers of the German army without any previ-
ous demining experience. All operators were introduced to all four detector
models in a two-day training lead by the representatives of the manufactur-
ers.
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8.3.2 Design of Experiment
The solution to the experimental problem described in the previous section is
given in Table 8.6. This design is a combination of two Graeco-Latin squares.
The factor ‘specimen’ is a nested variable, nested in the factor ‘detector’,
meaning that the level of the factor ‘specimen’ is meaningful only within a
level of the factor ‘detector’. For each specimen, a separate Graeco-Latin
square was constructed and they were combined together to form this design.
The organiser of the experiment did not have the opportunity to chose the
targets, neither their depths, but they had to be accepted with the test site.
This is why the mine types and the depths cannot be considered factors in
this test. The detector sensitivity is not fully integrated in the design for two
reasons. The first is that the frequent change of the sensitivity would cause
significant additional stress for the operators as well as the trial monitors.
The other reason is that the effect of the sensitivity was expected to be
much higher than a possible effect of time, so that the possibility of a bias
is negligible.
Eight starts were planned to be performed each day. However, that was
not possible to achieve, due to weather conditions and the slow advance on
the first day of the trial. This is why the factor “days” should be understood
solely as a label and it does not exactly correspond to actual days, however,
it faithfully represents the order of execution of the measurements. Day 2 is
the exact repetition of day 1. All starts within days 1 and 2 were performed
with high sensitivity. Days 3 and 4 are identical to days 1 and 2, except that
the measurements were performed with low sensitivity. Days 5, 6, 7 and 8
are a repetition of the days 1, 2, 3 and 4, but with other operators: A, B,
C, D were replaced by E, F, G, H.
8.3.3 Results
Figure 8.1 is a ROC diagram for the complete set of data, containing all
factor levels (all targets, target depths, lanes and operators). In this diagram
we can compare the overall performance of the four detectors tested in the
trial. There are obvious differences between the detectors, two of them
having a higher POD than the other two.
An ROC diagram based on the same data set, but comparing four lanes,
is on Figure 8.2. This diagram should be interpreted as a comparison of the
lanes, and not of the soils. Namely, the lanes contained different targets on
different depths. In other words, the targets, their depths and the soil types
were all confounded. Nevertheless, the results for the lanes 2, 3 and 4 are
very similar. The slightly increased FAR in lanes 3 and 4 might had been
caused by some minor metal contamination.
The same kind of diagram can be used to examine the differences between
the operators: Figure 8.3. The points lie on what could be an ROC curve:
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Figure 8.1: Oberjettenberg May 2003, an ROC diagram for the complete
data set, a comparison of detectors. The crosses indicate 95% confidence
limits.
Figure 8.2: Oberjettenberg May 2003, an ROC diagram for the complete
data set, a comparison of lanes. The crosses indicate 95% confidence limits.
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Figure 8.3: Oberjettenberg May 2003, an ROC diagram for the complete
data set, a comparison of operators. The crosses indicate 95% confidence
limits.
the operators who detected more targets also had more false alarms. It
might be that they were more careful and more thorough and that their
indications counted as false alarms are actually caused by metal clutter.
The problem of metal clutter causing alarms is discussed in Section 8.8.2.
The next diagram provides a comparison between the results with the
high and the low sensitivity. On Figure 8.4 we see that the difference between
the two results is very small, not even statistically significant at the level
α = 0.05.
It is possible to create POD curves from the data of this trial, however,
that would not be very informative. The reason is the unfavorable choice
of depths. None of the target types was buried to a wide range of depths,
so that the estimated POD curve would have a very wide confidence region.
The estimated POD would be reliable only around the depths at which the
targets were buried.
A comparison of the two specimens of each model revealed no significant
differences.
8.3.4 Discussion
The probability of detection in this trial was much lower than many experts
expected. However, all earlier trials had similarly low detection rates. The
reasons for low PODs in this trial are:
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Figure 8.4: Oberjettenberg May 2003, an ROC diagram for the complete
data set, a comparison of high and low sensitivity measurements. The
crosses indicate 95% confidence limits.
1. The test was purposely designed to be difficult. The targets were
placed to depths that do not represent a typical realistic scenario.
The goal of the test was to discriminate the detector models, and not
to estimate the actual detection rates in a minefield.
2. The time schedule and the obligation to complete a large number of
runs in a limited time created time pressure on the operators, which
caused a faster progression and lower concentration than in a minefield.
3. The absence of danger decreased the alertness of the operators.
4. The training with the new detector models was shorter than in prac-
tice. The operators had to master four detector models in two days.
5. The operators changed the detector models very often, with little time
to adjust to the next device.
As a result, the most difficult targets were often missed and the pinpointing
was less precise than it would be in a real minefield. Poor pinpointing is
the reason why some mines with a significant metal content were missed,
even if they were buried shallowly. The results of these and other trials
certainly do not reflect the actual clearance success. If they would faithfully
represent the actual performance of metal detectors, there would be many
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more demining accidents. Most accidents are caused by a violation of the
prescribed clearance procedures, and not by the failure of the metal detector
[86, 86, 88].
The improvements of the experimental design and organisation in the
following trials reduced the influence of points 2, 4 and to some extent point
5 from the upper list. The problems numbered 1 and 3 remained, since they
cannot be solved, as it is discussed in Section 8.8.
The choice of target depths in this trial was not suitable for constructing
POD curves (POD versus target depth), because the target depths were not
systematically determined. Since the targets were placed in each lane to
different depths, it was not possible to evaluate the influence of soils.
The use of blast furnace slag in lane 1 has proven to be inappropriate,
since it contained metal fragments. Only the largest ones could be found and
removed during the preparation of the trial. The fragments remaining in the
lane created signals that were sometimes stronger than the signals coming
from the nearby lying targets, which is why some targets were missed.
The calibration for the so called low sensitivity produced an insignificant
change compared with the so called high sensitivity (see Figure 8.4). This
is why the results of this trial provided no insight into the nature of the
ROC curve. If the calibration target had been buried closer to the surface,
the difference between the two sensitivities would have been larger. Namely,
the calibration target would have been detected with a lower sensitivity,
so that the “low sensitivity” setting would have been lower. An improved
calibration procedure was applied in the next trial, see Section 8.4.
The design of experiment applied in this trial allows us to draw con-
clusions about the performance of metal detectors in conditions which are
faithfully represented by the choice of factor levels present in the trials. The
design does not allow an unbiased comparison of detector models in each
soil separately. Let us, for example, select the data obtained from lane 2.
We can produce an ROC diagram with four points, with the intention to
compare the four detectors. Each of these points would be the average P̂OD
versus the average F̂AR of all starts performed in lane 2 with one of the four
detectors. By referring to Table 8.6 presenting the design of experiment, we
read that each detector was always used by the same two operators. For
example, detector model gamma was used only by operators B and F. If
operators B and F (or only one of them) were much different from the oth-
ers, then the differences between the four points would be caused by the
differences between the operators and not by the differences between the
detectors.
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8.4 Reliability Tests, Benkovac, July 2003
8.4.1 Introduction
The goal of these tests was to evaluate the performance of four detector
models in each soil type separately. Detectors U, X, Y and Z (see Table 8.2)
were tested. There were two specimens of each model, marked with numbers
1 and 2, and all measurements were performed with two sensitivity settings
called high and low. The high sensitivity was the maximum sensitivity of a
metal detector. The low sensitivity was calibrated so that a detector could
just detect a 16 mm steel ball (100Cr6 steel) buried to a specified depth.
This depth was 11 cm in Obrovac soil (lanes 1 and 5), 12 cm in Benkovac soil
(lanes 3, 4, 7 and 8) and 13 cm in Sisak soil (lanes 2 and 6). The calibration
of the low sensitivity was such that the difference between the high and the
low sensitivity was higher than in the Oberjettenberg May trials.
Eight operators tested the devices, four deminers in the first week and
four in the second one. They were all employees of demining organisations
working in Croatia, three of them being currently active as deminers, while
the others were former deminers. They were introduced to the four detector
models in a two-day training led by manufacturer representatives.
There were eight lanes in the experiment. Lanes 1 and 2 contained soil
from the area around Obrovac, Croatia, lanes 3 and 4 contained soil from
the surroundings of Sisak, Croatia, and lanes 5, 6, 7 and 8 contained the
original local soil from Benkovac (see Table 8.4). All lanes were 30 m long
and 1 m wide. Each lane contained the same 32 targets buried to the same
depths, as presented in Table 2 in the Appendix. For example, PMA-2 was
buried to 0, 5, 10, 13 and 20 cm depth in each lane, the same as PMA-
1A and PMA-3. The antitank mines TMA-3 and TMA-4 were treated as
the same target, since they have exactly the same metal content. They both
contain three detonators of the same type that is used in PMA-2 and PMA-3
antipersonnel mines. The antitank mines TMRP-6 and TMM-1 both contain
large amounts of metal, so that they were considered to be the same target
[65].
Let us compare these trials with the Oberjettenberg May trials described
in Subsection 8.3.1. The main improvement was the inclusion of the targets
and their depths into the design of experiment. In Benkovac trials, the
targets were systematically distributed over a wide range of depths (0-20
cm). This enabled an evaluation of the dependence of POD on depth.
Eight lanes were used instead of four and they were longer. Since the
working hours were the same, the workload was higher than in the Ober-
jettenberg tests. The density of the targets was smaller, 32 targets per 30
m2 compared with 24 to 28 targets per 20 m2 in Oberjettenberg, which al-
lowed for some empty space in the lanes. Fewer soil types were present, only
three. The operators were experienced deminers, compared with inexperi-
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enced soldiers in the Oberjettenberg trials. The low sensitivity was lower
than in the Oberjettenberg trials. The improvements of the experimental
design are discussed in Subsection 8.4.2.
During the preparation of the trials, the lanes had to be cleared of metal
debris. Two teams of two persons worked several days on clearing the lanes
with the help of metal detectors. Lane 8 was so contaminated with metal
fragments, that the teams decided to give up after the first five metres. It
was decided not to use lane 8 in the tests, but instead to use lane 4, which
contained the same soil type. To keep the data analysis, the description of
the design and of the results as simple as possible, the label ‘lane 8’ was
kept, but the reader should know that the starts planned for lane 8 were
performed in lane 4.
8.4.2 Design of Experiment
The design of experiment, Table 8.7, was very similar to the design of the
Oberjettenberg May tests described in Subsection 8.3.2, Table 8.6. The
starts of day 1 of the two tests are identical. Day 2 of the Benkovac test can
be understood as a repetition of day 1, with changed lanes and operators.
Instead of lanes 1, 2, 3, 4, we have lanes 5, 6, 7, 8; lane 5 having the
same soil type as lane 1, lane 6 the same as lane 2, etc. The same operators
performed the measurements on day 2, but they were permuted. The change
can be symbolically expressed as (A, B, C, D)↔ (C, D, A, B), where letters
represent the operators. Days 3 and 4 are low sensitivity measurements with
the same design as days 1 and 2. Days 5, 6, 7 and 8 are identical to days 1,
2, 3 and 4, except that these measurements were performed with four new
operators labeled E, F, G and H. The main difference to the Oberjettenberg
tests was the choice of targets and their depths (see Subsection 8.4.1 and
the tables in the Appendix). The targets and their depths can be considered
factors, since they were systematically chosen.
The motivation to permute the operators in the repeated measurements
(days 2, 4, 6 and 8) was to get four instead of two operator-detector-lane
combinations and thus get closer to a full factorial design. For example,
in Obrovac soil, lanes 1 and 5, detector alpha was used by four operators:
A, C, E and G, while in the Oberjettenberg May test, we had only two
operators using detector alpha in the soil type contained in lane 1. This
way the comparison of detectors in only one soil type is less influenced by
the differences between the operators. The factors ‘detector’ and ‘operator’
are still confounded, but much less than in the Oberjettenberg May tests.
8.4.3 Results
Unless stated otherwise, only the high sensitivity measurements are pre-
sented in this subsection. Namely, the calibration procedure for the low
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Figure 8.5: Benkovac July 2003, an ROC diagram for the high sensitivity, a
comparison of detectors. The crosses indicate 95% confidence limits.
sensitivity has the effect that the PODs of all detectors become more simi-
lar when using the low sensitivity. The reason for this is that all detectors
are calibrated to detect the same target on the same depth, i.e. they are
calibrated to the same sensitivity. This is why it is better to select only
the high sensitivity data. The same argument holds for the Oberjettenberg
May tests (Section 8.3), but in those tests the low sensitivity was almost
identical to the high sensitivity, so that the selection of high sensitivity was
not necessary.
ROC diagrams for the high sensitivity data are in Figures 8.5, 8.6 and
8.7. Except for the sensitivity, all levels of all factors have been selected.
The first of these diagrams compares the four detectors. We see clearly
that one of the detectors achieved much lower detection rates and a much
higher false alarm rate. A separate analysis of three soil types present in the
tests showed that detector Y is comparable with other detectors in the more
cooperative soil from Sisak (lanes 2 and 6), but it has serious difficulties in
coping with the uncooperative soils.
The next figure, 8.6, provides a comparison between the soils. There
is no significant difference between the results in the two uncooperative
soils from Obrovac and Benkovac, although the Benkovac soil contains large
magnetically neutral limestones (see Table 8.3 with the magnetic properties
of the soils). The results in the cooperative Sisak soil are clearly higher.
The operators are compared in Figure 8.7. Operators A, B and D have
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Figure 8.6: Benkovac July 2003, an ROC diagram for the high sensitivity, a
comparison of soils. The crosses indicate 95% confidence limits.
achieved results obviously different from the other operators. These three
operators were the only currently active deminers among the test partici-
pants, the others work in quality assurance or in more senior posts.
It should be noticed that the operators A, B, C, and D worked in the
first week of the tests, and the operators E, F, G and H in the second
week: the operators and the weeks are confounded. It is possible that the
observed difference between the operators, or a part of that difference, is
caused by the difference between the two weeks. However, the organisers
and the participants of the trials could not notice any differences between
the two weeks of the trials.
The design of experiment applied in these tests enables us to study the
performance of metal detectors for a selected combination of a target, its
depth and a soil type. Let us take the same example mentioned in Subsection
8.4.2: PMA-2, Obrovac soil (lanes 1 and 5), all depths. With an ROC
diagram we can compare the PODs and the FARs of the four detectors, see
Figure 8.8. Detector Y achieved much lower POD and much higher FAR
than the other detectors, which are similar. We should keep in mind that
the results are still not entirely free from confounding effects, as explained
in Subsection 8.4.2.
We might wish to compare the eight operators for the same selection of
factor levels: PMA-2 and the Obrovac soil (lanes 1 and 5). The resulting
ROC diagram is Figure 8.9. However, the confounding is too strong to
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Figure 8.7: Benkovac July 2003, an ROC diagram for the high sensitivity, a
comparison of operators. The crosses indicate 95% confidence limits.
Figure 8.8: Benkovac July 2003, an ROC diagram for the high sensitivity,
target PMA-2 in Obrovac soil (lanes 1 and 5), a comparison of detectors.
The crosses indicate 95% confidence limits.
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Figure 8.9: Benkovac July 2003, an ROC diagram for the high sensitivity,
target PMA-2 in Obrovac soil (lanes 1 and 5), a comparison of operators.
The crosses indicate 95% confidence limits. This diagram should be inter-
preted carefully, since it leads easily to biased conclusions.
allow us to draw conclusions about the differences between the deminers.
By looking at the design of experiment, Table 8.7, we see that each operator
used only two detectors. For instance, the low result of operator F might
have easily been caused by the low performance of the two detectors he used
in this soil, namely, beta and delta.
The systematic choice of targets and their depths enabled the creation
of POD curves (they are described in Section 8.2.2). The curves on Figure
8.10 are a result of the same selection of factor levels as for the previous two
diagrams, PMA-2 in Obrovac soil. We see again a clear difference between
detector Y and the other three detectors. We also see that the POD falls
rapidly with depth. At about 7 cm depth the POD of detectors U, X and Z
falls to 0.5, and for detector Y it is below 0.5 at all depths.
The next diagram, Figure 8.11, provides a comparison between the re-
sults with the high and the low sensitivity. The difference between the two
results is much more pronounced than in the Oberjettenberg May trials, see
Figure 8.4 for a comparison.
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Figure 8.10: Benkovac July 2003, POD curves for the high sensitivity, target
PMA-2 in Obrovac soil (lanes 1 and 5), a comparison of detectors. The
crosses indicate 95% confidence limits.
8.4.4 Discussion
Since the working procedures and the training were similar to the trials
in Oberjettenberg in May, the PODs are again lower than they would be
in a real minefield. The reasons are discussed in the section about the
Oberjettenberg May tests, Subsection 8.3.4.
The calibration procedure of the low sensitivity caused a statistically
significant difference both between the PODs and between the FARs of
the high and the low sensitivity measurements. The detectors should be
compared using only the high sensitivity measurements, since the calibration
of the low sensitivity creates similar sensitivities of the four metal detectors.
It has been shown that the two points on an ROC diagram representing the
high and the low sensitivity results lie on an ROC curve, but two points
are not sufficient to allow further conclusions about the shape of the ROC
curves.
The analysis of a selection of some factor levels was made possible due
to the improved design of experiment. The changes aimed for a design
closer to a full factorial design to reduce the operator-detector confounding.
The bias due to this confounding is larger if the differences between the
operators are more pronounced. Fortunately, it has been shown that the
variability among the experienced and well-trained currently active deminers
is much smaller than the variability between persons who do not work day
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Figure 8.11: Benkovac July 2003, an ROC diagram for the complete data
set, a comparison of high and low sensitivity measurements. The green lines
indicate 95% confidence limits.
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to day with a metal detector. (This experience is also known from some
tests in non-destructive testing [77].) This is an important finding, since it
is recommended to perform tests with currently active deminers who will
actually perform the clearance operations. As expected, currently active
deminers also achieved better results.
When some levels of some factors are selected from the full data set, the
total number of opportunities to detect a target is smaller. Consequently,
the confidence intervals are wider than they would be with the full data set.
We see that clearly by comparing the results for the PMA-2 in Obrovac soil,
measured with high sensitivity, Figure 8.8, with the overall high sensitivity
results, Figure 8.5. The number of opportunities to detect a target is about
18.3 times smaller for the selection of Obrovac soil and PMA-2 (see the
design of experiment, Table 8.7; and the list of targets, Table 2 in the
Appendix). Equation (8.6) roughly implies that the confidence intervals are
about
√
18.3 = 4.3 times wider.
Due to metal contamination, the runs planned for lane 8 were performed
in lane 4 (see Subsection 8.4.1). The negative consequence was that a source
of variance was thus abolished. There were concerns that the operators
might remember the positions of the targets, since they would search lane 4
more times than the other lanes. However, the results did not indicate that
the operators remembered the target positions.
According to the standard CWA 14747:2003 [26] (see Section 4.2), the
distance between each pair of targets should be at least 50 cm. During
the preparation of the test lanes it became evident that that condition is
not sufficient. Some smaller targets were not detectable when placed closer
than 70 cm from a large metal content mine like TMRP-6. This problem
can be solved in one of the future updates of the standard. There should
be an additional requirement that all targets are distinguishable and that
none of the signals is overwritten by a signal of a neighbouring target. The
resolution of adjacent targets is important, but it is a subject of a separate
test described in CWA 14747:2003.
8.5 Reliability Tests, Oberjettenberg, November
2003
8.5.1 Introduction
The main goal of these tests was to compare the performance of metal detec-
tors in each soil and with each target separately. The design of experiment
had been altered to meet this goal. Other important modifications compared
to previous tests were the reduction of the workload on the operators and a
longer training. The influence of these changes was evaluated by comparing
the results of this test with the Oberjettenberg May test, using the factor
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detectors: alpha, beta detectors: gamma, delta
Week 1 operators: A, B, C, D operators: E, F, G, H
Week 2 operators: E, F, G, H operators: A, B, C, D
Table 8.8: Training and testing scheme, Oberjettenberg, November 2003.
levels that were in common for both tests.
A new training scheme was applied, with a longer training then in the
previous trials. The training for two groups of detectors was separated, as
well as the tests (see Table 8.8). Eight operators participated in the tests
and they were all soldiers of the German army with no previous experience
in demining. In the first week, operators A, B, C and D were trained for the
time domain detectors alpha and beta and they used only these detectors
during the first week of the tests (see the design of experiment, Table 8.9).
The other four operators were simultaneously trained for the other detectors,
so that the tests were performed at the same time with all eight persons.
In the second week the deminers switched the devices. The training took
a day for a detector model, which is twice as long as in previous tests.
Consequently, the operators had enough time to practice on hidden targets.
The number of starts performed per day was reduced to 6, compared to the
average of 8 starts per day in the previous two tests. This was a significant
reduction of the work load for the operators.
Five detector models were tested: the same four models as in the previous
two tests and an additional one, detector W (see Table 8.2). That detector
was a new prototype and only one specimen was provided. Also the other
model of the same manufacturer, detector X, was represented with only one
specimen. Only the high sensitivity was used in the test.
It was planned to use eight lanes. Four of them were the same lanes as in
the Oberjettenberg May trials, with most of the targets still in the ground.
Four new lanes were prepared, lanes 5, 6, 7 and 8. However, lane 6 was so
contaminated with metal debris, that it could not be cleared in a reasonable
time and it was abandoned for the tests. The experiment has been designed
for eight lanes, so that the operator scheduled for lane 6 made a break. One
of the new lanes, lane 5, contained a very uncooperative soil, a mixture of
magnetite and coarse sand. The soils in lanes 7 and 8 were magnetically
neutral. The summary of the soil properties is provided in Table 8.3 on
page 83.
Most of the targets in lanes 1 to 4 were kept from the first tests in May
2003. In the new lanes 5, 7 and 8, the targets were buried according to the
scheme used in the Benkovac July 2003 tests (see Table 3 in the Appendix):
the targets Maus, PMN (MS3) and PMA-S were buried to 0, 5, 10, 13 and
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20 cm depth. The target PMA-S is a surrogate of the PMA-2 (see Figure
7.1 on page 67). In the analysis, the targets PMN and MS3 were treated as
the same target, since they have exactly the same metal content and almost
identical shapes.
8.5.2 Design of Experiment
The experimental design of the Oberjettenberg November 2003 tests, Table
8.9, is also based on the Graeco-Latin square, but it is more complex than
the previous two tests. Seven operators worked at the same time. (Actually,
they could not all work simultaneously, because of electromagnetic interfer-
ence between their detectors, but the runs of the same start were executed
shortly one after the other.) The starts of the first two quarters were exe-
cuted in the first week and those of the second two quarters in the second
week. It is important that each operator used only two or three detector
models each week. In the second week they have switched the detector mod-
els (see Table 8.8). By some authors, such an approach is called crossover
design [71].
This design is a full factorial design if we count the operators, the de-
tectors and the lanes as the only factors and leave out the starts. In other
words, all factor level combinations of the factors ‘operator’, ‘detector’ and
‘lane’ are present in the test. Let us take the example of detector alpha in
lane 1. We can read from Table 8.9 that each of the eight operators used
detector alpha in lane 1. As a consequence, there is no more confound-
ing between the factors ‘operator’, ‘detector’ and ‘lane’. Consequently it is
possible to compare the detectors in each lane separately.
8.5.3 Results
An ROC diagram for the complete set of data, Figure 8.12, contains all
factor levels, i.e. all targets, lanes and operators. The confidence intervals
are wider for detectors X and W, since only one specimen of these detector
models had been tested (see Subsection 8.5.4).
Figure 8.13 is a ROC diagram based on the same data set, but comparing
four lanes. The same as Figure 8.2 in the Oberjettenberg May tests, this
diagram should be interpreted as a comparison of the lanes, and not of the
soils, since the lanes contained different targets. However, the comparison
of the results in lanes 5, 7 and 8 gives information about the differences
between soils, since these lanes contained the same targets buried to the
same depths. There is a clear difference between the three soils: the POD
is the lowest in lane 5, which contained magnetite.
The differences between the operators can be read from the diagram on
Figure 8.14. There are differences between the achieved false alarm rates.
The POD of operator F is clearly lower than the POD of all other operators.
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Figure 8.12: Oberjettenberg November 2003, an ROC diagram for the com-
plete data set, a comparison of detectors. The crosses indicate 95% confi-
dence limits.
Figure 8.13: Oberjettenberg November 2003, an ROC diagram for the com-
plete data set, a comparison of lanes. The crosses indicate 95% confidence
limits.
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Figure 8.14: Oberjettenberg November 2003, an ROC diagram for the com-
plete data set, a comparison of operators. The crosses indicate 95% confi-
dence limits.
One of the easier targets in these tests was the antipersonnel mine PMN.
A single measurement of the maximum detection height in air was performed
with each detector model and the results were in the range between 43 and
63 cm. The antipersonnel mine MS3 has the same metal content, so it
was treated as the same target. For the entire range of depths used in the
reliability test (0-20 cm), the POD was very close to 1. For the selection of
this target, the logistic regression model does not describe the test results
adequately. To evaluate the dependence of POD on depth, the simpler
method of analysis is used, described in Subsection 8.2.2 (first proposed in
[42] and [76]). Each depth is analysed separately and the confidence limits
are those of a binomial and a Poisson distribution, for the POD and the
FAR respectively. The diagram on Figure 8.15 presents the results in lane
5, containing the uncooperative magnetite. Despite the difficult soil type,
the PODs are very high and the detectors are indistinguishable. Even if all
depths are counted together, the differences between the PODs are not very
pronounced, as can be seen on Figure 8.16. However, this ROC diagram
reveals an important difference in FAR between detector X and the others.
To evaluate the influence of the reduced workload and an improved train-
ing, we compare the ROC points of the two Oberjettenberg tests. For a valid
comparison, only the factor levels common to both tests have to be chosen.
Figure 8.17 shows there is a clear difference between the two test results.
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Figure 8.15: Oberjettenberg November 2003, diagrams of POD versus depth
for lane 5 containing magnetite mixed with sand, targets PMN and MS3.
95% confidence limits are indicated.
Figure 8.16: Oberjettenberg November 2003, an ROC diagram for lane 5,
targets PMN and MS3, a comparison of detectors. The crosses indicate 95%
confidence limits.
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Figure 8.17: A comparison of the two Oberjettenberg tests, an ROC dia-
gram. Only the levels common to the two tests were selected. The crosses
indicate 95% confidence limits.
The POD in the May tests was 0.84, and in the November tests 0.90, while
the width of the confidence interval (the difference between the higher and
the lower confidence limit) is only about 0.03.
After the completion of the test, an additional test was performed. The
operators indicated the positions of all alarms, they were recorded, and the
operators investigated each signal until they found its source: a mine or a
metal fragment. Seven operators completed only one run each, using one
detector, thus excavating the targets from all seven lanes, so that the test
could not be repeated. There were some opinions that such a test would
produce much higher PODs because the procedure is more similar to the one
applied in a minefield. However, the results did not confirm that belief. The
procedure is so slow, that it produced a very small amount of data resulting
in very wide confidence intervals. For example, for POD = 0.5 and n = 25
targets, the confidence intervals for the POD are approximately 2/
√
N = 0.4
(follows straight from Equation (8.6)). It is therefore not surprising that the
results in some of the lanes were lower than in the reliability test and in some
lanes higher. Second, such a procedure is very much subject to confounding:
the runs on the same lane cannot be repeated with other persons. For these
reasons, testing with full investigation of each signal is not recommended.
The results of the Mozambique trial described in Chapter 6 support this
conclusion.
However, this test with the excavation of the targets produced some
interesting insights. In all lanes except lane 5, almost all signals were caused
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by metal fragments, which were overlooked during the preparation of the
tests. This means that the vast majority of the false alarms in the detection
reliability test performed earlier was actually caused by metal fragments,
and not by the soil. The way to handle the problem of these false alarms is
discussed in Section 8.8.2.
8.5.4 Discussion
The improvements of the experimental design enabled an unbiased com-
parison of detectors in each lane separately, without confounding between
operators, lanes and detectors. The results were compared with the results
of the May Oberjettenberg tests. The improved training scheme and the re-
duced workload on the operators resulted in significantly higher PODs and
in no changes in FAR.
Since four lanes were kept from the Oberjettenberg May trials, many
remarks regarding those trials are also valid for the November trials. As
discussed in Subsection 8.3.4, the choice of target depths for the May tests
was not the most suitable for the evaluation of the influence of depth. Nev-
ertheless, those lanes were kept to provide a comparison of the two training
schemes and to evaluate the influence of the workload reduction.
The confidence intervals of detectors X and W are wider than the con-
fidence intervals of the other detectors, since only one specimen of these
detector models had been tested. We can see from the design of experiment
(Table 8.9) and from the number of targets in each lane (Table 3 in the
Appendix) that each of these two detector models had a total of N = 708
opportunities to detect a target, while N for the other three detectors was
2 · 708 = 1416. Consequently, the approximate width of the confidence inter-
val, according to Equation (8.6), is PODupper−PODlower = 2/
√
N = 0.075
for detectors W and X, and only 0.053 for the other detectors.
The testing procedure with the full investigation of the audio signals and
excavation of all targets is unnecessary, since it is very time consuming and
produces unreliable and biased results.
8.6 Reliability Tests, Benkovac, May 2005
8.6.1 Introduction
As in the previous two trials, the goal of this trial was to compare the
metal detectors in each soil and with each target separately. The major
improvement compared with the previous trials was in the treatment of the
human factor. The time pressure on the operators was much smaller than
in all previous trials and the operators followed a procedure which is similar
to their standard operating procedures. A section leader was included in
the test to supervise their work and they wore their personal protective
113
detectors: alpha, beta detectors: gamma, delta
Week 1 operators: A, B operators: C, D
Week 2 operators: C, D operators: A, B
Table 8.10: Training and testing scheme, Benkovac, May 2005.
equipment. The design of experiment was simplified, so that the number
of factor levels was drastically reduced. The effect of all these changes was
investigated by comparing the results of these tests with the results of the
Benkovac 2003 tests.
Four experienced deminers operated the detectors and an additional per-
son played the role of a section leader. The section leader supervised the
work of all four deminers. After a deminer finished a run, the section leader
chose randomly about 3 m of the lane and searched that area with the same
metal detector the deminer was using. If he estimated that the deminer did
not do his job properly, he had the authority to order him to repeat his run.
The deminers wore their personal protective equipment to create a sense of
work in a real mine field, thus increasing their attention. A similar train-
ing scheme was applied as in the previous trials. Each person was trained
for a day for each detector model. In the first week, operators A and B
were trained for the time domain detectors alpha and beta. The other two
deminers were trained for the other two models. The two days of training
were followed by three days of blind tests. In the next week the operators
switched the detectors. This training scheme is summarised in Table 8.10.
There were only four starts in each week of the tests. The number of starts
performed per day did not exceed two, which is much less than in the earlier
trials. Consequently, the workload was much smaller and the deminers had
sufficient time for careful pinpointing of the targets.
Four detector models were tested. Detectors Z and U were the same as in
the first Benkovac trials, and detectors Y and X were new models. Detector
Y was a double-D frequency domain detector working in a static mode and
detector X a single coil time domain one, working in a dynamic mode, so
that Table 8.2 is valid also for this trial. Only one specimen of each model
was tested, since no significant differences were noted between the specimens
in the earlier trials. All detectors were operated at their highest achievable
sensitivity.
Only four lanes were used: two lanes with the Obrovac soil and two with
the Sisak soil. In the Benkovac July 2003 trials, these lanes were labeled 1,
5, 2 and 6 respectively. For simplicity they were renamed in these trials into
1, 2, 3 and 4, so that lanes 1 and 2 contained the Obrovac soil and lanes 3
and 4 the Sisak soil. Table 8.4 with an overview of soils is given on page 84.
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Week 1:
Start 1 Start 2 Start 3 Start 4
Lane 1 A alpha C delta B beta D gamma
Lane 2 C gamma A beta D delta B alpha
Lane 3 B beta D gamma A alpha C delta
Lane 4 D delta B alpha C gamma A beta
Week 2:
Start 1 Start 2 Start 3 Start 4
Lane 1 C alpha A delta D beta B gamma
Lane 2 A gamma C beta B delta D alpha
Lane 3 D beta B gamma C alpha A delta
Lane 4 B delta D alpha A gamma C beta
Table 8.11: Design of the reliability test, Benkovac, May 2005.
The number of target types was also reduced. Only PMA-2 and PMA-1A
were used, 15 pieces of each type in each lane, i.e. 30 targets per lane. Five
pieces of each target type were buried to each of the three depths: PMA-2’s
were buried to 0, 5 and 10 cm (0 cm meaning just below the surface so that
they are not visible), while PMA-1A’s were buried to 5, 10 and 15 cm depth
(see Table 4 in the Appendix).
8.6.2 Design of Experiment
The design of experiment, Table 8.11, was much simpler than the design of
the earlier tests, since the number of investigated factors and factor levels
was much smaller. This design is a crossover design, like the design of the
Oberjettenberg November 2003 tests. Recalling that lanes 1 and 2 contained
the same soil type, as well as lanes 3 and 4, we see that each detector
was used by each person in each soil type. All 32 detector-soil-operator
combinations are present in the test. It is thus possible to compare the
performance of the four detectors in any of the soil types without bias,
since there is no confounding between the operators, detectors and the soils.
Strictly speaking, Table 8.11 does not represent completely the design of
experiment, since the targets and their depths are also factors and are a
part of the design.
8.6.3 Results
The following three diagrams provide an overview of the overall test results.
The full data set is included in the analysis: both mine types, both soil
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Figure 8.18: Benkovac May 2005, an ROC diagram for the complete data
set, a comparison of detectors. The crosses indicate 95% confidence limits.
types, all detectors and all operators. The first diagram, Figure 8.18, is an
ROC diagram showing the difference between the detector models.
The difference between the lanes is the subject of the next diagram,
Figure 8.19. The false alarm rate is higher in the uncooperative Obrovac
soil contained in lanes 1 and 2. The difference between the false alarm rates
is much less pronounced.
No significant differences were detected between the deminers, Figure
8.20.
The next diagram, Figure 8.21, is an ROC diagram for the selection of
PMA-2 and lanes 1 and 2, that is, the Obrovac soil.
Figure 8.22 is the POD curve for the same selection of factor levels.
This diagram shows that the application of the nonlinear regression model
described in Subsection 8.2.2 is not the most appropriate to deal with this
data. It has been shown in this trial (see Section 7) that the maximum
detection height has some variability, which is one of the reasons why it is
likely that some of the mines buried to 0 cm depth are missed and some of
those buried to 10 cm are found. However, it can easily occur that all at 0
cm depth are found and all at 10 cm are missed, as actually happened in the
case of detector U in Obrovac soil and with PMA-2. In the cases when there
is only one depth with P̂OD different from 0 or 1, the regression model will
produce extremely wide confidence intervals and no conclusions about the
shape of the POD curve will be possible.
Figure 8.23 presents the results for the same selection of factor levels,
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Figure 8.19: Benkovac May 2005, an ROC diagram for the complete data
set, a comparison of lanes. Lanes 1 and 2 contained Obrovac soil, while lanes
3 and 4 contained Sisak soil. The crosses indicate 95% confidence limits.
Figure 8.20: Benkovac May 2005, an ROC diagram for the complete data
set, a comparison of operators. The crosses indicate 95% confidence limits.
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Figure 8.21: Benkovac May 2005, an ROC diagram for the PMA-2 in
Obrovac soil, a comparison of detectors. The crosses indicate 95% confi-
dence limits.
Figure 8.22: Benkovac May 2005, POD curves for the PMA-2 in Obrovac
soil, a comparison of detectors. The green lines indicate 95% confidence
bounds.
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Figure 8.23: Benkovac May 2005, ROC diagrams for the PMA-2 in Obrovac
soil with different halo radii. The full line and the dashed line indicate the
results with the halo radius 10 cm and 13 cm respectively. The results of
detectors U and Z have not changed with the increase of the halo radius.
The crosses indicate 95% confidence limits.
but for two different halo radii: 10 cm and 13 cm.
The next two diagrams, Figures 8.24 and 8.25, compare the results of
this test with the previous Benkovac test, that took place in July 2003
(Subsection 8.4). Only the factor levels common to both tests are selected:
detectors U and Z, Obrovac and Sisak soil and PMA-2 on depths 0, 5 and
10 cm. The first of these figures contains an ROC diagram, while the other
contains POD curves. There is an obvious increase in performance, both in
terms of POD and FAR, especially for the shallowly buried targets.
8.6.4 Discussion
The results of the Benkovac 2005 test are noticeably better than the results
of the previous tests. The most important outcome is that the detectors are
easier to distinguish. This is a result of a better choice of factors and factor
levels, and an improved human factor. There were very few targets with
P̂OD close to 0 or 1, which made the detectors more distinguishable. The
number of starts performed per day was reduced to one or two, which is much
less than in the earlier trials, when it was sometimes higher than eight. The
operators did not feel any time pressure and therefore had better pinpointing
than in previous trials. The presence of the section leader improved their
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Figure 8.24: A comparison of the Benkovac July 2003 and the Benkovac
May 2005 test results, an ROC diagram. Only the factor levels common for
the two trials are selected: PMA-2 at depths 0, 5 and 10 cm in Obrovac soil
and Sisak soil, detectors U and Z. The red crosses indicate the 2003 results,
while the green ones the 2005 result. The size of the crosses indicates 95%
confidence intervals.
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Figure 8.25: A comparison of the Benkovac July 2003 and the Benkovac
May 2005 test results, POD curves. Only the factor levels common for the
two trials are selected: PMA-2 at depths 0, 5 and 10 cm in Obrovac soil and
in Sisak soil.
concentration.
Improved pinpointing reduces the scatter of the deminers’ indications
around the target position. With an improved pinpointing, more markers
fall inside the halo and the POD rises. The increase of the POD will depend,
among other things, on the number of markers around the target, that is,
on the POD. The larger the POD, the larger its increase will be. Since
shallowly buried targets have a larger POD, the increase of the POD due to
better pinpointing will be larger for shallowly buried targets. This is clearly
seen on Figure 8.25.
There were no significant differences between the results of the operators.
This was a consequence of the choice of skilled and currently active deminers.
A good training and the application of some elements of the local standard
operating procedures have also contributed to the decrease of the variability
between the operators. The same was observed for all selections of targets
and soils.
The regression model with the logistic function was not adequate for all
data selections of this test. The data can be analysed as in the example
from Subsection 8.5.3, Figure 8.15, that is, each of the three depths, 0, 5,
and 10 cm, can be analysed separately. To avoid this problem in the future,
the targets should be buried to depths in smaller steps, only one or two
targets on each depth, for example, to 0, 1, 2, 3 cm, etc. The largest depth
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should be the depth at which the P̂OD is expected to fall between 0 and
0.5. The design would be less efficient if some targets would be buried to
depths at which no detector could detect them. If some maximum detection
height measurement results are available, they can guide the experimenter
to choose the appropriate maximum depth.
A possibility to choose a larger halo radius than the one prescribed in
the CWA 14747:2003 should be considered. The current definition of the
halo size was a result of an estimate and it was not preceded by any scientific
investigations. It has been shown (Figure 8.23) that a small increase of the
halo radius leads to some changes in the results. The results differ due to
pinpointing errors, but also due to errors of the measurements of the marker
positions. Further investigations are necessary to determine the criterion for
the appropriate size of the halo.
The Benkovac 2005 test results were compared with the Benkovac July
2003 results using the factor levels common to both tests. As shown on
Figures 8.24 and 8.25, there is a significant improvement in the performance.
For detector U only the FAR improved significantly, while for detector Z
only the POD increased. The POD curves from 2005 are closer to detection
rates expected to be found in actual minefields. Especially the performance
at smaller depths improved. Since the same factor levels were chosen for
this analysis, we conclude that the difference between the results from 2003
and 2005 is caused only by the difference of the human factor. Compared
to the trials in 2003, the operators had undergone a longer training, they
had much shorter working hours similar to those in the field and a section
leader supervised their work.
8.7 Connection between MaximumDetection Height
Measurements and Reliability Tests
There is clearly a connection between the maximum detection height (MDH)
and the probability of detection in a detection reliability tests. This section
describes that connection, taking the example of the MDH measurements
from the Benkovac 2005 trial elaborated in Chapter 7.
Let us consider the maximum detection height measurements with a
specific detector-target-soil combination. MDH measurements are subject
to experimental error and they follow a certain distribution p(MDH). We
assume here that the MDH does not change during an MDH measurement.
The targets of the same type are buried to different depths (as described
in Section 7.2). When a deminer approaches one of the targets, knowing
its position, he detects it with a probability that can be found from the
distribution p(MDH). The probability of detecting a target at depth h is
actually the probability that the MDH is larger or equal to that depth. That
probability is the integral of the distribution p(MDH) over the depths larger
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than h:
POD(h) = P (MDH > h) =
∫ ∞
h
p(MDH) dMDH (8.13)
This way we can construct POD curves, that is, curves of the functional
dependency of POD on depth, POD(h). If the distribution p(MDH) is as-
sumed to be normal, it is completely defined by two parameters: the mean
and the standard deviation. These parameters completely define the POD
curve too, which has the shape of the cumulative normal distribution:
P̂OD(h) = Φ
(
MDH − h
σˆ
)
(8.14)
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution,MDH is the average
of the MDH measurements, and σˆ is the estimated standard deviation of the
MDH measurements. The estimated POD has the value 0.5 at the depth
equal to MDH: P̂OD(MDH) = 0.5. At the depth h = MDH − σˆ the P̂OD
reaches approximately 0.84. The connection between POD curves and MDH
measurements is illustrated on Figure 8.26.
We expect that these POD curves will be different from the POD curves
obtained as a result of a blind detection reliability test. The searched depth
will not be equal to the MDH, because the targets will not always be directly
below the center of the search head. The area around the search head in
which a particular target causes the detector to alarm is called a footprint2
This area has an approximate paraboloid shape. The operators involved in
a blind test do not know the positions of the targets, which is why it is more
difficult for them to detect them. There are additional sources of variation
involved with blind trials. The depths of the targets cannot be controlled as
well as in MDH measurements. Each target is at a different location, with
different local soil properties and a different configuration of the surface.
Pinpointing is not always accurate. All these influences introduce a higher
experimental error, both for the POD and for the target depths. This is
why the POD curves obtained from a reliability trial will have a smaller
slope than those obtained from MDH measurements as described above. In
other words, the POD will not fall as abruptly as expected from the MDH
measurements.
Let us apply Equation (8.14) to the maximum detection height mea-
surements performed during the Benkovac May 2005 trials and presented in
Chapter 7. Figure 8.27 refers to the PMA-2 in the Obrovac soil. The red
curves are calculated from the MDH measurements according to equation
(8.14), while the black curves with green confidence bounds are the results
2The standard CWA 14747:2003 defines the footprint differently. However, clause 6.7.2
of that standard describes a measurement procedure and calls it a footprint measurement
(method 2), although it does not correspond to the footprint definition given in the stan-
dard. The definition used in this thesis adequately describes the measurements of the so
called method 2.
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Figure 8.26: The connection between POD curves and MDH measurements.
p(MDH) is the distribution of the maximum detection height, and h is the
target depth.
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Figure 8.27: The POD curves of the reliability test compared with the POD
curves calculated from the MDH measurements, PMA-2 in Obrovac soil.
The black curves are the POD curves of the reliability tests, the green curves
are their corresponding 95% confidence bounds, while the red curves are cal-
culated from the MDH measurements using Equation (8.14). The red error
bars indicate the average of the MDH measurements and the corresponding
standard deviations.
of the reliability test. There is an excellent correspondence between the two
results. As expected, the depth at which P̂OD(h) = 0.5 in the reliability
test is for all four detectors lower than the average MDH. The slope of the
curves of the reliability test is higher, as predicted.
It is more difficult to compare the results in the Sisak soil, since the
MDH measurements were performed on PMA-S, the surrogate of the PMA-
2. It has been shown in Section 7.4 and Subsection 7.5.3 that the surrogate
is slightly more difficult to detect. The diagrams for detectors U and X on
Figure 8.28 are similar to the diagrams in the Obrovac soil, Figure 8.27 : the
depth h0.5 at which the reliability test gives P̂OD(h0.5) = 0.5 is smaller than
the MDH, as expected. However, in the case of the other two detectors, Y
and Z, this depth is larger than the MDH. This can be explained as a possible
consequence of several influences. The most important one is the difference
between the PMA-2 and the PMA-S: if the MDH measurements had been
performed with PMA-2 instead of PMA-S, the MDH would probably have
been higher. The other influence is a possible systematic measurement error
of the target depths for the reliability test. Another possible influence is the
local variation of the soil magnetic properties. Rather than speculating any
further, we recommend that any future measurements are performed with
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Figure 8.28: The POD curves of the reliability test compared with the
POD curves calculated from the MDH measurements, PMA-2 and PMA-
S in Sisak soil. The reliability tests were performed with PMA-2, and the
MDH measurements with PMA-S. The black curves are the POD curves of
the reliability tests, the green curves are their corresponding 95% confidence
bounds, while the red curves are calculated from the MDH measurements.
The red error bars indicate the average of the MDH measurements and the
corresponding standard deviations.
real targets instead of surrogates, or with faithful copies of original targets.
We can conclude that the MDH measurements give us the information
about the maximum possible performance in the reliability test.
It has been explained at the beginning of Section 7.4 that the MDH
is defined as the largest depth at which the target has been detected. It
occurred during some MDH measurements that the target was detected at
depths, for example, 6, 7, 8 and 10 cm, but not on 9 cm. In such cases,
the lack of detection (also called false negative indication) at 9 cm depth
was ignored. Thus we obtained the results presented in Section 7.4 and
used again in this section. Let us investigate if ignoring of the false negative
indications had a large influence on the estimated MDH.
An MDH measurement as described in Section 7.2 can be understood as
a series of Bernoulli experiments: for each target placed on a certain depth,
a binary variable takes its value y = 1 (“detected”) with the probability
p and its value y = 0 (“not detected”) with the probability 1 − p. The
same analysis applied to the reliability test results can be applied to the
MDH measurements. By applying the generalised linear model described
in Section 8.2.2, equations (8.10) to (8.12), we get the estimated curve of
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Figure 8.29: The POD curves obtained from the MDH experiment using the
generalised linear model. The measurements were performed in the Obrovac
soil on the target PMA-2 during the Benkovac May 2005 trials. The black
curves are the POD curves, while the green curves are their corresponding
95% confidence bounds.
POD versus target depth. The POD will be 0.5 if the target depth equals
the MDH. The intersection of the estimated POD curve with the straight
POD = 0.5 defines the estimated MDH, while the intersections of the 95%
confidence bounds with the straight POD = 0.5 define the 95% confidence
bounds of the estimated MDH. The procedure is illustrated on Figure 8.29.
Let us compare the MDHs estimated with the generalised linear model
with those obtained with a simpler method presented in Chapter 7. A
comparison is given in Table 8.12 and Figure 8.30. The two methods give
very similar estimates of the MDH. We therefore conclude that the simpler
method described in Chapter 7 is adequate to describe the measurements
presented in that chapter. However, in soils with less homogeneous magnetic
properties, the difference between the two methods might be larger. The
simpler method with the normality assumption requires that some missed
targets are treated as if they were detected. The number of such targets
would be higher in a heterogeneous soil. The generalised linear model over-
comes that problem, since it treats each measurement with a target buried
to a specific depth as a separate experiment. It is therefore recommended
to use the generalised linear model whenever the discrepancy between the
MDH results obtained with the two methods is too large.
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U X Y Z
normal distribution 7.4± 0.8 8.0± 0.6 10.0± 0.6 9.4± 1.2
GLM 7.0± 0.7 7.6+0.7−0.6 9.8± 0.6 9.1+1.1−0.8
Table 8.12: A comparison of two methods for estimating MDH. The numbers
in the table are the estimated MDHs in centimetres with 95% confidence lim-
its. The first row contains the results obtained with the method presented
in Chapter 7, which relied on the assumption that the MDH is normally dis-
tributed. The second row contains the results obtained with the generalised
linear model.
Figure 8.30: A comparison of two methods for estimating MDH. The blue
points indicate the results obtained with the method presented in Chapter
7, which relied on the assumption that the MDH is normally distributed.
The red points indicate the results of the generalised linear model. The error
bars indicate 95% confidence limits.
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8.8 Discussion
8.8.1 Representative Conditions in Tests
The end user of the demining equipment needs to know which device is
the best suitable for his specific application conditions. Ideally, a test of
demining equipment would be performed in conditions representative of their
intended use. However, creating those representative conditions is not an
easy task and many compromises have to be made to minimise the costs of
the trial. An experimenter aiming for fully representative testing conditions
would have to take into account the following three elements:
1. The variety of soils and mine types. The test would need to include
the soils and the targets present in the area where the equipment is
intended to be used.
2. The depths at which the mines are typically found. In most minefields,
mines are mostly found close to the surface. A test would include a
large number of shallowly buried mines and a smaller number of deeply
buried mines.
3. The influence of the human factor. Recreating the same behaviour as
in a real minefield is the most difficult task of all. If people know that
they are participating in a test, they behave differently than in a real
minefield.
The topic of this section is how to deal with these three elements with an
appropriate design and planning of the test. Only the tests of detecting
abilities will be discussed, other properties of metal detectors are not a
subject of this section. It has been recognised in the demining community
that the blind tests called detection reliability tests are the closest to the
ideal of reproducing representative testing conditions. In addition, they are
the only tests devised to evaluate the false alarm rate. Our discussion will
therefore refer to detection reliability tests.
8.8.2 Soils and Targets
The first of the three elements that have to be considered, the choice of the
soils and the mine types, is relatively straightforward and simple, compared
with the other two. The end user is usually interested in the performance
of the demining equipment in each soil and with each target separately.
To achieve a sufficient number of runs for each target-soil combination, the
experimenter has to choose a small number of soils and target types, and a
large number of targets and starts. If it is known that a certain target is
very easy or almost impossible to detect, it should not be included in the
test.
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The standard for testing metal detectors CWA 14747:2003 [26] gives a
recommendation to use some ITOP inserts (defined in [80] and described
in the CWA 14747:2003) to provide a reference to other trials. This is why
some of these targets were included in the tests described in this chapter.
However, the usefulness of such a procedure is limited. It has been shown
in this chapter that the test results strongly depend on the conditions in
which the tests are performed, especially on the human factor, to name
just a few: working hours, training, supervision, etc. It is therefore very
difficult to compare the results of two different tests. There was an idea to
compare the results of the Oberjettenberg tests with those of the Benkovac
tests, but the number of common targets (mostly ITOP inserts) was too
small for any reliable conclusions. Consequently, the ITOP inserts were not
used in the 2005 trial. The ITOP inserts still have their place in test and
evaluation: they can be used for maximum detection height measurements,
which are much faster than reliability tests and less subject to human factor
influences, so that a comparison between trials is possible. However, it
should be kept in mind that the final choice of the metal detector has to be
based on measurements on the targets which represent the local threat.
If one of the goals of the experiment is to compare the influence of soils,
than it is recommended to have all lanes with different soils on a single
location, to allow simultaneous testing, and thus to avoid the unwanted
influence of the changes in the environmental conditions, for example, rain.
It is also important that all lanes contain the same targets buried to the
same depths.
In all metal detector trials much effort has been put to clearing the lanes
from metal clutter before the trial. The lanes were cleared with the aid of
metal detectors. The experiences from all trials show that such a proce-
dure can never result in a completely metal-free lane. After each test the
positions of the deminers’ indications were examined. Places with a higher
concentration of false alarms were investigated. If a metal fragment was
found, the indications in the proximity of that fragment were ignored; they
were not counted as false alarms, neither as true positive indications. How-
ever, it is still likely that some smaller metal fragments stayed undiscovered.
These fragments led to higher false alarm rates of more sensitive detectors.
To reduce this problem to a minimum, two measures are necessary: before
the trial, the lanes need to be thoroughly searched and cleared from metal
fragments; after the trial, the deminers’ indications caused by the remaining
metal fragments have to be ignored.
8.8.3 Target Depths
The second element important for the design of experiment is the choice of
the target depths. If we investigate Equation (8.5) from Section 8.2.2, we see
that the confidence interval for the POD is the widest around p = P̂OD = 0.5
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and the narrowest close to p = 0 and 1. Some have argued [84] that, for
this reason, the experimenter trying to detect differences between detectors
should aim for an experiment with the probability of detection p close to 0
or 1, simulating a very “easy” or a very “difficult” scenario. However, this
argument overlooks the fact that the differences between the detectors would
in that case also be smaller. The results of Oberjettenberg November 2003
tests confirm this statement (see Figure 8.15 on page 111). The easiest way
to controll the difficulty of the scenario is with the choice of target depths.
The slope of the POD curve is the highest around POD = 0.5. According
to the logistic regression model introduced in Section 8.2.2, it is exactly at
POD = 0.5. The model based on maximum detection height measurements
and introduced in Section 8.7 has the same property. If the targets are buried
to the depths covering the maximum detection heights of all detectors and a
bit smaller, then the POD will be around 0.5, as explained in 8.7. Since the
slope of the POD curve is the highest at POD = 0.5, detectors with different
detection capabilities will have very different PODs in a reliability test with
such a choice of depths. If the same number of targets is buried shallowly (or
very deeply), most of them will be detected (or missed) by all detectors and
there would be no statistically significant difference between them. A larger
total number of mines would be necessary to allow more reliable conclusions,
which also means a longer test, with considerably higher costs. It is therefore
not recommendable to choose only small depths in a test.
However, choosing only depths producing POD = 0.5 would also not be
the best choice. The slope of the POD curve of some detectors might be
very low and the POD at depth zero might not approach 1. Less stable
detectors with a high variance of the MDH measurements would have that
property. We would lose all knowledge about the detector performance at
small depths if we did not choose smaller depths for the test. Most detectors
can detect many shallowly buried targets easily, but the possible exceptions
to this rule are important, since most mines in minefields are found at very
small depths.
The most appropriate solution is to place the targets to depths between
zero and a depth at which P̂OD is expected to be smaller than 0.5 for all
detectors in the test (or in other words for the most sensitive detector). The
MDH measurements of the most sensitive detector in the test can serve as
a guidance in choosing the largest depth. If the MDH is not known during
the test planning, it needs to be estimated. As discussed in Section 8.7, the
P̂OD will be about 0.5 or below for depths equal to the MDH. It follows from
Equation (8.14) that the P̂OD will fall bellow 0.16 at depths equal to MDH
increased by the estimated standard deviation of the MDH measurements.
It is therefore pointless to place some targets in a reliability test beyond
that depth, since the design would be less efficient if some targets would be
buried to depths at which they could hardly be detected.
For the construction of POD curves, it is recommended to bury the
131
targets at equally spaced depths, as, for example, in the Benkovac 2003
tests or in lanes 5, 7 and 8 of the Oberjettenberg November 2003 tests. To
avoid difficulties like those in the Benkovac 2005 tests, when the regression
model could not be used, the targets should be buried in smaller steps, for
example, to 1, 2, 3, . . . cm. Choosing fewer depths has the advantage that a
simpler statistical evaluation is possible, that is, the results for each depth
can be analysed separately, as done in Oberjettenberg November 2003 tests
with PMN in lane 5 (see Figure 8.15 on page 111 and the corresponding
discussion).
8.8.4 Human Factor
The third element guiding the design of experiment is the human factor. It
has been shown in some investigations in the area of non-destructive testing
that the persons involved in the test can have a large influence on the test
results (see Section 3.4 and [73]). The metal detector trials described in this
thesis lead to the same conclusion. The influences of the human factor are
the most difficult to reproduce in a test. It follows from the discussion in
Subsection 8.3.4 that most reasons for PODs lower than in reality can be
attributed to the human factor. Most of all, the absence of danger decreases
the alertness of the operators. The time pressure causes a faster progression
through the lanes with a lower concentration than in a minefield. The
training is necessarily shorter than in practice. During the test, about one
day per detector model is the maximum affordable, due to limited financial
resources, while it is customary to train professional deminers at least a
week for a new detector model before they use it in a minefield. In a well
designed experiment the operators change the detector models very often,
with little time to get accustomed to the next device. All these effects need
to be taken into account and all efforts have to be made to reduce them by
careful planning and execution of the trials.
It is probably impossible to achieve that the operators have the same
concentration as in a minefield, since the strongest motivator for thorough-
ness, a life threatening danger, is not present in a trial. Other ways have
to be found to enhance motivation, like competitiveness, curiosity, sense of
duty and importance of the work, etc.
The time pressure on the operators has to be reduced by careful planning
of the trial. The number of runs per day and per person should not be too
high, three or four runs on 30-m lanes are recommended.
It is very important to choose currently active deminers for tests, since
they will actually perform the clearance operations. The deminers chosen
for the test should be randomly chosen from the group of deminers who
would later operate the detectors in real minefields.
The training should be as long as possible. However, one day of training
for each detector model seems to be sufficient for the operators to feel confi-
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dence in a detector. The training should be adapted to the requirements of
the test. The operators do not need to master the detectors as thoroughly
as they would for their work in a minefield. They should feel that they can
reliably detect the targets used in the trial buried in the soils selected for the
trial. Additional short “refreshment trainings” can be organised during the
trial and a competent person should be available to help the operators in
some problem situations and to supervise and correct their work. Further
investigations are needed to evaluate the influence of training on the test
results.
Most changes of the experimental design, from the first trial in May
2003 to the last one in 2005, had the aim of improving the influence of the
human factor. The workload was lower in the second Oberjettenberg trial
and even lower in the last Benkovac trial. Professional deminers were used
in both Benkovac trials. In the first two trials, the operators had on average
8 starts per day; in the Oberjettenberg November 2003 trials, 4-6 starts; and
in the Benkovac May 2005 trials, maximum 2 starts a day. Some elements of
the local standard operating procedures (supervision of the section leader,
personal protective equipment) were introduced to increase the attention of
the operators. With a crossover design applied in Oberjettenberg November
2003 and Benkovac May 2005 trials, the operators had to switch between
fewer metal detectors. That reduced the stress, since they could concentrate
on fewer detector models.
All these changes are visible in the results. The two Oberjettenberg
test results were compared, as well as the two Benkovac test results. The
improvements of the experimental design and organisation of the trials have
lead to:
1. higher PODs,
2. better distinction between the detectors,
3. smaller variability between deminers.
The PODs were especially higher at smaller depths, because pinpointing
was more precise. It is equally important that the detectors are better
distinguishable in the last trials. Finally, in the Benkovac 2005 trial, there
were no significant differences between the results of the operators.
The finding that the currently active and skilled operators performed
similarly is important. It has the consequence that any confounding between
operators and any other factor is relatively small. This can help in the
planning of future tests.
Some blind tests were performed in actual minefields [46, 47]. For obvious
reasons detection capabilities cannot be tested in such trials; only detectors
with a proved ability to detect the expected threat can be applied in a
minefield. Some other properties of metal detectors were tested in this
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way. The major problem of such tests is the lack of control over the testing
conditions. It is very difficult or sometimes impossible to distinguish the
influence of different factors, for example, the influence of the vegetation
from the influence of the differences between detector models. An evaluation
based on such tests is liable to many subjective estimates, and transparent
reporting is very difficult. Apart from all these shortcomings, an important
benefit of such trials is the opinion of the deminers who participate in the
trials and who would work with the tested equipment.
There were some ideas to perform a detection reliability test in a con-
tinuation of a live minefield [6], or in a simulated minefield, so that the
deminers would believe they are in a minefield and they would not know
that their detectors are being tested. The behaviour of deminers would thus
not change. Real mines rendered safe would be used. The conditions of the
test would be better controlled than in a real minefield. The detection ca-
pabilities of the detectors would be evaluated in such a trial. This is hardly
achievable for many reasons.
1. Sample size. Most of the mines would have to be placed shallowly,
as they are in real minefields. It has been shown in Subsection 8.8.3
that a very large area and a long time would be needed to achieve
statistical significance. That would cause high costs.
2. Keeping the secrecy. Deminers often know the area and know the
locations of minefields. They have often a good contact with the local
population. Monitoring would be difficult, the deminers would notice
that ‘something unusual’ is happening.
3. Safety issues after the tests. At latest after the trial, the deminers
would find out that they had participated in a test. They would never
be sure in future, whether they are in a real minefield, or they partic-
ipate in a test. This could be dangerous for their future safety.
For the safety of the end user of the land, it is of high interest to know how
many mines are actually found and how many missed. Some believe that it
is possible to organise tests that would answer this question. The author of
these lines very strongly believes that no tests can answer that question, even
if they are designed for that purpose. All the problems discussed previously
in this section speak in favour of this conclusion.
A better way to estimate the actual detection rates is to investigate acci-
dents on areas proclaimed cleared and in minefields during clearance. Even
then, the estimates of the number of missed mines will be only rough spec-
ulations, but still more reliable than speculations based on a much smaller
data sample collected in a limited range of conditions reproduced in a test.
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8.8.5 Improvements of Experimental Design
The former discussion was about the human factor influences and the ap-
propriate choice of factor levels. A few words should also be said about how
these factor levels are combined in an experiment, or about the choice of
treatments.
The basic approach proposed in this thesis is that of the Graeco-Latin
square. The modifications of the experimental design explained and dis-
cussed in this chapter enabled the analysis of a selection of some factor
levels, that is, an unbiased comparison of detectors in each soil type with
each target separately. The design was changed to be closer to a full facto-
rial design with the aim to reduce the operator-detector confounding when
the results are analysed in each soil type separately.
If there is some confounding between the operators and the detectors, it
is smaller if the differences between the operators are less pronounced. It
has been shown, especially in Benkovac July 2003 tests, that the variability
among experienced well trained currently active deminers is much smaller
than the variability between persons who do not work daily with a metal
detector. This is an additional reason why currently active deminers should
be chosen for a test. The first and the more important reason was mentioned
earlier in this section: the operators should represent the persons who would
use the detectors in minefields.
When some factor levels are selected from the full data set, the total
number of opportunities to detect a target is smaller than for the full data
set. Consequently the confidence intervals are wider. This is why the number
of soils and target types should be as small as possible. However, the number
of operators should be as large as possible, since operator is a nuisance factor.
The targets should be buried to depths in smaller steps, as discussed earlier
in this section.
8.8.6 Maximum Detection Height and Reliability Tests
The maximum detection height (MDH) measurements were compared with
the reliability test results in Section 8.7. The MDH measurements provide
information about the maximum possible performance of a metal detector
in a reliability test. MDH measurements can therefore be used for a pres-
election of metal detectors before the reliability test. MDH measurements
take considerably less time and their preparation requires fewer resources.
However, detection reliability tests include more of the human factor influ-
ences and thus more closely represent the realistic demining conditions. It is
also important that the false alarm rate can be evaluated only in reliability
tests. This is why it is highly recommended that the final decision about
the acquisition of metal detectors is based on the results of reliability tests.
If there is no possibility for organising a detection reliability test, then
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the metal detector has to be chosen based on MDH measurements. If there
is a statistically significant difference between the average MDHs of two de-
tectors, the detector with the higher average will be chosen. If the difference
is not significant, the choice has to be done based both on the averages and
on the estimated standard deviations. A detector with a higher MDH might
not be the best choice. Namely, a detector with the slightly higher MDH,
but with a much higher standard deviation of MDH would miss more of the
shallowly buried mines.
The criterion for the comparison of the tested metal detectors needs to
be defined prior to the test. That criterion could be the target depth h0.95
at which the POD equals 0.95, POD(h0.95) = 0.95. This POD is estimated
from the MDH measurements as described in 8.7. The estimated depth hˆ0.95
equals
hˆ0.95 =MDH − Z0.95 · σˆ (8.15)
where σˆ is the estimated standard deviation of the MDH measurements and
the Z0.95 is the upper 0.95 percentage point of the normal distribution.
Another possible approach would be to specify a depth and to compare
P̂OD’s at that depth using Equation (8.14).
8.9 Conclusions
Detection reliability tests come closest to representing the real field condi-
tions in humanitarian demining. Most important, they include a large part
of the human factor influences. Each test design is a compromise between
the fully representative conditions and cost effectiveness.
A reliable estimate of the detector performance is possible only with
a scientifically planned experiment. Statistical design of experiment leads
to smaller experimental errors and reduces bias. In this thesis, fractional
factorial designs based on the Graeco-Latin square have been proposed as
a solution to the experimental problem. The subsequent changes to the
design enabled an unbiased comparison of detectors in each soil and with
each target model separately. The results were reported in the form of ROC
diagrams and POD curves, with estimated uncertainties. With the help of
these tools, it was possible to distinguish the metal detectors and to evaluate
their performance in dependence on target depth.
An important part of the experiment planning is the choice of factor
levels. The number of target types and soil types should be as small as
possible to have a larger data set for each target-soil combination. The
soils and the targets have to be representative of the regions where the
metal detectors would be eventually used. The target depths have to be
systematically chosen to enable an evaluation of the dependency of POD
on depth. The targets can be buried to depths in smaller steps and the
dependency of POD on depth can be evaluated with a regression model.
136
The depths should be chosen so that the estimated PODs are approximately
between 0.5 and 1, depending on the depth.
The human factor has a large influence on the test results and it is the
most difficult to reproduce in a test. Most of all, the absence of danger de-
creases the alertness of the operators, and this problem is inevitably present
in all tests of demining equipment. All other influences, however, can be
reduced. The planned workload on the operators should not be too high,
to avoid time pressure. The training needs to be sufficiently long; one day
per detector model is probably sufficient. It is essential to choose currently
active and skilled deminers for a test, since they would later use the tested
equipment in a minefield. The application of some elements of the local stan-
dard operating procedures may have a positive influence on the attention of
the operators.
The design and the organisation of the experiments described in this
chapter had been improved to meet all these requirements. The improve-
ments have caused an increase of the PODs, a better distinction of the metal
detectors and a smaller variability between the operators.
The maximum detection height measurements provide the information
about the best possible performance of a metal detector in a reliability test.
Both the variance and the mean are important indicators of the detection
capabilities of metal detectors. The variability is mostly caused by the
operators and by the electronics of the devices. Only repeated measurements
in a scientifically planned experiment can provide an estimate of the variance
and provide reliable results and an unbiased comparison of the equipment
and the personnel under test.
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Chapter 9
Proposals for Update of
CWA 14747:2003
This chapter contains proposals for changes of the CWA 14747:2003, the
standard for testing metal detectors for humanitarian demining [26]. The
proposals are based on the experiences gained during the metal detector
trials described in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. These experiences include the ex-
periences with the statistical design of experiments, data evaluation and
reporting, and practical experiences from the field. The first section of this
chapter deals with maximum detection height measurements, since most of
the tests described in the CWA 14747:2003 are based on the maximum de-
tection height. The topic of the second section are the detection reliability
tests. The chapter is closed with conclusions, containing a summary of all
recommended changes.
9.1 Maximum Detection Height Measurements
9.1.1 Uncertainty of Maximum Detection Height Measure-
ments
Almost all tests of the detection abilities of metal detectors described in the
CWA 14747:2003 have the maximum detection height (MDH) as a response
variable. The CWA 14747:2003 defines the MDH as “the maximum height
above a test target at which a metal detector at given settings produces a
true alarm indication due to that target.”
All laboratory tests of metal detectors performed up to the present and
having the MDH as a response variable were one-factor tests, meaning that
the variable of interest was varied, while all other predictor variables were
kept constant. These tests usually included only one measurement for each
factor level, so that the variability of the results could not be estimated.
However, repeating the measurements is essential for MDH measurements
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because they have a large variability. An obvious advantage of laboratory
measurements is that they are performed in controlled conditions. However,
if the experimenter disregards some predictor variables (most importantly,
the detector setup and the operator), than his experimental conditions will
only apparently be controlled and his conclusions will not be valid. A simple
advice to repeat the measurements is not sufficient for an experimenter to
design an experiment. He needs to take into account all variables influencing
the MDH to design an unbiased experiment and to reach reliable conclusions.
The predictor variables associated with the MDH as a response variable
and included in the CWA 14747:2003 are:
1. sweep speed,
2. setup of the detector,
3. time after the detector is adjusted for use (the effect is called sensitivity
drift),
4. orientation of the search head,
5. shaft extension,
6. moisture on the search head,
7. temperature extremes (0 ◦C and 60 ◦C),
8. temperature shock,
9. battery life,
10. soil electromagnetic properties,
11. electromagnetic properties of media other than soil (magnetic stones,
bricks, pottery, etc.), and
12. ground compensation performed on strongly magnetic media (e.g. mag-
netic rocks) influencing the MDHmeasurements in less magnetic media
(e.g. cooperative soils).
Here we do not mention the metal detector and the target, since they are
included in the definition of the MDH. Remembering the experimental re-
sults presented in Chapters 7 and 8, we see that an important predictor
variable is missing in the standard: the operator. The differences between
the operators have been proven to have an important influence on the re-
sults of MDH measurements (see Subsection 7.5.1). We have solid grounds
to believe that the differences between operators who are not professional
deminers are even larger, as it is certainly the case with the reliability tests
(see Subsection 8.8.4).
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Another predictor variable deserving our special attention is the setup.
The setup cannot be controlled like all other predictor variables. If the ex-
perimental goal is to compare the maximum detection heights of different
metal detectors, it is essential that the measurements with the same de-
tector are performed with repeated setups. If measurements with only one
setup were performed, the setup would cause a systematic error and the
experimenter would come to biased conclusions.
To compare the MDHs of different detector models, the experimenter
does not need to include all predictor variables in his experiment as fac-
tors. (As defined in Section 5.1, predictor variables are called factors if they
are deliberately varied during the test with the intention of measuring their
influence on the response variable.) Some of the predictor variables have
a more important influence than the others. These are the soil (or other
medium), the setup and the operator. If the experimental goal is to com-
pare metal detectors, these variables have to be included in the experiment
as factors. Their influence is more relevant because they always affect the
performance of metal detectors, while the other predictor variables in most
realistic situations are constant most of the time. There are possible excep-
tions to this rule, in which case the variable with some relevant influence
should be included in the experiment.
When the predictor variables described here as less relevant are not con-
stant, they can change the performance of metal detectors significantly. It is
recommended to evaluate their influence in separate one-factor experiments,
or in multiple-factor experiments, with a fixed setup, operator and medium,
which can be the air. The setup and the operator would thus form a block
and the measurements would be repeated with several blocks. Crossover
design should be applied in all one-factor experiments, meaning that the
order of execution of the measurements with two levels of the principal fac-
tor should be chosen randomly. There are some obvious exceptions to the
rules exposed in this paragraph, for example, the influence of temperature
extremes cannot be evaluated with the setup as a block. However, it is be-
yond the scope of this work to go into details of the evaluation of each factor
separately.
An example of an experiment with the setup as a block are the MDH
measurements performed in Benkovac in 2005 and described in Chapter 7.
For the purposes of comparison of PMA-S and PMA-2, the in-air measure-
ments in each row of Table 7.1 were performed with the same setup, the
same detector and by the same person.
The setup cannot be used as a block over the levels of the factor “detec-
tor”, since it is a nested factor, nested in the levels of the factor “detector”.
In other words, “setup no. 1” over several detector types is meaningless.
A question arises, whether it is possible to evaluate the influence of
the setup independently from the experimental error. If every measure-
ment is performed with a new setup, the influence of the setup will not
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be distinguishable from other causes of the experimental error. In such an
experiment, if all predictor variables listed in this subsection including the
operator are included in the design of experiment, the experimental error
would be caused by:
 the setup (including the operator’s influence on the setup),
 the uncertainty of the distance measurements,
 the subjectiveness of the operator (without the operator’s influence on
the setup),
 the fluctuations of the sensitivity due to the electronics of the device,
due to some unknown influences of the surroundings, or due to any
other unknown influences.
If the experimenter would wish to evaluate the influence of the setup,
he would have to plan a number of measurements with the same setup and
the setup would need to be varied. He would thus be able to separate the
influence of the setup from the remaining experimental error. The measure-
ments with the same setup do not need to be performed with other factor
levels fixed, but there need to be several measurements with the same setup.
However, such an experiment has never been executed, since it would be dif-
ficult, or even impossible, to conduct it in practice. In tests, metal detectors
are used with their highest achievable sensitivity. When they are set to their
highest sensitivity, they can be very instable, so that they need a frequent re-
calibration, i.e. a repeated setup. In practice, the subjective estimate of the
operator determines when a new setup is needed. When used on their high-
est sensitivity, metal detectors can work only a limited time with one setup
and only a limited number of measurements can be performed. This time
depends on many unknown factors and it can generally not be predicted.
It is therefore recommended to perform repeated measurements each
time with a new setup, if the experimental goal is to compare the MDHs
of several detector models. Thus the influence of the setup will be included
in the experimental error (as it was done in Benkovac May 2005 trial, see
Chapter 7). The influence of the setup on the experimental error is not
just an obstacle that needs to be avoided, but it is a necessary part of the
experiment.
The influence of the setup could be evaluated using another response
variable, for example, the output voltage. Such experiments, however, lie
beyond the interest of this dissertation.
From our discussions of the experimental error we see that it is pointless
to reduce the uncertainty of the distance measurements beyond the level
when the uncertainty is dominated by other contributions. This is why a
simple in-air measurement procedure as described in Chapter 7 is adequate
in most cases.
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9.1.2 Layout of Test Area and Execution of Measurements
The procedures for the in-soil MDH measurements on disarmed mines are
not specified in the CWA 14747:2003, although they are most important
among all MDH measurements. Measurements with small targets like stan-
dard test targets simulating metal mine components are described in clause
8.2.2 of the CWA 14747:2003. It is prescribed to use a small diameter tube
to place and move the targets. Measurements on mines would require larger
tubes. However, the use of larger tubes is not recommended, since some
detectors might produce an alarm tone as a reaction to the large cavity
in an uncooperative soil. The experimental results of the Benkovac July
2003 trial (presented in the project final report [76]) have shown that a re-
peated burial of a target to increasing depths displaces some soil volume
and thus changes the soil electromagnetic properties, consequently influenc-
ing the results. Clause 8.4.3 of the CWA 14747:2003 describes a so called
“fixed-depths detection test” with targets buried to depths of 0, 5, 10, 15
and 20 cm.
If the targets are buried to depths in smaller steps, than the maximum
detection height can be measured, provided that the targets have identi-
cal electromagnetic properties and that the soil is electromagnetically ho-
mogeneous. That is how the MDH measurements in the Oberjenttenberg
November 2003 trials were performed (with only one measurement per each
detector model) and also the Benkovac May 2005 measurements described
in Chapter 7 of this dissertation.
Clause 8.4.3 of the CWA 14747:2003 describing the fixed-depths detec-
tion tests prescribes that the search head is swept over the test area at a
height of 3 cm. This condition is not necessary and can be difficult to follow
in practice, which is why it was never followed in any of the tests mentioned
in this dissertation.
It is recommended to bury the targets in 1 cm steps, in an increasing
order, placed on a board, as described in Chapter 7. The experimenter needs
to make sure that the board does not change the signal of the tested metal
detectors. The detector search head shall be swept over the test area at a
height as close as possible to zero.
9.2 Detection Reliability Tests
9.2.1 Statistical Design of Experiment
The experimenter needs to decide how to combine the factor levels in a
reliability test. Unfortunately, it is not possible to give simple prescriptions
applicable to every experimental problem. Each trial is different: both the
available resources and the experimental goal differ from trial to trial. The
experimenter should be familiar with the principles of experimental design
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and approach every trial as a new experimental problem and a new challenge.
However, some general recommendations can be made.
It is recommended to use fractional factorial designs based on the Graeco-
Latin square. The experimenter usually wants to compare metal detectors
in each soil type and with each target separately. In order to meet this goal,
the design needs to be unconfounded with respect to soil type, detector
model, operator, target and target depth.
The number of soils and target types should be as small as possible,
so that the number of targets in each target-soil combination can be as
large as possible. The number of operators should be as large as possible,
since operator can be understood as a nuisance factor, in the sense that the
experimenter is not interested in the results of any particular operator. If
some earlier measurements (e.g. maximum detection height measurements)
imply that there is very little variation between specimens of the same metal
detector model, than only one specimen can be used in a reliability test. The
recommendation for the choice of target depths can be found in Subsection
9.2.5.
By applying a crossover design, it is possible to achieve that the operators
work with fewer detector models at a time. This is strongly recommended,
since it reduces stress on the operators.
9.2.2 Data Analysis and Reporting
It is specified in clause 8.5.7 of the CWA 14747:2003 that the number and
the location of true indications, of missed targets and of false indications
shall be reported. It is not specified how these numbers will be presented
and there is no mention of the uncertainty of the result.
It is recommended in this thesis that the results are presented in the
form of ROC diagrams and POD curves, with the corresponding measures
of uncertainty, as described in Subsection 8.2.2.
9.2.3 Choice of Targets
Targets which are certainly known to be detectable with all detector models
should not be included in the test. The same applies to extremely difficult
targets for which the expected POD is very close to 0 for all tested detectors.
The CWA 14747:2003, clause 8.5.3, gives a recommendation to use some
ITOP inserts (defined in [80] and described in the CWA 14747:2003) as
standard targets, to enable a comparison between the results of different
trials. However, the usefulness of such a procedure is quite limited. It is
very difficult to compare the results of two different tests because the test
results strongly depend on the conditions in which the tests are performed.
The ITOP inserts still have their place in test and evaluation: they can be
used for maximum detection height measurements, which are less subject to
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human factor influences, so that a comparison between trials is possible. The
in-air measurements of the maximum detection height with ITOP targets
can be used to evaluate the influence of many factors, e.g. moisture on the
search head, search head orientation, temperature extremes, battery life,
etc. However, it should be kept in mind that the final choice of the metal
detector has to be based on the measurements on the targets which represent
the local threat.
9.2.4 Target Layout
It is specified in the CWA 14747:2003 that the targets shall be buried to
random locations within a 1 m wide stripe placed in the middle of a lane,
which is 1.5 to 2 m wide. However, this condition is not sufficient: the
targets should be placed so that their entire detection halo lies within the
1-m stripe. If some halos partially lie outside of the 1-m stripe, there are
two problems. The first are indications falling in a halo, but outside of
the 1-m stripe. We cannot be sure if an indication falling in the halo but
outside of the lane is caused by the target or by a metal fragment from the
surroundings of the lane. This problem becomes more important if the lanes
are narrower than prescribed in the standard. The other problem is that the
operators might decide not to indicate the signal, since they are instructed
to look for targets inside the 1-m stripe. If the entire halo of each target lies
within this stripe, both problems are solved.
After the experimenter has chosen the target types for his test, one of
his first tasks is to determine the number of targets in a lane. The size
of the lane is usually known prior to the test. The location of each target
is random, respecting the limitations described in the previous paragraphs.
Due to these limitations, the number of targets per lane will be limited.
It is, of course, desirable to have as many targets as possible. However,
if the number of targets per square metre exceeds approximately 1.2, the
target positions start to form some patterns, what should be avoided. It is
recommendable to leave some parts of the lane empty, but empty areas are
very likely to occur if the targets are placed to random positions and if their
number is close to 1 per square metre. It is therefore recommended that the
average number of targets per square metre is between 1 and 1.2.
9.2.5 Target Depths
The targets should be placed to depths between zero and a depth at which
P̂OD is expected to be smaller than 0.5 for the most sensitive detector in
the test. As discussed in Section 8.7, the P̂OD will be about 0.5 or lower for
depths equal to the maximum detection height.
For the construction of POD curves, it is recommended to bury the
targets to depths in equal steps. If the experimenter uses a regression model
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containing an assumption about the dependency of POD on depth, than
it is recommended to bury the targets in smaller steps, for example, to
1, 2, 3, . . . cm. However, choosing fewer depths has the advantage that a
simpler statistical evaluation is possible, without any assumptions about the
dependency of POD on depth. In that case, the results for each depth will
be analysed separately, based on the assumption of a binomial distribution.
(an example is given in Subsection 8.5.3, Figure 8.15, page 111).
9.2.6 Operators
It is recommended in the CWA 14747:2003 that the operators “should be
representative of the operators that would use the detector in the field”.
This recommendation should be stronger: it is essential to choose currently
active deminers for tests, since they represent the persons who will actually
perform the clearance operations. The deminers chosen for the test should
be randomly chosen from the group of deminers who would later operate
the detectors in minefields.
The operators should feel no time pressure. The number of runs per day
and per person should not be too high, about three or four runs per day on
30-m lanes are recommended. If the lanes are shorter, the number of runs
can be greater.
Time taken for training should be as long as possible. However, one day
of training for each detector model seems to be sufficient for the operators
to feel confidence in a detector.
Some elements of the local standard operating procedures could be ap-
plied to improve the concentration of the operators and to make their work
similar to their daily routine. These elements could be the presence of a
section leader performing quality assurance, or the wearing of personal pro-
tective equipment.
9.3 Conclusions
The standard for testing metal detectors in humanitarian demining CWA
14747:2003 needs a thorough revision. A simple specification of some details
of the tests incompletely described in the standard would not adequately
reflect the current knowledge. In this chapter we discussed the measurements
based on the maximum detection height and the detection reliability tests.
Maximum Detection Height. Two important predictor variables
are neglected in the standard CWA 14747:2003: the operator and the setup.
We need to make a difference between two kinds of experiments. The
first has the experimental goal of comparing the in-soil maximum detec-
tion heights of several detectors. In this kind of experiment, it is essential
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that the measurements with the same detector are performed with repeated
setups and with several operators. It is necessary to design the experiment
so that the setup and the operators are included in the experimental design
as factors. It is recommended that repeated measurements be made each
time with a new setup. Thus the setup cannot be evaluated independently
from the experimental error.
The second kind of experiment has the goal of evaluating the influence
of variables other than the medium, setup, or the operator. These vari-
ables are: the sweep speed, the time after the detector is adjusted for use,
the orientation of the search head, the shaft extension, the moisture on the
search head, temperature extremes, and the temperature shock. If the in-
fluence of one of these variables proves to be important, that variable can
be included in the first kind of experiments as a factor. In the second kind
of experiments, it is recommended to perform one-factor or multiple-factor
in-air measurements with the operators and the setup as a block, whenever
possible. Crossover design should be applied in all one-factor experiments:
the order of execution of the measurements with two levels of the principal
factor should be chosen randomly. The first kind of experiment is more rele-
vant than the second one, since it evaluates the influences which are always
present in the field.
For the in-soil measurements with larger targets like mines, it is rec-
ommended that the targets be buried at depths varied in 1-cm steps. It
is recommended that repeated measurements be conducted according to a
carefully prepared design of experiment, in which the setup and the opera-
tors are varied in accordance with the principles of experimental design. The
reported results should include at least the average MDHs, the estimated
errors and the detailed design of the experiment.
Detection Reliability Tests. It is recommended to use fractional
factorial design based on the Graeco-Latin square. The operator has to
be included in the design as one of the factors. The experimenter usually
wants to compare metal detectors in each soil type and with each target
separately. In order to meet this goal, the design needs to be unconfounded
with respect to soil type, detector model, target and target depth. This can
be achieved by permuting the operators or the detectors. The application
of a crossover design is recommended, since it allows the operators to work
with fewer detector models at a time.
The number of soils and target types should be kept as small as possible,
so that the number of targets within each target-soil combination is as large
as possible. The number of operators should be as large as possible. If
earlier experiments confirm that the specimens of the same detector model
are very similar, than only one needs to be used in a reliability test.
When choosing targets, preference should be given to disarmed mines
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representing the local threat, rather than to standard test targets simulating
mine components. The targets should be placed with their entire halo areas
within the 1 metre wide stripe placed in the middle of the lane. The number
of targets in the lane should be between 1 and 1.2 per m2. They should be
buried to depths between zero and the maximum detection height of the
most sensitive detector in the test.
It should be emphasized more strongly that professional deminers should
operate the metal detectors in the trial. One day of training per detector
model is probably sufficient for them to gain confidence in the detectors.
The recommended daily number of runs per person is 3 to 4 if the lanes
are 30 metre long. Some elements of the local operating procedures can be
applied to ease the concentration of the operators.
It is recommended to report the results of reliability tests in the form
of ROC diagrams and POD curves, with the corresponding measures of
uncertainty. They are described in Section 8.2.2.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions
The aim of this work was to set up a design of experiment for testing and
evaluation of the equipment and methods used in manual mine clearance.
Most of the work deals with metal detector tests, since the metal detec-
tor is the most common detection tool in humanitarian demining. Other
demining methods considered in this thesis are manual excavation methods.
Detectors and excavation methods need to be compared reliably, regarding
their conditions of application, so that the most suitable device or demining
method can be selected for given conditions of use. A reliable estimate of
the detector performance is possible only with a scientifically planned exper-
iment. Statistical design of experiment leads to smaller experimental errors
and reduces bias.
Comparative Trial of Manual Mine Clearance Methods. The
trial was performed in November 2004, in Mozambique, as a part of the
Study of Manual Mine Clearance [36] managed by the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining. The results of the trial were highly
biased, because not all methods were tested by the same personnel. In
future tests, more care should be taken that the methods are tested in
similar conditions. Most importantly, they should be tested by the same
operators. However, these tests gave valuable lessons about the treatment
of the human factor in reliability tests. The work of the deminers in a
reliability test should follow a procedure similar to their standard operating
procedures applied in their daily work.
Maximum Detection Height Measurements. Maximum detec-
tion height (MDH) measurements were performed during the trials in Ober-
jettenberg, Germany, and in Benkovac, Croatia, in 2003 and 2005. The
measurements in Croatia in 2005 were the first in which the uncertainty was
estimated from the measurement results. These measurements have shown
that the MDH has a high variability that has to be taken into account in
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all experiments. That variability was caused by the differences between the
operators, by the setup, and by the remaining sources of the experimental
error, which are the changing subjectivity of the operators, the instability
of the hardware between two setups, and the uncertainty of the measure-
ments of the distance between the search head and the target. A comparison
with the results of reliability tests have shown that the MDH provides the
information about the best possible performance of a metal detector in a
reliability test.
Many experiments described in the standard for testing metal detectors
CWA 14747:2003 are experiments with the MDH as a response variable.
The influences of the setup and the operator are not adequately treated in
the standard. It is recommended that two kinds of experiments are defined
in the next update of CWA 14747:2003. The first kind should include the
setup, the soil (or an other medium) and the operator as factors in the design
of experiment. In these experiments, the experimental goal is to compare
the in-soil maximum detection heights of several detectors in each soil type
separately. The measurements with the same detector should be performed
with repeated setups and with several operators. Thus the setup could
not be evaluated independent of the experimental error. The experiment
performed in Croatia in 2005 and described in Chapter 7 belongs to this
group of experiments.
The second kind of experiments should be experiments evaluating the in-
fluence of other predictor variables than the medium, setup or the operator.
These predictor variables are: the sweep speed, the time after the detector is
adjusted for use, the orientation of the search head, the shaft extension, the
moisture on the search head, temperature extremes, and the temperature
shock. To evaluate the influence of these predictor variables, it is recom-
mended to perform one-factor or multiple-factor in-air measurements with
the operators and the setup as a block, if possible. Crossover design needs
to be applied in all one-factor experiments, i.e. the order of execution of
the measurements with two levels of the principal factor should be chosen
randomly. If the influence of some of these variables is both relevant and
statistically significant, than it can be included in the design of experiment
of the first kind.
Detection Reliability Tests. The reliability tests described in Chap-
ter 8 of this thesis were performed in Oberjettenberg, Germany, and in
Benkovac, Croatia, in 2003 and 2005.
Detection reliability tests come closest to representing the real field con-
ditions in demining. However, each test design is a compromise between
fully representative conditions and cost effectiveness. In this thesis, a frac-
tional factorial design based on the Graeco-Latin square has been proposed
as a solution to the experimental problem. The subsequent changes to the
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design enabled an unbiased comparison of detectors in each soil and with
each target model separately. The crossover design allowed the operators to
work with fewer detector models at a time. The results were reported in the
form of ROC diagrams and POD curves, with the corresponding measures
of uncertainty. It is recommended that the design of experiment, the data
analysis and the reporting proposed in this thesis be included in the update
of the standard for testing metal detectors CWA 14747:2003.
It is not possible to give exact prescriptions for a design of experiment
applicable to every experimental problem. Each trial is different: both the
available resources and the experimental goal differ from trial to trial. The
experimenter should be familiar with the principles of experimental design
and approach every trial as a new problem and a new challenge.
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Appendix: Target Positions
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Table 1: List of targets, Oberjettenberg, May 2003. The coordinates x and
y mark the positions in the lane, while h denotes the depth measured from
the soil surface to the top of the target. All measures in centimetres.
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All passes were performed in Lane 4.
Table 2: List of targets, Benkovac, July 2003. The coordinates x and y mark
the positions in the lane, while h denotes the depth measured from the soil
surface to the top of the target. All measures in centimetres.
153
x,
 y
 - 
po
si
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
la
ne
 (c
m
)
h 
- d
ep
th
 m
ea
su
re
d 
fro
m
 th
e 
so
il 
su
rfa
ce
 to
 th
e 
to
p 
of
 th
e 
ta
rg
et
 (c
m
)
ta
rg
et
ha
lo
 
ra
di
us
h
x
y
h
x
y
h
x
y
h
x
y
h
x
y
h
x
y
h
x
y
1.
10
0C
r6
 b
al
l
11
10
10
2
74
10
96
42
5
10
98
16
60
10
89
81
5
10
38
96
0
10
82
13
00
10
55
19
05
2.
C
0
10
5
94
24
0
5
96
11
80
5
88
16
2
5
12
4
31
5
81
35
8
5
34
82
0
5
48
81
0
3.
E
0
10
5
34
16
08
5
96
17
70
5
20
13
70
5
11
9
16
57
5
96
13
91
5
96
19
25
5
81
13
76
4.
G
0
10
5
98
10
25
5
23
18
78
5
64
15
98
5
81
44
0
5
60
13
11
5
47
74
5
5
93
28
5
5.
I0
10
5
37
65
2
5
77
18
2
5
68
80
8
5
41
34
5
5
64
15
20
5
27
78
5
34
87
5
6.
K
0
10
5
71
95
3
5
58
30
6
5
27
12
85
5
46
49
8
5
31
29
8
5
95
17
90
5
45
22
5
7.
M
au
s
14
5
56
47
0
3
50
49
2
83
50
0
2
72
17
7
20
42
21
0
20
93
28
3
20
86
10
03
8.
M
au
s
14
4
89
13
15
1
28
91
0
2
31
96
0
2
60
13
76
0
10
6
26
0
0
37
49
5
0
81
18
38
9.
M
au
s
14
5
10
7
16
53
3
55
10
60
1
87
14
27
1
79
15
85
5
82
62
5
5
91
87
2
5
35
73
0
10
.M
au
s
14
5
32
18
47
2
10
4
19
72
2
31
19
27
1
10
5
19
06
13
33
11
40
13
86
14
23
13
90
39
6
11
.M
au
s
14
5
38
14
40
5
75
15
30
5
67
12
95
12
.M
au
s
14
10
95
17
59
10
53
18
57
10
29
11
07
13
.M
au
s
14
5
93
18
50
5
32
17
32
5
31
16
32
14
.P
M
N
16
5
35
27
0
15
96
10
5
3
14
11
9
2
60
86
5
38
53
3
5
10
4
64
6
5
64
66
0
15
.P
M
N
16
17
70
14
40
3
56
15
56
15
91
75
0
3
12
8
39
2
0
90
75
0
0
85
22
5
0
37
11
86
16
.P
M
N
16
5
46
16
98
2
11
0
18
75
2
84
93
4
15
49
63
0
5
92
12
44
5
37
67
8
5
50
17
70
17
.M
S
3
16
10
39
67
1
10
45
61
0
10
71
13
3
18
.M
S
3
16
13
90
84
0
13
92
15
99
13
96
11
35
19
.M
S
3
16
20
94
99
5
20
91
45
0
20
89
19
66
20
.M
S
3
16
5
33
16
80
5
35
11
35
5
45
14
95
21
.P
P
M
- 2
16
4
10
3
12
3
2
29
60
7
3
37
63
3
2
12
1
14
0
22
.P
P
M
-2
16
5
88
62
4
2
31
10
99
3
89
12
15
2
13
0
92
8
23
.P
P
M
- 2
16
4
98
15
40
2
10
3
14
38
3
28
16
58
3
12
9
12
53
24
.P
T-
M
i-B
a-
III
11
8
41
17
8
5
91
13
68
7
55
25
9
25
.P
T-
M
i-B
a-
III
11
8
75
12
11
6
38
19
45
5
57
18
76
26
.S
ch
A
M
i D
M
 3
1
15
7
47
12
78
5
28
12
56
5
86
65
4
6
12
0
21
6
27
.T
M
-4
6
25
8
42
38
6
35
18
11
5
78
39
7
5
62
30
1
28
.T
M
-6
2 
M
26
17
44
45
9
15
72
67
5
5
33
10
79
15
94
11
71
10
67
48
0
10
83
37
1
10
86
17
03
29
.T
M
-6
2 
M
26
7
42
15
06
6
36
16
39
16
36
15
10
6
98
14
90
30
.P
M
A
- S
11
5
58
49
1
5
36
55
8
5
37
37
5
91
52
5
5
27
63
31
.P
M
A
-S
11
0
82
11
1
0
94
10
84
0
84
12
40
32
.P
M
A
-S
11
13
96
17
0
13
70
12
20
13
88
15
72
33
.P
M
A
-S
11
20
23
80
0
20
78
10
17
20
45
56
0
34
.P
M
A
-S
11
7
40
10
54
5
61
81
6
6
75
56
5
52
88
5
5
91
16
71
5
98
76
8
35
.P
M
A
-S
11
6
36
13
65
5
77
18
28
10
54
10
70
10
10
0
11
8
10
33
14
23
36
.P
M
A
-S
11
5
79
16
20
5
58
19
62
5
50
95
5
P
os
iti
on
s 
of
 th
e 
m
in
es
 k
ep
t f
ro
m
 th
e 
M
ay
 T
ria
ls
 (L
an
es
 1
-4
)
IT
O
P
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
ta
rg
et
s
P
os
iti
on
s 
of
 th
e 
m
in
es
 a
na
lo
go
us
 to
 th
e 
B
en
ko
va
c 
tri
al
s 
(L
an
es
 5
-8
)
La
ne
 1
La
ne
 7
La
ne
 5
Annex 7: Oberjettenberg November, Target Positions
La
ne
 4
La
ne
 3
La
ne
 2
La
ne
 8
Table 3: List of targets, Oberjettenberg, November 2003. The coordinates
x and y mark the positions in the lane, while h denotes the depth measured
from the soil surface to the top of the target. All measures in centimetres.
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    Lane 1 Lane 2 Lane 3 Lane 4 
  mine type halo r. depth x y x y x y x y 
1. PMA-1A 13 5 31 90 35 343 33 362 71 196 
2. PMA-1A 13 5 85 704 63 496 20 947 18 233 
3. PMA-1A 13 5 74 1147 76 1978 48 1553 53 910 
4. PMA-1A 13 5 80 1736 16 2490 54 1721 25 2000
5. PMA-1A 13 5 72 2368 43 2862 78 2072 60 2482
6. PMA-1A 13 10 70 50 79 288 30 479 21 121 
7. PMA-1A 13 10 82 265 32 878 27 660 24 1243
8. PMA-1A 13 10 57 433 72 1833 17 1155 83 2023
9. PMA-1A 13 10 41 820 71 2183 72 1607 14 2538
10. PMA-1A 13 10 66 2567 74 2393 73 2521 41 2747
11. PMA-1A 13 15 36 718 62 401 72 524 40 511 
12. PMA-1A 13 15 25 1550 34 787 53 890 74 1113
13. PMA-1A 13 15 65 2010 82 1349 64 1863 84 1272
14. PMA-1A 13 15 19 2256 20 1654 65 1940 75 1695
15. PMA-1A 13 15 84 2634 75 2617 16 2740 77 2546
16. PMA-2 10 0 40 1215 69 50 64 87 71 449 
17. PMA-2 10 0 85 1450 38 996 59 1009 47 1366
18. PMA-2 10 0 25 1745 48 1582 16 2114 85 2266
19. PMA-2 10 0 70 2776 31 1915 74 2340 30 2626
20. PMA-2 10 0 12 2820 64 2108 86 2443 55 2847
21. PMA-2 10 5 56 912 17 80 28 2012 77 115 
22. PMA-2 10 5 26 1116 19 151 40 2218 21 680 
23. PMA-2 10 5 83 1340 73 1078 42 2396 63 800 
24. PMA-2 10 5 42 1618 22 2319 23 2548 29 1589
25. PMA-2 10 5 62 1952 45 2544 67 2790 23 2288
26. PMA-2 10 10 27 548 16 1990 24 283 33 31 
27. PMA-2 10 10 50 633 52 2259 82 1089 28 372 
28. PMA-2 10 10 34 1362 20 2685 20 1261 61 637 
29. PMA-2 10 10 52 2443 70 2732 47 1808 67 2212
30. PMA-2 10 10 27 2625 82 2819 64 2668 77 2689
 
Table 4: List of targets, Benkovac, May 2005. The coordinates x and y
mark the positions in the lane, while h denotes the depth measured from
the soil surface to the top of the target. All measures in centimetres.
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